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ABSTRACT

SHADWORTH HODGSON AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WILLIAM JAMES:
EXPERIENCE, TELEOLOGY AND REALISM

by
RICHARD PAUL HIGH
UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 1978

In the last fifteen years there has been a renaissance of scholarly
activity on the psychological thought of William James from both the Con
tinental and Anglo-American philosophical traditions.

These works are

illuminating in a number of respects, as James did anticipate a number of
the central themes of contemporary phenomenology and logical positivism.
A problem which pervades this literature, however, is that it is method
ologically presentistic.

That is, it tends to view the past, in this case

James's Principles of Psychology, out of its historical context, focussing
instead on its distinctively modern aspects.

The result is that James is

portrayed as a thinker who was moving toward either a phenomenology or
logical positivism, depending on the predisposition of a particular writer.
This study seeks to redress this problem by examining the origin and
development of the fundamental themes and/or theories in James's Principles.
Three general areas of James's psychological thought are considered:
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(1) philosophical psychology, (2) cognition and (3) perception.

Once this

clearly historical orientation is adopted, the importance of Shadworth
Hodgson, a nineteenth century English philosopher who has been ignored in
contemporary James scholarship, comes to the foreground.

This study is

composed of five chapters.
The first chapter is a general introduction to James's early life
and thought and seeks to integrate relevant biographical material with his
published writings between 1861 and 1884.

After examining his early con

flict over the question of freedom vs. mechanism, it is argued that his
voluntaristic solution formed the conceptual basis of his general account
of philosohpical and scientific activity.

This solution is articulated on

the basis of a series of philosophical essays he published between 1877
and 1884.

The chapter concludes with a preliminary sketch of some of the

problems which his voluntarism created for his later program of scientific
psychology.
The second chapter is devoted to an examination of James's debt to
Hodgson with respect to the philosophical assumptions which underlie the
Principles. Three philosohpical problem areas are considered.

First,

James's methodological orientation is explicated within the context of
his notion of the psychologists' fallacy.

It is argued that his call for

an assumptionless description of experience is an outgrowth of what Hodgson
called the method of reflection, which arose in conjunction with a critical
interpretation of the two dominant philosophical traditions of the nine
teenth century.

Second, it is argued that James's epistemological dis

tinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge about is a devel
opment of Hodgson's distinction between first and second intention
descriptions.

Lastly, James's somewhat contradictory statements regarding

vii

dualism in the Principles is examined within the context of Hodgson's
more consistent formulation of a philosophical monism and methodological
dualism for scientific psychology.
James's formulation of the higher mental processes in the Principles
is examined in the third chapter.

This chapter begins with a consideration

of his debt to Hodgson in offering a dynamic formulation of the laws of
association.

In examining James's formulation of reasoning (cognition) and

valuing (belief), however, it is argued that he went beyond the letter and
spirit of Hodgson's philosophy.

With respect to human cognition, James's

biological interpretation of the a priori is set forth as an attempt to
synthesize Kant's rationalism and Mill's empiricism.

His formulation of

the sub-universes of reality (belief) is then interpreted as an attempt
to deal with the dynamic, transitive portions of the stream of thought.
In the fourth chapter James's theory of perception is examined in
relation to the perceptual realism he found in Hodgson's analysis of space
and time.

James's critique of the empiricist account of space perception

is examined within the context of three problems in perceptual psychology:
(1) simultaneous color contrast, (2) the eccentric projection of sensations
and (3) form perception.

Hodgson's influence with respect to James's

notion of the spatial quale is then examined, followed by James's attempt
to retain a perceptual realism while acknowledging the role of intellect
in perception.
The concluding chapter summarizes the impact of Hodgson on James's
psychology and briefly sketches the impact of James on psychology between
1900 and 1920.

Two somewhat distinct lines of influence are delineated:

(1) the dynamic, cognitive psychologies of Calkins, MacDougall and Baldwin
and (2) the neo-realist thought of Holt, Perry and Dewey.
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INTRODUCTION

William James is perhaps best known as the founder of pragmatism,
an early twentieth century American philosophy which Old World philoso
phers immediately branded anti-intellectual.

In the eyes of these tradi

tionalists, James's system— if it could even be called a system-— was
little more than an oblique expression of the rather crass, practical
spirit of a nation which possessed an over-abundance of natural resources
and an undying will to exploit them.

In a sense, James set the stage for

this characterization with his scathing attacks on the great systems of
European philosophy and his embarrassingly persistent insistence that we
look to the "cash-value" of concepts to find their meaning and truth.
At another level, however, the response of the European philosophical
community can be viewed as jaundiced and rather superficial.

As Ralph

Ross has written, James's "philosophical beliefs were more caricatured
than comprehended" by his contemporaries.^

This judgement gains support

from contemporary philosophers, who have returned to James as far more
than a symptom of the pioneer spirit of an expanding America.
In fact, in the last fifteen years there has been a renaissance
of scholarly activity on James by members of widely divergent philosophi
cal traditions.

From our perspective, this literature is particularly

interesting because his psychology has been rediscovered along with his
philosophy.

A. J. Ayer, for example, has recently examined James's

^William James, The Meaning of Truth, introduction by Ralph Ross
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1970), p. ix.

1

2

psychological and philosophical thought and concluded that he must be
viewed as a forerunner of the tough-minded philosophy of logical positivism.

2

He argues that James implicitly distinguished between three

types of statements— those of empirical science, logic/mathematics and
metaphysics/aesthetics— and that the pragmatic criterion of emotional
satisfaction was offered only for our metaphysical and aesthetic beliefs.
In the realms of science and logic/mathematics, Ayer attempts to show
that James, the psychologist-philosopher, was in fundamental agreement
with the Vienna Circle— verifiability principle included!

The fact is

that James did offer a version of the verifiability principle in The
Meaning of Truth; and one of Ayer's lasting services is his refutation
of the view that James ever maintained that a person can believe in
anything which he finds emotionally satisfying.

3

At the same time, how

ever, calling James a forerunner of logical positivism does not fit well
with the active, voluntaristic conception of human nature which pervades
his psychology and philosophy.
While Ayer's interpretation paints an illuminating picture of the
tough-minded side of James, a number of phenomenologists have recently
centered their attention on the tender-minded side of America's first
4
psychologist.
Taking Edmund Husserl's laudatory evaluation of James's
2

A. J. Ayer, The Origins of Pragmatism: Studies in the Philosophy of
Charles Pierce and William James (San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper and Co.,
1968).
3
James, Meaning of Truth, p. xxx.
4
Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1964); Hans Llnschoten, On the Way Toward a Phenomeno
logical Psychology: The Psychology of William James (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1968); Bruce Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology:
A Study of the "Principles of Psychology" (Bloomington: University of
Indiana Press, 1968); John Wild, The Radical Empiricism of William James
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psychology as a starting point, no less than five phenomenologists have
offered detailed analyses of the philosophical implications of a number
of the seminal ideas in James's Principles of Psychology.^

It is simply

impossible to do justice to such a large body of research in a short
review, but these commentators have: (1) articulated the similarities
between James and the phenomenologies of Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty
and others, (2) offered phenomenological solutions to some of the contra
dictions and problems in the Principles and (3) integrated aspects of
James's psychology with contemporary thought in phenomenological, exis
tential and gestalt psychology.

These writers have been especially

concerned with the descriptive aspects of James's psychology, his de
scription of experience as a fringed, flowing stream, the notion of self
as a distinctive member of the stream, his description of the experience
of freedom and lastly, the perspectivalism or contextualism which per
meates his psychology.

Although this literature does more justice to

the details of James's psychology, it suffers from two disciplinary
prejudices.

First, as phenomenologists of the German tradition, these

people have steadfastly ignored the positive influence of British empir
icism on James.

This omission becomes especially conspicuous because,

as we shall argue, a number of James's so-called phenomenological insights
can be traced to Shadworth Hodgson, an Englishman working within the
empiricist tradition.

Second, as non-scientists, the phenomenologists

have been unsympathetic to the fundamental goal of the Principles— to
create a scientific psychology.

(New York: Doubleday and Co., 1969); Richard Stevens, James and Husserl:
The Foundation of Meaning (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).
^See Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 2 vols.
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), 1:67; 113.

4

The one methodological feature which underlies both the phenomeno
logical and positivistic interpretations of James is that both seek to
recast his thought into terms which are compatible with the fundamental
postulates of a contemporary philosophy.

This is, in some respects, a

thoroughly reasonable and understandable aim; contemporary systems should
be able to withstand the challenges of, and find support in, previous
systems.

But a problem which hovers over any attempt to integrate aspects

of the present with the past is the tendency to view the past out of its
historical context, to subordinate the past to the present.

Herbert

Butterfield has called this the whig interpretation of history;
The total result of this method is to impose a certain form upon
the whole historical story, and produce a scheme . . . which is
bound to converge beautifully upon the present— all demonstrating
throughout . . . the workings of an obvious principle of progress.
A whiggish strain can be discerned in the contemporary literature on
James.

It appears most clearly in the conclusions of this otherwise val

uable literature.

That is, James is portrayed as a thinker who was moving

toward either a phenomenology or logical positivism, depending on the pre
disposition of the writer.

In either case, however, a contemporary scheme

is imposed on James's writings and he emerges as a prophet for some modern
school of thought.

The problem is that an important aspect of William

James is lost as he is cast in the role of a harbinger of either phenom
enology or logical positivism.

The positivist interpretation, for example,

fails to integrate his conception of human nature with his formulation of
the nature of scientific inquiry, a theme which pervades his early works.
On the other hand, the phenomenological interpretation simply does not

^Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (New York:
W. W. Norton and Co., 1965), p. 12.
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take his program of scientific psychology seriously, despite the fact
that the Principles was written for exactly that purpose.

And while there

surely are phenomenological as well as positivistic strains in James's
psychology, neither aspect alone does full justice to the contents of the
Principles.
In this study— "Shadworth Hodgson and the Psychology of William
James: Experience, Teleology and Realism"— we shall examine the origin
and development of the fundamental themes and theories of the Principles.
Our method is historical and our goal is to clarify some aspects of
James's psychological thought.

The assumption which ties our method and

goal together is the belief that James's psychology can be best under
stood through an analysis of its development from its beginnings in the
1870's to its culmination in 1890.

In adopting this method, we are try

ing to approach the Principles as James himself approached it— as an
attempt to integrate the best of philosophy with evolutionary biology
and thereby create a scientific psychology.
history of psychology.

Thus this is a study in the

Accordingly, the bulk of our study— chapters two,

three and four— is devoted to an analysis of three general areas of the
Principles: (1) philosophical psychology, (2) cognition and (3) perception.
Moreover, the scope of this work is clearly limited to James's pre-1892
writings, for after publishing his Psychology in that year he turned to
philosophy until his death in 1910.

In limiting our scope in this way,

we shall not take up either of his mature philosophical doctrines—
pragmatism or radical empiricism.

Hopefully, what has been consciously

sacrificed in breadth will be recompensed by the depth and detail of our
analysis of James's psychological thought.

6

Describing this work as a study in the history of psychology would
be misleading unless two qualifications are made explicit at the outset.
First, the historical reality is that James's psychology developed handin-hand with a complex of related philosophical and ethical positions
during the 1870's and 1880's.

The commonly held opinion that he progressed

gradually from physiology to psychology to philosophy is simply inaccurate
and serves only to obscure the threads which tie these areas of his
thought together.

Instead, however, of avoiding the complexity of the

historical record or treating it as an unsettling complication, we have
tried to use it to our advantage.

Thus, in the first chapter, James's

early philosophical and ethical thought will be presented as the assump
tive frame of reference from which his psychology emerged.

From this

perspective, his early philosophical and ethical thought can be viewed
as a vital source of enrichment to his scientific psychology— it raised
questions (e.g., human freedom, the status of consciousness and a priori
knowledge) which he later sought to answer in the Principles.
The second sense in which this study departs from the history of
psychology proper is Shadworth Hodgson.

To call Hodgson anything but a

metaphysician would be positively misleading.

He did, of course, keep up

with the latest developments of the psychology of his time but even in
this respect his fundamental goal was philosophical.

As we shall see, his

philosophical system was founded upon distinguishing scientific psychology
from philosophy on methodological grounds.

At this juncture, we would

simply like to make Hodgson's role in this study explicit; to state, in
general terms, why his name graces the title of this work.

Put simply,

on reading James, Hodgson and Ralph Barton Perry, it became clear that
Hodgson's thought served as the philosophical point of departure for James's

scientific psychology.

Hodgsonian insights, and applications of principles

which can be traced to Hodgson, served as the foundation upon which James
constructed his psychology.

It should be stated clearly that we shall not

do full justice to Hodgson’s philosophical system.
this study,

Given the goal of

we shall use him selectively, as James did in the Principles.

At the same time, however, this study is organized around the belief that
Hodgson had an important, and perhaps the most important, impact on the
structure and contents of the Principles.
In closing, one aspect of the style of this study deserves comment.
Since deciding to work on James, my goal has been to provide an in-depth
historical analysis of his psychological thought.

What I failed to real

ize until I began writing was that an in-depth analysis— at least at
this stage of my understanding of James— entails a considerable amount
of attention to the details of his writings.

James is simply not a

person who can be easily classified into the dichotomies of the history
of philosophy and psychology, e.g., rationalism-empiricism, idealismrealism, subjectivism-objectivism.

In an attempt to preserve the richness,

and most importantly the integrity of his thought, I have taken the
liberty of using excerpts of his writings rather liberally.

My funda

mental goal is to provide a clear picture of what James was saying and,
quite frankly, there are times when his precision and descriptive genius
cannot be equaled.

^Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James,
2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1935).

CHAPTER 1

WILLIAM JAMES:

THE YOUNG PHILOSOPHER-PSYCHOLOGIST

The fundamental task of history, if it wishes to be in all
seriousness a science, must be to show how this philosophy, or
that political system, could only have been discovered,
developed, and, in short, lived by a particular type of man
at a particular date.*
Ortega y Gasset's statement can stand as an eloquent and succinct
formulation of the goal of this chapter, for here we shall seek to root
the dominant themes of William James's early philosophical thought in
his life in nineteenth century America.

The task ought to be a joyous

one for a psychologist, for there is a great wealth of seductively psy
chological conflicts in James's early life.

One finds, for example,

young William James thinking of suicide, being harassed by innumerable
psychosomatic disorders and then being saved by a conversion experience,
if one takes that term in its broader sense.

Furthermore, these psy

chological conflicts clearly find their way into James's early philo
sophical writings before 1884.
Before moving incautiously into a psycho-historical exposition,
however, one would do well to read William Earle's admonishment that a
study of James "must be diverted from his life, however interesting, to
2
his published philosophy."
The conflict exemplified in Ortega y Gasset

^Jose Ortega y Gasset, What is Philosophy?, trans. Mildred Adams
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1960), p. 25.
2

William Earle, "William James," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
8 vols., ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1972), 4:241.
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and Earle— between living and thinking— was one which James spent a good
deal of his life (or should we say 'thought'?) trying to integrate.
Now, almost a century later, we continue to stare blankly into the face
of this bifurcation, wondering whether the debate is a matter of seman
tics or fundamental ontology.

In spite of this discomforting dichotomy

however, the substance of Earle's warning must be acknowledged.

William

James did, after all, offer the philosophical community of his time a
system and he defended his system with philosophical arguments/ Both
his system and arguments were, in fact, more or less continuous with pre
vious philosophical thought; even his unique contributions can only be
recognized as such from within the context of nineteenth century philo
sophy.

Earle's contention is simply that James's thought ought to be

considered in its philosophical context, regardless of the seductiveness
of the biographical details of his life.
As a whole then, this study must be able to stand up to Earle's
remarks.

James's psychology, like his philosophy, must stand on its own

since it is— in some sense at least— independent of his life.

At the

same time however, this is an historical study and we therefore have the
responsibility of situating James's ideas within the context of his life
and times.

In this chapter we hope to do just that.

This chapter will

cover the years between 1861 and 1884, with the focus on the last decade
of that period.

In biographical terms, this period spans the nineteenth

through forty-second years of William James's life.

These were James's

formative years, our subject is a classic example of the late-bloomer.
In terms of his professional development, we shall open the chapter as
James enters Harvard College and close it as he begins teaching there, at
the mid-point of a twelve-year project which culminated in the Principles

10

of Psychology.

In terms of personal development, we shall follow the

young philosopher-psychologist through a state of confusion, hopelessness
and psychic paralysis to a state of willful activity and optimism.

Most

importantly however, we shall attempt to articulate a number of inchoate
themes of a philosophy which sought to integrate the fundamental con
flicts which racked the nineteenth century in general and William James
in particular.
This chapter will focus on a series of 'philosophical1 essays
which James wrote between 1877 and 1884.

The strategy of approaching

James's psychology through his early philosophical thought holds a number
of unique advantages.

It directly challenges, for example, the commonly-

held opinion that there was a neat chronological progression in James's
intellectual development— from physiology to psychology to philosophy.

4

In fact, James was in print as a philosopher before he published as a
psychologist and he continued to write philosophical essays during the
twelve-year period (1878-1890) when he was writing the Principles.^
This approach will also bring the unified nature of James's psychological
and philosophical thought to the foreground.
3
William James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1890; reprint ed., New York: Dover Publishing Co.,
1950). Hereafter cited as James, Principles.
4
For a work based on this assumption see Patrick K. Dooley,
Pragmatism as Humanism: The Philosophy of William James (Chicago: NelsonHall Inc., 1974). For a critique of this approach see Richard High,
review of Pragmatism as Humanism: The Philosophy of William James, by
Patrick K. Dooley, in Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences
12 (1976):190-192.
~*The Writings of William James, ed. John J. McDermott (New York:
Random House, 1967), p. 817. This collection contains an invaluable
annotated bibliography of James's entire works, including a large number
of anonymous book reviews and notices he wrote before 1880. Anonymous
or unsigned materials by James cited in this study are identified by
McDermott.

11

This chapter is divided into four sections.

In the first section

we shall examine the conflict James experienced as a philosophicallyminded scientist and the solution he offered in the late 1860's.

In the

second section we shall find James refining this solution and offering
it as a general account of the nature of philosophical and scientific
activity.

The third section will consider James's defense of human free

dom and in the last section we shall briefly look into the problems this
position created for his program of a scientific psychology.

Early Misgivings about Mechanical Science
and Moral Philosophy
However wanting by contemporary standards, James's education was
the best that a young and well-to-do American could enjoy in the middle of
the nineteenth century.

After studying at Harvard's newly founded

Lawrence Scientific School (1861-1864), James matriculated at Harvard
Medical School between 1864 and 1869.

He was more interested in physi

ology and anatomy than medicine per se during these years and he never
seriously considered practicing medicine.

Like many young scholars of

his day (e.g., Wilhelm Wundt, Hermann Helmholtz, Hermann Lotze and
Sigmund Freud), a medical education was, for James, a way of receiving
training in the natural sciences.

It held the additional advantage of

providing the graduate with a ready-made and possibly lucrative pro
fession if times became hard or academic positions were unavailable.
James's academic work during these years was supplemented by an expedi
tion to the Amazon in 1865 with Louis Agassiz, a year of somewhat erratic

^Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James,
2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1935), 1:202-273. Hereafter
cited as Perry, William James.
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study in Europe during 1867 and a good deal of independent reading in
physiology, psychology and philosophy.7
In terms of James's later work, his Harvard years proved to be
most important.

In this first decade after the publication of Darwin's

Origin of Species the Cambridge campus became the focal point of the
American response to the question of 'transmutation.' In fact, even
before James's arrival in Cambridge the scientific and religious impli
cations of Darwin's theory had been debated by members of Harvard's
g

faculty.

The names of Asa Gray, Louis Agassiz, Francis Bowen and

Jeffries Wyman stand out in this respect.
Gray and Agassiz were the acknowledged titans of American bio
logical thought in the middle of the nineteenth century; both held senior
editorial positions on the prestigious American Journal of Science and
each had made contributions to their respective fields of speciality.
Agassiz, a European-trained naturalist of Cuvier's school, had presented
his formulation of the fixity of species in his Essay on Classification
in 1855.

9

Having viewed nature through the eyes of a 'special creationist'

for over thirty years, Agassiz found little to praise in Darwin's work
and he feared the religious and moral implications of the concept of chance
and the principle of natural selection.

In his review of the Origins in

the American Journal of Science, Agassiz dismissed the work as "a sci
entific mistake, untrue in its facts, unscientific in its method and

7Ibid., pp. 202-235.
g

E. J. Pfeifer, "United States," in The Comparative Reception of
Darwinism, ed. Thomas R. Glick (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972),
pp. 168-202.
9
Louis Agassiz, On the Principles of Classification in the Animal
Kingdom (Charleston, S. C.: Walker and James, 1850).
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mischievous in its t e n d e n c y . F r o m Agassiz's perspective, a perspec
tive which mixed biology and theology inextricably, the classification
of species represented an attempt to reconstruct the plan of Divine Will.
Spurred by a theistic idealism which was rooted in the Naturphilosophie
of his mentor Schelllng, America's most respected naturalist became
Darwin's most obstinate and vocal American critic.
Gray's review of the Origins. which appeared in the same journal
in 1860, pitted editor against editor.

In marked contrast to the conde

scending tone of Agassiz's review, Gray was supportive and even concil
iatory in that he emphasized that natural selection was no more intrinsically atheistic than Newton's universal gravitation.

12

Both laws,

wrote Harvard's eminent botanist, were formulated in terms of 'efficient'
causes and neither excluded God as a 'final' cause.

Gray had been in

correspondence with Darwin since the mid-1850's and his work on the
geographic distribution of flora in Japan was used by Darwin to support
his argument for evolution.

Gray followed his review with a series of

popular essays through the 1860's and 1870's which sought to reconcile
natural selection and Design.

The Harvard anatomist, Jeffries Wyman,

and Francis Bowen, the moral philosopher, also assumed active, though
less luminous, roles in the debate over evolution at the meetings of
the Academy for the Advancement of Science during the I860's.

13

^Louis Agassiz, "Professor Agassiz on the Origin of Species,"
American Journal of Science, 2nd series, 30 (1860):142-154, p. 154.
**See Edward Lurie, Louis Agassiz; A Life in Science (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 51.
12

Asa Gray, "Review of Darwin's Origin of Species," American
Journal of Science, 2nd series, 29 (1859):153-184, p. 154.
^Pfeifer, "United States," pp. 170-176; 187-189.

14

Agassiz and Wyman were James's teachers and men such as Gray and
Bowen could not have gone unnoticed by a student of science with philo
sophical Inclinations.

In such an atmosphere James became aware of the

arguments advanced by both parties, and though awed by the aura of
Agassiz's character, he lined up behind the cause of evolution and
science.

James's early alliance with evolution— and science in general—

is evidenced in his correspondence during his 1867-1868 European tour.
Guided by the spirit of evolution, we find James demanding a mechanistic
explanation for any topic under consideration, but the young scientist
was concerned about how such an attitude might effect his future in the
academic world.

Writing to Oliver Wendell Holmes, the future Chief

Justice of the United States, James intimated that he would continue
studying psychology and try teaching moral philosophy "in some western
academy, but I have no idea how such things are attainable, nor if they
are attainable at all to men of a non-spiritualistic mould."

14

James's misgivings about the reality of the spiritual world are
most clearly evidenced in an exchange of letters with his father during
this stay in Europe.

Henry James Sr. had sent his son-the-scientist an

essay he had published in 1867 entitled "Swedenborg's O n t o l o g y . I n
this essay the elder James described the gradual unification of the
individual's consciousness with the Creator when selfish, earthly striv
ings were overcome.

Yet these selfish motives, which Swedenborg and

Henry Sr. were only too willing to overcome, stood at the very center
14
The Letters of William James, ed. Henry James III, 2 vols.
(Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920), 1:276.

Review

^Henry James Sr., "Swedenborg's Ontology," North American
105(1867):89-123.
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of what Darwin had called the 'struggle for existence'.

But Henry Sr.

was not merely arguing for the reality of a spiritual realm alongside
of the material universe.

Instead, he sought to demonstrate that all

reality Is, by its very nature, spiritual!

After reading the article

William respectfully remarked that he could not help Interpreting his
father's description in terms of the "natural constitution of things . . .
in its mechanical s e n s e . T o this reply William's father retorted that
. . . it is very evident to me that your trouble in under
standing . . . arises mainly from the purely scientific cast
of your mind just at the present time.17
His father went on to say that for him, as a spiritualist and free-thinker:
"Nature . . . is void of absoluteness, or has no being in se but only in
the exigencies of our carnal understanding."

18

For nearly a decade how

ever, William had been nurtured on a mechanistic interpretation of the
universe and taught to trust 'empirical evidence' as the ultimate arbiter
for truth.

If the younger James was to approach the phenomena which his

father wrote about, he would need concrete evidence rather than the per
sonal testimony and metaphysical assumptions of his father, Agassiz or
Swedenborg.
What can be abstracted from this early correspondence is that
while William was a scientist by training, he was unabashedly philosoph
ical by temperament.

Describing him in this manner means simply that

while he respected the power and rigor of science, he was impatient with
the partial answers which science was structured to provide.

^Perry, William James, 2:713.
17Ibid., p. 714.
*8Ibid., p. 713.

Thus even
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during the 1860’s we find James going beyond the 'factual data’ in search
of philosophical implications.

The system of thought called science, for

example, which William employed to interpret his father's spiritualistic
writings, meant more than a mass of laboratory results.

At its core,

science for James was a set of assumptions— a mechanistic philosophy—
and such a philosophy had unambiguous personal implications.

Thus we

find the philosopher by temperament, scientist by training, writing to
Thomas Ward that he was "poisoned with Utilitarian venom . . . ," but
that his "only ideal

19
is a scientific life."

college friend James

brings us to the crux of the problem:

In the same letter to this

Ah! Tom, Tom, you well-constructed whelps who travel on their
free-will and moral responsibility are more to be envied than
anyone in the world . . . .
They [the believers in human free
dom] are a superb form of animal, and beat the cows of whom you
speak . . . beat 'em hollow, on their very own track of finite
absoluteness.20
And writing to Ward again, a year later, the brooding young scientist
openly complained that he was
. . . swamped with an empirical philosophy. I feel that
we are Nature through and through, that we are wholly condi
tioned, that not a wiggle of our will happens save as a result
of physical laws.21
This is the same message which James expressed to
earlier but the tone

his father twoyears

of these letters has changed significantly. The

rebellious certainty which pervaded his reply to his father's article
has melted away into dissatisfaction and diffidence.

These letters are

enlightening in that they bring us to the fundamental personal and later

19Ibid., p. 287.
20Ibid.
21

Gay W. Allen, William James: A Biography (New York: Viking
Press, 1967), p. 164.
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philosophical conflict which plagued James throughout his early life,
i.e., the tension between the mechanistic goal of scientific knowledge
and the moral tone which seemed to pervade experience.

The contradic

tory nature of James's letters during the late 1860's is best understood
as a reflection of the profound ambivalence which he felt between a
mechanistic philosophy of science and his own moralistic cast of mind.
To speak in terms which he would later make popular, the 'tough-minded'
James was devoted to an empirical philosophy, as he respected the pre
cision and concrete utility of scientific knowledge.

For these reasons

a spiritualistic idealism like his father's seemed vapid, however much
he sympathized with its aims and ideals.

At the same time, however,

the 'tender-minded' James disdained the moral, or more precisely, the
amoral implications of a mechanistic philosophy.
This conflict reached its emotional crescendo in the late 1860's
when James was continually harassed by psychosomatic disorders and
bouts of severe depression.

Relief from these ailments came slowly

through the 1870's but the first signs of improvement coincided with
his solution to the problem of human freedom.

In the spring of 1870

James made the following entry in his diary:
I think yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished reading
the first part of Renouvier's second 'Essais' and see no reason
why his definition of Free Will— 'the sustaining of a thought
because I choose to when I might have other thoughts'— need be
the definition of an illusion. . . . My first act of free will
Hitherto, when I have
shall be to believe in free will . . . .
felt like taking a free initiative, . . . suicide seemed the
most manly form to put my daring into; now I will go a step
further with my will not only act with it, but believe as well;
believe in my individual reality and creative power.22
This passage is often quoted but is rarely given the kind of analysis
22

James, Letters of William James, 1:147-148.
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it deserves.

Most commentators offer it as an example of James's concern

over the problem of free will and then move on to his defense of human
freedom in 1884.

23

Murphy, for example, described James as a person sick

with the disease of indecision: "There he lay, a sick man, wretched soul,
unable to move.

Renouvier . . . told him to march.

Murphy is surely correct, as far as he goes.

And he marched."

24

What must not be overlooked

in this seductive biographical event however, is that Renouvier told
James more than that he could march, he also told him what marching in
volved. That is, a psychological model underlies James's affirmation
of human freedom, a model which made belief a central element in human
experience.

This basic model extended beyond James's defense of human

freedom and pervaded his psychological as well as philosophical thought.
Thus it is important to recognize exactly what James's declaration
of freedom entailed and note how it influenced his early philosophical
and psychological thought.

Philosophically, James is stating more in

this passage than 'man is free1 in the theological or metaphysical sense in
which the American moral philosophers or his father chose to deal with
the question.

For James, human freedom was reformulated as a continuous

process rather than a potential given in or with the faculty of will.
From the latter part of the passage especially, it is clear that James
recognized that the process of becoming free involves a subjective voli
tional act, an act of faith or belief in himself in a moment of decision.
23
William James, "The Dilemma of Determinism," Unitarian Review
(1884); reprinted in William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays
in Popular Philosophy (New York: Dover Publishing Co., 1956), pp. 145183. Hereafter cited as James, Will to Believe. Page numbers from the
latter work will be cited whenever possible in future footnotes.
24
Gardener Murphy, "William James on the Will," Journal of the
History of the Behavioral Sciences 7 (1971):249-258, p. 251.
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This brings us to the impact of this passage on James's psychology, spe
cifically on the role of belief in the higher mental processes.

For James,

in this declaration of freedom in 1870, makes believing an essential
aspect of volition and action.

As he said, "I will go a step further

with my will, not only act with it, but believe as well; believe in my
individual reality and creative power."

As we shall see in chapter three,

belief, an emotional response of the whole person, plays a central role
in James's treatment of the higher mental processes in the Principles.
Let us return now to the philosophical level and note that James
in this passage is bringing the metaphysical question of freedom— his
freedom— into the realm of concrete, lived experience.

This is a meth

odologically unique philosophical perspective which culminated in James's
pragmatic philosophy.

Within such a perspective, the question of freedom

is to m from the strictly logical level of abstract discussion and tied
irrevocably to experience and action.

James's justification for this

move is that the problematical nature of what philosophers had called the
problem of freedom is only experienced in action, when freedom is a
living alternative.

To treat this question as an abstraction means,

ipso facto, to take it out of the situation which creates the problem.
Thus in spite of its circularity and irrationality, James suggested that
a person becomes free by willfully choosing to believe in the reality of
his freedom and then acting on that belief.

In justifying such a position

James, as early as 1877, pointed to the practical effects of such a stance,
"the result substantiates my belief, verifies it."

25

This represents

25
William James, "Considerations sur la Methode Subjective,"
Critique Philosophique (1878); reprinted in Collected Essays and Reviews,
ed. Ralph Barton Perry (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969), pp. 69-82,
p. 79.
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James's early attempt to reconcile science and the moral universe, a posltion which was later expanded and called 'pragmatism' in 1898.

26

Our

concern however, is not with pragmatism per se but the impact of James's
early philosophical thought on his psychology.

We must then leave James's

early formulation of pragmatism and turn to another, related theme in his
early philosophical thought— the concept of 'subjective interests'.

James's Early Critique of Science and the
Concept of Subjective Interests
James's solution to the problem of freedom by means of a subjec
tive act of belief— or, in psychological terms, an act of willful atten
tion— set the stage for his early philosophical and psychological thought.
In this section we shall follow the philosophical development of this
theme from a number of early book reviews in the mid-1870's to its culmination in a trilogy of essays he wrote in the late 1870's.

27

Specif

ically, it will be argued that the subjectivism of Renouvier's formula
tion of freedom, divorced from the problem of freedom per se, formed the
conceptual basis for James's critique of nineteenth century positivistic
science.

That is, having recognized the importance of subjective factors—

beliefs— in his affirmation of freedom, James argued that the adoption of
any philosophical system— including science— entailed a subjective act of
faith.

It should also be noted that while Renouvier, in France, was

26
William James, "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,"
University of California Chronicle (1898); reprinted in Collected Essays
and Reviews, ed. Ralph Barton Perry (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969),
pp. 406-437.
27
See William James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," Mind (1879);
reprinted in James, Will to Believe, pp. 63-110. Idem, "Reflex Action
and Theism," Unitarian Review (1881); reprinted in James, Will to Believe,
111-144. Idem, "Rationality, Activity and Faith," Princeton Review
2 (1882):58-86.
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building a philosophy around a 'subjective act', Hodgson, in England, was
constructing a psychology around the concept of 'attention'.

In a very

real sense, James's pre-1900 thought can be viewed as an attempt to inte
grate these systems.
In a relatively short period of time the mechanistic program of
science had gained many successes on issues which philosophers had been
verbally dissecting for centuries, i.e., the electrical nature of the
nerve impulse, the origin of life from lower forms and even the inter
convertibility of forces such as heat, motion and sound.
brilliant and powerful discoveries.

These were

Emboldened by these successes how

ever, a number of scientists turned to more clearly speculative and
complex issues, most conspicuously, the nature of life and mind.

Of

course, mechanistic formulations of these topics can be found throughout
history but Helmholtz's law of the conservation of energy and Darwin's
theory of evolution gave the new mechanistic formulations a credibility
they had never before possessed.

In terms of Its impact on the study of

human experience, John Tyndall's Belfast Address of 1874 can serve as a
valuable illustration of this trend.

28

The Belfast Address was prototypical of the science vs. philosophy
controversy in a number of respects.

First, it was delivered by a re

spected physicist as the presidential address to the prestigious British
Association for the Advancement of Science.

Secondly, after delivering

his speech Tyndall staunchly defended his position against the arguments
of dissenters.

Lastly, on hearing Tyndall's speech a Presbyterian

28
John Tyndall, Fragments of Science: A Series of Detached Essays,
Addresses and Reviews, 3 vols. (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1892),
1:135-202.
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minister offered to deliver a paper to the Biological section of the
Association which attempted to reconcile science and religion.

The Asso

ciation's refusal on the grounds that such a topic was unscientific
embittered many since Tyndall had admittedly gone beyond the boundaries
of scientific evidence.

29

The controversy which ensued was followed in

the pages of the popular magazines and did much to polarize all parties
involved.

Those members of both the religious and scientific communi

ties who had remained diplomatically neutral to the question of materi
alism found it increasingly difficult to maintain such a position.
Tyndall, it seemed, had explicitly challenged the authority of anything
that did not contain the stamp of science.

The response in the American

press, for Tyndall had recently completed a lecture-tour of the United
States, came fast and was generally negative.

It was written in Nation

magazine that Tyndall's performance was the "sort of propaganda not much
superior in method to that of theological missionaries."

30

The substantive issue involved Tyndall's formulation of a mecha
nistic materialism, with the physicist 'confessing' that he 'discerned
31
in matter the promise and potency of every form of life'.

The impli

cation was clear to a generation sensitized by fifteen years of contro
versy over evolution.

The study of man, whose consciousness to many

signified a uniquely spiritual nature, could now be approached within
the mechanistic framework of science.

Within this framework conscious

ness was reduced to epiphenomenal status and man's image to that of what
29

"Tyndall and the Theologians," Nation 19 (1874):181-182.

3°Ibid.
31
Tyndall, Fragments of Science, 1:181.
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Thomas Huxley called a 'conscious automaton'.

32

In his essay "Are We

Automata?," James offered an alternative to Tyndall's materialism.

33

He entered the 1874 controversy in the form of a letter to the editor
of Nation, where he responded to Tyndall's suggestion that scientists,
as scientists, are fully justified in

metaphysical speculations. This

was a loaded remark.

the thesis of what MauriceMandel-

Behind it stood

baum has called 'systematic positivism', "that the adequacy of our knowl
edge increases as it approximates the forms of explanation which have
been achieved by most of the natural sciences."

34

To Tyndall's claim

James wrote that:
As men, of course, they have! . . . only when this exhila
rated . . . mood is upon them let it be distinctly recognized
for what it is— the Mood of Faith, not Science.35
The question that arises is whether the 'Mood of Faith' of the specula
tive scientist is essentially the same as the subjective act by which
James affirmed his own freedom in 1870?
James wrote a notice for Nation magazine in 1873 which provides
support for this interpretation.

36

In this short acknowledgement James

applauded the newly founded journal of Renouvier and Pillon, La Critique
Philosophique, and took the opportunity to contrast their philosophy with
32
Thomas Huxley, "On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and
its History," Fortnightly Review (1874); reprinted in Collected Essays,
9 vols. (01ms: Hildesheim, 1970), 1:199-250.
"^William James, "Are We Automata?," Mind 4 (1879):1-22.
34
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16 (1873):94.

24

scientific positivism.

37

Not surprisingly, James noted that the primary

difference between these schools of thought is that Renouvier1s system
leaves room for the possibility of "absolute beginnings," i.e., human
freedom.

James concluded this short notice by noting that within

Renouvier’s system one has "an act enthroned in the heart of philosophic
thought."

38

The act which James refers to here is clearly subjective

but our interpretation would be more clearly supported by a more general
statement, one in which James explicitly postulates that all speculation
necessarily contains a subjective act of faith.

Such a statement was

fully articulated in James’s essay "The Sentiment of Rationality," but
his message to the speculative scientists is sufficiently clear in an
1875 review of The Unseen Universe; or Physical Speculations on a Future
State. Here he wrote that
. . . the author's belief in the 'bettemess of the other [mecha
nistic] world' which he constructs for us demands from him at the
end of his mechanical gyrations . . . the same simple act of teleological trust, the same faith that the end will crown the work . . .
as does the most narrow-minded old woman [who] so quickly envelops
her briefly-recited cosmogony."39
What James seems to have extracted from Renouvier's demand that the indi
vidual take an active role in determining his fate was that all specula
tion necessarily involves an emotionally based act of faith.

For if the

whole person of William James contributes to his affirmation of a philos
ophy which embraces human freedom, then the emotional interests of a
37
La Critique Philosophique (1872-1889) continued the first series
of Annee Philosophique (1867-1869) and was superceded by Annee Philoso
phique (1890-1913).
38
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39
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Spencer, Tyndall, Hodgson or Huxley must also be involved in their adoption
of a philosophy which denies the reality of freedom.

It is imperative to

note that whether such a choice is itself determined is not the central
issue here.

James’s major point is that a scientist’s affirmation of his

philosophy— his working assumptions— is not a scientific decision.

Like

religion and art, science necessarily involves a subjective commitment
which is rooted in the emotional interests of the scientist.

This posi

tion lent itself to cries of 'anti-intellectualism' and ’subjectivism’
by members of the philosophical and scientific communities.

That James

was aware of this difficulty is evidenced by his remark in an 1886 essay:
I know very well that in talking of dislikes to those who never
mention them, I am doing a very coarse thing, and making a sort of
intellectual Orson of myself. But, for the life of me, I cannot
help it, because I feel sure that likes and dislikes must be among
the ultimate factors of their philosophy as well as mine. Would
they but admit it! How sweetly we then could hold converse to
gether !^0
James was addressing the then emerging Hegelian philosophies of T. H.
Green and F. H. Bradley in this essay but his thesis— that personal likes
and dislikes are essential aspects of philosophical belief— had been
placed in a more general framework seven years earlier.

It received its

most detailed consideration in James's 1879 essay, "The Sentiment of
Rationality.
In that essay James explicitly posited that an emotionally based
act is an essential, though often unnoticed, aspect of the affirmation
of any philosophical system.

Not only Hegelian rationalism but the em

piricism of J. S. Mill and Alexander Bain and positivistic science find
40
William James, "Absolutism and Empiricism," Mind 11 (1886):
281-286, p. 284.
41
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their way into James's discussion.

James's working assumption in this

essay is that there is a fundamental ambiguity in experience, i.e., that
when all the evidence is collected there still remains a degree of opaque
ness and thus room for alternative interpretations.

James was fond of

making reference to the one-fluid and two-fluid theories of electricity
as an example of this ambiguity since both theories were scientific and
could account for the data equally well.

Given this ambiguity, James

argued that the particular interpretation which one adopts is an expres
sion or fulfillment of the 'subjective interests' which one holds to be
most valuable.

His thesis is more general and ambitious here, he is

concerned with the 'psychology' underlying philosophical affiliation as
a human activity.
The title of the essay— "The Sentiment of Rationality"— tells much
of the story.

This essay is aimed at the many faceted and pompously

fragile balloons of rationality which existed in the late nineteenth
century.

For however much science, British empiricism and Hegelian ra

tionalism differed as systems, they shared one fundamental similarity.
The end of each, as a system of thought, was a unified and abstract
account of the universe.

In different ways, each sought to show that

the world really was, in fact, a 'uni' rather than a 'multi'-verse.

In

moving toward this end, each of these systems conceived of the particu
lars of individual experience as a kind of messy afterthought to be sub
sumed under abstract laws.

Given this analysis, we find James in the

role of the gadfly, suggesting that 'rationality' itself is an individual
'feeling' whose distinctive marks are necessarily 'subjective'.

What

James was groping for here was the recognition of those fleeting feelings
by which the thinker himself recognizes that his search for a rational

27

answer is complete.

James's answer was that this experience consisted of:

A strong feeling of ease, peace, rest . . . . The transition from
a state of puzzle and perplexity to rational comprehension is full
of lively relief and pleasure . . . . Shall we then say that the
feeling of rationality is constituted merely by the absence of any
feeling of irrationality? I think there are very good grounds for
upholding such a view.42
Later in the essay James put his thesis more succinctly, "to think with
perfect fluency, the thing we think of seems to us pro tanto rational."

43

Within this formulation of rationality the thinker himself, his
entire personality, becomes an essential part of his system of thought,
for only the person doing the thinking can feel the 'perfect fluency'
which to him signifies a rational answer.

James thought that this simple

observation— which brings the whole person back into the process of philo
sophical belief and inquiry— provided the psychological basis for the
diversity of philosophical opinion.

The problem comes into clear focus

when it is recognized, as James did, that different people may hold
fundamentally different subjective criteria which their systems must
fulfill.

James delineated what he called two "sister passions"— the

passion for parsimony and the passion for particulars— which he saw as
the conflicting ideals which philosophical systems seek to satisfy.

44

In calling them passions, James sought to make clear the emotional basis
of these subjective interests.

He saw the passion for parsimony as the

common psychological motive which the systems Hegelian rationalism,
British empiricism and science in general were responding to.

Their

ideal is to explicate the fundamental unity of the universe, to demon
strate, through different methods, the uniformity and homogeneity which
underlies the multiplicity and heterogeneity of experience.
42
Ibid., pp. 63-64.
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Ibid., p. 64.

Their primary

44
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methodological tool is causal analysis, "which is often given," James
wrote, "as the definition of rational knowledge."

45

The power and esteem

of these systems lie in their power to explain, to subsume the particulars
of experience under a minimum of general laws.

This is the passion for

abstract simplicity most clearly evidenced in the theory-builder.

James

wrote that abstraction, classification and conceptual knowledge are the
ideals of this enterprise.

This tradition— this way of looking at reality—

can be traced back to Plato; it is the tradition of Reason and the Intel
lect which science took over from rationalistic philosophy.
James’s most important contribution to this analysis however, was
the recognition that each of these parsimonious ideals was a double-edged
sword, that other motives also operate in determining philosophical
opinion.

For in abstracting and explaining and articulating the higher-

order uniformities, one necessarily loses contact with the richness and
felt reality of the phenomena under study.

Hence, alongside the passion

for parsimony lies its rival, the passion for a clear understanding of
the particulars of experience.

Of this passion, this subjective interest,

James wrote that:
It loves to recognize particulars in their full completeness, and
the more it can carry the happier it is. It prefers any amount
of incoherence, abruptness and fragmentariness (so long as the
literal details of the separate facts are saved) to an abstract
way of conceiving things that . . . dissolves away at the same
time their concrete fullness. Clearness and simplicity thus set
up rival claims and make a real dilemma for the thinker.
The dilemma to which James is referring here can be seen in the specula
tions of the nineteenth century systematic positivists, e.g., J. S. Mill,
Herbert Spencer and Auguste Comte.
45
Ibid., p. 65.

46

Having forsakened the richness and

Ibid., p. 66.

(Italics mine.)
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complexity of individual experience for theoretical simplicity and unity,
they created systems of thought that failed to do justice to the creative
power of the individual.

Individuals came to be conceived as pawns in

a cosmic interchange of mechanical forces.

This conception of the indi

vidual seemed the epitome of ’empty barrenness’ to James.

What James

argued for was a bit of humility on the part of the speculative positivists,
the recognition that the "interest of theoretical rationality . . . is
but one of a thousand human purposes."

47

Thus while he defended the sci

entific ideal as a valuable way of conceiving of the universe, he refused—
unlike the systematic positivists— to acknowledge that scientific abstrac
tion was the only justifiable perspective.
What we have in this early essay, which Perry noted was written in
1877, is the rudiments of James's pluralism, a theme which plays a central
role in both his psychology and mature philosophical thought.

48

The

fundamental thesis of pluralism is that reality can be viewed from a
number of different perspectives— that there are multiple rather than
one fundamental Reality.

Another form which James's early pluralism took

was his attempt to reconcile religious belief and science in the late
1870's.

James took up this topic in an essay he published in 1879,

"Rationality, Activity and Faith," and again in an 1881 essay, "Reflex
Action and Theism."

49

Though our primary concern is James's early cri

tique of positivistic science, it might be noted that James's defense of
47

Ibid., p. 70.

48
Perry, William James, 1:495.

49
William James, "Reflex Action and Theism," Unitarian Review,
(1881); reprinted in James, Will to Believe, pp. 63-110. Idem, "Ration
ality, Activity and Faith," Princeton Review 2 (1882):58-86. The latter
essay appears as the second half of "The Sentiment of Rationality" in
James, Will to Believe, pp. 75-110.
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religious belief took the same form as his defense of human freedom— in
both cases the belief is justified by its practical consequences.

In the

late nineteenth century, science argued against both of these issues but
James recognized different problems demanded different perspectives and
that their answers were perspective dependent.

As we shall see in the

third chapter, James's pluralism appears in his psychology in his formu
lation of the various sub-universes of reality in which thinking takes
place.
Returning to James's early thought, it must be acknowledged that
the demand for objectivity, uniformity and verifiability were associated
with the ascendency of the natural sciences.

James feared however, and

with some justification, that the proponents of Tyndall and Huxley were
exploiting the authority of science when they ventured into the specula
tive realm.

Their exploitation took the form of speaking as though their

scientific formulations of metaphysical questions were the only reason
able alternatives, that they had an unequivocal basis of support.
short, positivistic speculation was presented as dogma.

In

At the same time,

they strongly implied that other interpretations were merely 'subjective',
or worse yet, 'theological'.

Their mistake, as James saw it, was that

their zealous proselytizing of science allowed them to forget that they
themselves were engaging in a thoroughly subjective and speculative enter
prise.

Thus James was upset that Huxley could suggest that faith in an

unproven religious doctrine was the 'lowest depth of immorality' while
righteously maintaining that man is a 'conscious automaton'.

50

The sci

entific evidence supporting Huxley's conception of consciousness was, in
50
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James's eyes, open to alternative Interpretation.

In his essay "Are We

Automata," James drew upon the most successful scientific achievement of
his age— evolutionary theory— to support his contention that conscious
ness is more than epiphenomenal.'**

In brief, he argued that since con

sciousness has 'survived' phylogenetically it must have adaptive value
and therefore must effect action, i.e., it must function to guide man’s
adaptation under some circumstances.

This proposition, coupled with

evidence from phenomenal experience and a practical justification for
the efficacy of belief, allowed James to present an at least plausible
argument for psycho-physical interactlonism.

52

In summary, by postulating that all speculation contains a sub
jective element, James sought to make clear that the presumed objectivity
of the scientific conception of human nature was illusory, that the
content of their speculative systems was dictated by the values which
they held dearest.

For this reason James's invitation to the specula

tive realm contained a noteworthy qualification:
By all means let every man who has a stomach for the fray be
admitted to the speculative realm. But let it be on equal footing
with all comers, all to wear the speculative colors, no odds given,
no favors shown. And may the critics help fair play by pointing
out to the . . . public that this wild-eyed champion who is now
seen throwing in his hat . . . was no other than the laborious and
accurate physicist, chemist, or physiologist Blank, who, having
. . . tired . . . of the laboratory's confinement, now appears in
his new and brilliant role of Blank, the Audacious and Ingenious
Speculative Philosopher.53
Let us take one example— the scientist's rejection of the reality of
human freedom— and see how it could be understood within James's account
of philosophical belief.

The scientist enters the philosophical realm
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seeking universal lawfulness and simplicity and, because of these sub
jective ideals— which have been valuable guides in his scientific work—
he opts for a strict determinism.

The possibility of 'absolute beginnings'

is, to the scientist, an unthinkable anomaly, a blatent contradiction of
everything that he has learned to cherish.

In contrast, in defending

human freedom the free-willist is responding to his passion for an accu
rate description of the particulars of phenomenal experience.

The

scientist's abstract determinism leaves him cold, it simply does not
address itself to the richness and moral Intensity which he is seeking
to understand.

How can moral righteousness be reduced to the interplay

of neural connections asks the person who believes in human freedom.
James's fundamental postulate is evidenced in the belief of both the
scientist and free-willist; the individual contributes something—
replaces factual ambiguity with emotional conviction— based on his
previously established subjects interests.

James's Philosophical Defense of Human Freedom
We have encountered James's belief in human freedom from two
perspectives; first as a personal dilemma which he overcame and second
in terms of his formulation of the nature of philosophical belief.
This is unavoidable since this theme literally pervades James's early
writings.

Instead of continuing to approach this theme obliquely how

ever, we shall examine it explicitly in this section.

With this accom

plished, we shall attempt to show the continuity between James's interactionistic conception of man in his philosophical and psychological
thought.
Although James's formal statement on human freedom did not appear
until his 1884 essay "The Dilemma of Determinism," the essentials of his
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formulation can again be seen emerging in his book reviews and writings
of the 1870's.

54

While we shall deal primarily with his more elaborate

statement, a number of his early works will be cited to anchor his
thought chronologically.

The relationship between his defense of human

freedom, psycho-physical interactionism and his critique of nineteenth
century science should also be made explicit.

If his philosophical and

psychological work before 1884 is considered as an integrated whole, it
can be seen to contain both critical and constructive aspects.

At the

philosophical level, he was critical of the ostensibly objective scien
tific formulation of man.

On the positive side, his early philosophical

work culminated with pragmatically based argument for human freedom.
At the psychological level James criticized the scientific formulation
of mind, mounted a scientific argument in support of psycho-physical
interactionism and presented a formulation of volition which could accom
modate human freedom.
It should not be surprising to learn that James's argument for
human freedom centered around the subjective affirmation of the "moral
order in the universe .F or mu la te d in terms of the behavioral effects
of a person believing in his freedom or determination, his argument is
the practical embodiment of Victorian moralism.
James fully realized, in considering the topic of human freedom,
that he was dealing with a metaphysical postulate which could not be
verified in a scientific fashion.

His argument therefore consisted of

an explication of the real life implications, the 'practical effects'
54
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of believing In a thoroughly determined universe.

According to James,

the dilemma of determinism is that its affirmation ipso facto repudiates
the reality of the moral world and creates a universe in which 'what
ought to be' is impossible or morally meaningless.

That is, James

argued that since determinism postulates that all behavior is decreed
(caused) by a set of antecedent events, 'what ought to be' is impossible
unless, per chance, 'what ought to be' is decreed to be.

The problem,

for the moralist, is that with either alternative 'what ought to be' is
beyond human control and therefore devoid of moral responsibility.
James analyzes the case of murder in the following fashion.
According to the determinist, the act of murder was the only possible
outcome of the given set of antecedent conditions.
James asked, regret the murder?

Would the determinist,

Possibly, but if so, he should surely

regret all the other evils in the world. The result of these feelings of
regret in a world which is beyond our control, James argued, would bethe
development of an attitude of 'deterministic pessimism'.

James saw such

pessimism evidenced in the German philosophies of von Hartmann and
Schopenhauer.

It also follows that 'what ought to be' is impossible

since the possibility of non-murder under the given conditions is non
sensical to the determinist.

The only escape for the determinist, thought

James, was the adoption of a Rousseau-like attitude of 'deterministic
optimism', i.e., a philosophy of life which maintains that 'whatever
happens is for the best in the long run'. The problem here is that the
determinist must forever renounce his feelings of regret and the moral
universe as either unreal or pathological."^

James, Will to Believe, p. 163.

James concluded his discussion

"^Ibid., pp. 162-167.

of a deterministic philosophy of life by suggesting that it
. . . fosters the fatalistic mood of mind. It makes those
who are already too inert more passive still; it renders wholly
reckless those whose energy is already in excess.58
The moralistic and interactionistic conception of James's argument
against determinism is clear In this passage, as well as an earlier
essay published in Renouvier's journal.
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The problem of evil was a

very real problem within James's moral universe.

It could neither be

denied nor explained away in the name of science.

From James's point

of view, the only viable strategy was to acknowledge its existence and
actively strive to overpower it through willful effort.

His formula

tion of human freedom was fully compatible with such a melioristic con
ception of the world.
James's interactionism is evidenced by his suggestion that If a
person believes his efforts are ineffectual— that whatever will be will
be— then he would be less likely to expend the effort necessary to do
what ought to be done.

In contrast, believing in his own freedom and

creativity would act to reinforce the expenditure of additional voli
tional effort.

This argument in terms of the 'practical effects' of a

belief in freedom provided the concrete justification which his father's
or Agassiz's idealism lacked.

The psychological tone of this philo

sophical argument should also be made explicit.

James Is saying, in

effect, that a belief in one's helplessness contributes to a person being
and acting helpless while a belief in freedom can contribute to a stren
uous and effort-filled life.
58
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It should also be noted how closely James's argument for freedom
is tied to his own crisis over the problem of freedom in the late I860's.
Remember the importance of belief in Renouvier's formulation of free
will, and James's proclamation in 1870 that:
Hitherto, when I have felt like taking a free initiative . . .
suicide seemed the most manly form to put my daring into; now,
I will go a step further with my will, not only act with it, but
believe as well; believe in my individual reality and creative
power. My belief . . . can't be optimistic— but I will posit
life (the good, the real) in the self-governing resistance of the
ego to the world. 60
Thus an interactionistic conception of self— an actively choosing fighter
for ends— stood at the very center of James's personal and philosophical
conception of human freedom.

Without exaggeration, believing provided

James with an alternative to thoughts of suicide, and after 1870 he never
again, seriously questioned the reality of his freedom.

It should not be-

surprising then, that James's early philosophical works represent the
foundation of a system which sought to accommodate human freedom, a system
in which the individual was an actively choosing and creative part of
reality.

Human Freedom and a Scientific Psychology
During the years between 1875 and 1884 however, James was begin
ning to formulate the central principles of his scientific psychology
and his personal and philosophical affirmation of freedom created enor
mous difficulties for this task.

For if volitional effort does effect

action, if mind does effect body, an alternative to the then popular
psycho-physical parallelism would have to be supplied.

In fact, if

James's psychology was to be consistent with his moral philosophy, it

^Henry James, Letters of William James, 1:148.
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could be nothing less than a psycho-physical interactionism— a psychology
In which an efficacious and mentallstic self traversed the unfathomable
Cartesian chasm.

Surely his moral philosophy demanded only a limited

interactionism but, as we have seen, nineteenth century scientific deter
minism required that psychology adopt a strict psycho-physical parallel
ism.

The Principles reveals that James felt this conflict intensely.

The Principles was, after all, a scientific text and, in hopes of avoid
ing metaphysical polemics, James empllcitly postulated a complete paral
lelism, "the blank unmediated correspondence, term for term, of the states
of consciousness with the total brain p r o c e s s . F o r the most part he
was able to stay within the boundaries of this formulation.

But despite

the author's intent to maintain the collaterality of mind and body, James's
parallelism leaks— from the mental to the physical— in precisely those
areas which his moral philosophy demands that it leak, viz., in his formulation of will and related topics.

62

James's conception of consciousness as an efficacious cognitiveemotive process can be seen emerging in his 1878 critique of Spencer's
definition of mind.
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Spencer, in his own Principles of Psychology, had

postulated that the entire process of mental evolution could be conceived
as "the continuous adjustment of internal mental relations to external
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environmental relations."

64

According to this correspondence theory of

mind, mind passively registers those actually experienced relations and
events which make survival more probable.

This formulation is the evolu

tionary embodiment of an empirical philosophy.

The motivational principle

is pleasure and pain and ultimately the survival of the organism.

James

thought this characterization was a gross oversimplification— another
instance of the positivistic pseudo-scientist losing sight of the obvious
in the glare of cosmic speculation.

The poverty of such a formulation

is that it concealed the complexity and teleology inherent in experience,
the teleology which James had argued is central to both scientific and
philosophical inquiry.

Beyond passively registering the events and rela

tions of the external world, James suggested that consciousness
. . . seems to supply the means and the standard by which the
[objects] are measured. It not only serves a final purpose, but
it brings a final purpose— posits, declares it, this purpose is
not a mere hypothesis . . . but an imperative decree; Survival
shall occur, and, therefore, brain must so perform.65
In this passage we find James describing two qualitatively different forms
of conscious activity. The first is strictly psychological and relates to
the use of the concept of subjective interests as a psychological construct,
i.e., the subjective interests embedded in consciousness seem "to supply
the means and the standard" by which objects are measured.

Thus experi

ence seems to be pervaded by what we shall call in the third chapter a
transient teleology through which some objects and relations are judged
valuable and true while others are declared trivial and misleading or
simply ignored.

In this same passage however, we find James making reference
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to a qualitatively different form of conscious activity.

Thus he wrote

that some subjective interests take on the status of "imperative decrees;"
and survival, or some other subjective ideal, "shall occur, and, there
fore, brain must so perform."

Such imperative decrees are the fundamental

beliefs of the knower— which we shall call the fundamental teleology in
James's psychological thought.

Not surprisingly this form of conscious

activity represents a clear and explicit 'leak' from the mental to the
physical and this is a source of inconsistency and confusion in James's
psychology.

In this section we shall begin to trace the development and

implications of both forms of conscious activity in James's psychological
thought.

But it must be repeated that this is just the beginning; this

task will not be completed until we examine his formulation of belief in
the third chapter and directly confront the relation between his early
philosophical thought and his psychology of the higher mental processes.
James's debt to Renouvier might also be noted, for while the French phi
losopher put an act by the individual in the heart of his philosophical
thought, James placed an act by the individual in the heart of his psycho
logical thought.
At the strictly psychological level, the means which James makes
reference to in the above passage are the mental representations of the
various possibilities of action.

These mental representations are the

cognitive portions of consciousness, as stored in memory.

By defining

mind almost exclusively in terms of the passive registration of relations
experienced in the environment, Spencer's formulation emphasized this
cognitive aspect of mind.

But James recognized that an equally important

aspect of mind is that it supplies its own standard through which reality
is judged.

With this idiosyncratic standard, consciousness becomes an
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active participant in a person's construction of reality— much like the
subjective ideals of the person play an essential part in James's analysis
of philosophical belief.

For example, given the same mass of sensory

input— a northern New Hampshire landscape— the painter, the real estate
developer and the geologist see different worlds based on their divergent
interests.

Within James's psychology, subjective interests draw an indi

vidual's attention to different aspects of the same mass of sensory experi
ence.

They influence action by determining exactly what a person perceives.

In this respect they represent a deterministic and potentially scientific
construct.

Of equal importance to James however, is that subjective

interests represent the dynamic-motivational aspect of all conscious
activity, "the real a priori element in cognition which precedes the
outer relations noticed."

66

He described this dynamic aspect as "an

immense number of emotional judgements, judgements of the ideal, judge
ments that things should be thus and s o . T h i s

transient, dynamic and

frightfully complex network of ideal, mental relations develops gradually
in time and becomes the cognitive-emotive rules which a person brings
into the game of experiencing reality.

They can be understood as mental

constructions which result from the interaction of a person's network of
ideal relations with what is actually experienced in the world.

Most

importantly, they need not correspond to anything that actually has been
experienced in the real world.

With the concept of subjective interests

the content of consciousness is forever embedded, in James's psychology,
in a dynamic act.
Given this formulation, the terms pleasure and pain beg the moti
vational question since only by knowing a person's ideals— his unique

66Ibid., p. 6.

67Ibid., p. 3.
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structure of interests— can one define what is pleasureful or painful.
Thus with the concept of subjective interests James obtained a construct—
however evasive— through which a person could transcend objectively defined
pleasures and pains as well as the actually experienced relations given in
the world.

68

And that at least some people can make such a transcendence,

James wrote, is evidenced by phenomenal experience.

69

Though it received little attention from psychologists at the time,
the concept of subjective interests is central to James's mature psycho
logical as well as philosophical thought.

Perhaps its explicitly teleo-

logical and idiographic character made nineteenth century experimental
psychologists wary of its utility as a scientific construct.

Whatever the

reasons, however, it is certainly the most pervasive theme in James's pre1890 essays and it appears in the Principles in the most distinctively
Jamesian chapters, i.e.."Automaton Theory," "The Consciousness of Self,"
"The Stream of Thought," "Reasoning," "Association" and "The Perception
of Reality."

We can turn to the Principles to solidify this point.

In

his treatment of self, James makes the dynamic-motivational character of
subjective interests explicit.
Our interest in things means the attention and emotion which the
thought of them will excite, and the actions which their presence
will evoke . . . my social self-love, my interest in the images
other men have framed of me, is . . .a n interest in a set of
objects external to my thought.70
And in his treatment of attention we find a passage that goes to the heart
68

We shall examine James's formulation of the distinctive, a priori
capacities of human beings which make such a transcendence possible; see
pp. 124-138 below.
69
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of James's critique of classical associationism.

Here he writes that

Millions of items of the outward order are present to my senses
which never properly enter into my experience. Why? Because
they are of no interest to me . . . . Only those items which
I notice shape my mind— without selective Interest, experience
is utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, light
and shade, background and foreground— intelligent perspective,
in a word.71
For our last example we shall turn to James's most distinctive psycholog
ical concept, the stream of thought.

Again, the notion of interest is a

central aspect of this formulation.
Relation . . . to . . . interest is constantly felt in the fringe,
and particularly the relation of harmony and discord. . . . any
thought the quality of whose fringe lets us feel ourselves 'all
right' is an acceptable member of our thinking. . . . Provided we
only feel it to have a place in a scheme of relations in which
the interesting topic also lies, that is quite sufficient to make
it a relevant and appropriate portion of the train of ideas.72
Thus subjective interests transform consciousness, for James, from a
passive register to an essentially active, selective process which is
antithetical to Spencer's definition of mind.

Furthermore, the subjec-

tivistic and idiographic tone of the concept of subjective interests set
the foundation upon which the formulation of the stream of thought was
constructed.

Its intimate relationship to James's early philosophical

thought should also be noted.

Implicit in his affirmation of freedom,

his early book reviews and his essays on the motives of philosophical
belief is a recognition that the person selects one aspect of experience
to be his reality, whether that reality be a scientific theory or some
concrete perceptual object.
Let us now return to the second form of conscious activity contained
in James's critique of Spencer's definition of mind, the imperative decree

^*Tbid., p. 402.

(Italics mine.)
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which we have called the fundamental teleology in James's psychology.
Here we find James describing what must be called an essentially interactionistic and indeterministic form of conscious activity.

"Survival

shall occur," he wrote, and, therefore, brain must so perform."

73

This

willful command represents an unequivocal 'leak' from the mental to the
physical and, once acknowledged, any hope of a complete psycho-physical
parallelism is shattered.

The philosophical postulate which stands in

the not too distant background of this sentence is, of course, human
freedom.

This imperative decree which James tells us is characteristic

of volitional activity is essentially the same as Renouvier's formula
tion of freedom which James alluded to in 1870, i.e., "the sustaining
of a thought because I choose to when I might have other thoughts."

74

The sustaining of a particular thought involves attending to that
thought and voluntary attention, according to James, is the essence
of will.^

In both cases a subjective volitional act brings one of

any number of possible actions into reality.
In his first full-length treatment of volition, James stated
that the question of human freedom reduced to whether or not the amount
of volitional effort expended was fully determined by antecedent events.^
The scientist explicitly postulates that the amount of effort jLs fully
determined and states, in effect, that the line of least resistance is
73
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always followed.

Anything short of such a postulate would be the tacit

affirmation of mental efficacy.

James noted, however, that such a posi

tion is not supported by phenomenal experience in those cases in which
a more altruistic idea is chosen.
(1)

M per se < S

(2)

M + E >S

He symbolized such an instance as,

where S is the more forceful or instinctual idea, M is the less force
fully felt or altruistic idea and E is the amount of volitional effort
expended in attending to the idea.^

According to James, in the second

equation volitional effort seems to be added ole novo to the rather weak,
altruistic idea and the path of greater resistance becomes a reality.
Of course, the determinist would posit that this experience is an illu
sion but James took pains to point out that such a statement is an
assumption rather than an empirical fact.

Of course, James's position

is also assumptive rather than factual but his assumption does not do
violence to phenomenal experience. Rather thanbeing
of a

set ofantecedent events,volitionaleffort,

afixed resultant

for James, "is a

psychic or moral fact pure and simple," which
. . . appears adventitious and indeterminate in advance.
We can make more or less of it as we please, and if we make ^g
enough we can convert the greatest resistance into the least.
It is obvious but important to recognize that within this formulation
of volition, James is going beyond his own deterministic construct of
subjective interests and entering the realm of the metaphysics of human
freedom.

He is therefore constructing a formulation of volition within

which a person can transcend not only pleasure and pain, but also his
subjective interests, through willful effort.
77
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This type of conscious
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control, which James called the 'fiat' of the will, represents a clear
departure from the strictly psychological form of selectivity contained
in the concept of subjective interests.
James used a number of phrases to communicate the full meaning of
the fiat.

In his earliest publication on volition he called it the

"mental click of resolve."

79

In a later article he described it as a

"genuine and sincere mental consent."

80

And in the Principles the fiat

is simply a "volitional mandate" or an "act of mental consent."

81

In

all usages, however, he describes the fiat as a mental process by which
"we keep affirming and adopting a state of mind of which disagreeableness is an integral factor."

82

And whenever James employs the term it

is clearly mentalistic, implicates a psycho-physical interactionism and
is potentially indeterministic.

I say potentially indeterministic

because James knew full-well that he was injecting metaphysics into
his psychology of volition.

In fact, it might be more accurate to say

that James's formulation of volition was offered with human freedom in
mind rather than to imply that his formulation stands or falls with
the resolution to the question of free will.
In any case, James is obviously troubled and torn over the impli
cations of human freedom for scientific psychology and vice versa.

And

it should not be surprising that he openly discards his proposed paral
lelism in his chapters on Attention, Will and Automaton Theory.

That

79
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he had free will in mind when he broke his parallelism in these chapters
is evidenced by his 1879 letter to Shadworth Hodgson.

Here he wrote

that:
. . . so obscure are still the relations of the individual
consciousness to the universal thought . . . that I can't help
hoping . . . that some way will be found by which causality may
still be ascribed to individual volitions and reactions of
attention. My article in Mind was written against the swaggering
dogmatism of certain medical materialists. . . . I wanted to
show them how many empirical facts have been overlooked.83
The very language which James uses in this excerpt— "the relations of
the individual consciousness to the universal thought"— is reminiscent
of his father's discussion of Swedenborg's ontology.

But while father

and son may have shared the same ideals, William truly was a scientist
and needed empirical facts to support his contention.

The article in

Mind which he alludes to in this letter is his essay, "Are We Automata?,"
which first appeared in 1879 and was later incorporated into the
Principles.

It also becomes clear from this letter that James's cri

tique of nineteenth century positivistic science and his formulation
of volition were both motivated by a desire to defend— or at least
leave open— the possibility of human freedom.
The Jamesian circle is now complete and above the abstract theo
retical inconsistencies there appears a fundamental personal consistency
in James's early philosophical and psychological thought.

A phenomenon

which James— the man— discovered in personal experience was later affirmed
by James— the moral philosopher— in the metaphysical realm and still
later presented by James— the empirical psychologist— as an integral part
of his scientific psychology.

If James— the psychologist— is considered

83
Perry, William-James, 1:616.

(Italics mine.)

47

in isolation, the traces of interactionism and indeterminism in the
Principles become aberrations and the inconsistencies of that work be
come incomprehensible or, worse yet, naive.

But if James is recognized

as a man who was vitally concerned with moral issues which centered
around the problem of human freedom, these inconsistencies can be seen
as necessary, and, in fact, essential parts of his attempt to create a
science of psychology.

Of course, such a recognition does not make the

theoretical and metaphysical inconsistencies disappear but one wonders
whether the inconsistencies are rooted in the emotional sentiments of
William James or the equally emotional sentiments of those who wish to
legislate jex cathedra the contents and methods of a scientific psychology.
For James, the scientist by training, philosopher by temperament, a
scientific psychology
. . . means . . . not a sort of psychology that stands on
solid ground. It means a psychology particularly fragile, and
into which the waters of metaphysical criticism leak at every
joint.
A hundred years after the birth of William James, Gordon Allport exam
ined what he called the 'productive paradoxes' of James's psychology.
We shall close our chapter with Allport's description of his mentor's
message to contemporary psychology.
Narrow consistency can neither bring salvation to your science
nor help mankind. Let your approaches be diverse, but let
them in aggregate do full justice to the heroic qualities of
man. If you find youselves tangled in paradoxes, what of
that? Who can say that the universe shall not contain para
doxes simply because he himself finds them unpalatable? To
accommodate the whole of human experience keep layers of space
and air and vision in your scientific formulations.

William James, Psychology: A Briefer Course, (New York: Henry
Holt and Co., 1892; reprint ed., New York: Harper, 1961), p. 334.
Gordon Allport, "The Productive Paradoxes of William James,"
Psychological Review 50 (1943):95-127, pp. 126-127.

CHAPTER 2

SHADWORTH HODGSON AND JAMES'S PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY

He [Hodgson] rejected what passed in his day for empiricism . . .
because . . . it was infected with Hume's sensationalistic atomism . . . . It is as an exponent of the experiential theory of
being . . . that Hodgson was James' master. . . . But while James . . .
cites Hodgson as an exponent of empiricism in general, and names
him with Charles Pierce as one of the two sources of his pragmatism,
the influence of Hodgson is most evident in matters of detail. He
helped James to bridge the chasms created both by traditional dual
ism and by Hume's sensationalistic atomism.1
This passage, from Perry's The Thought and Character of William
James, is both remarkable and confusing.

On the one hand, Perry clearly

acknowledges James's indebtedness to what he called Hodgson's experien
tial theory of being, i.e., Hodgson's description of experience as a
stream and his unequivocal rejection of Hume's atomism.

What is remark

able about this observation is that while James's formulation of the
stream of thought is generally recognized as a seminal theme of the
Principles, no one— not even Perry— has provided a systematic examina
tion of the influence of Hodgson on James's psychology.

This omission

becomes especially conspicuous— and in need of clarification— in the
light of the recent phenomenological interpretations of the Principles.
These writers have considered the notion of the stream of thought in
detail but have, for the most part, ignored Hodgson.

Instead they have

chosen to look to German sources for the roots of James's phenomenological

Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James,
2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1935), 1:612-613. (Italics
mine.) Hereafter cited as Perry, William James.
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conception of thought as a stream.

2

While their efforts provide us with

a clean and ostensibly reasonable historical interpretation— phenome
nology did, after all, emerge as a distinct philosophical movement in
Germany— a discemably w.higgish strain in this interpretation appears
when James's debt to Hodgson, an English empirical philosopher, is ex
amined.
What is confusing in Perry's treatment of the Hodgson-James rela
tionship comes into clear focus when two parts of the above excerpt are
juxtaposed.

We are told that Hodgson "helped James to bridge the chasms

created both by traditional dualism and Hume's sensationalistic atomism"
but them, in the same breath, that "the influence of Hodgson is most
evident in matters of detail."

The problem is that dualism and sensa

tionalistic atomism were not details of nineteenth century philosophy
and psychology but rather fundamental and long-entrenched assumptions
which served as the conceptual foundation of these disciplines.

Another

interpretation of Perry might be that he meant to relegate Hodgson's

See, for example, Hans Linschoten's On the Way Toward a Phenom
enological Psychology: The Psychology of William James (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1968), pp. 150-160; Aron Gurwitsch's The
Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964),
pp. 307-365; James Edie's "William James and Phenomenology," Review of
Metaphysics. 23 (1970):485-490. Hodgson is sometimes mentioned in
passing by recent phenomenological commentators as one of those who
supported the automaton theory conception of consciousness, e.g., see
John Wild's William James' Radical Empiricism (New York: Doubleday,
1969), p. 12. James's indebtedness to Hodgson has been noted in passing
by Andrew Rack, "Epistemology in William James' Principles of Psychology,"
Tulane Studies in Philosophy, 22 (1972):88-89; John Passmore, A Hundred
Years of Philosophy (London: Duckworth and Co., 1957), p. 107; and Aron
Gurwitsch, "William James' Theory of the 'Transitive Parts' of the
Stream of Consciousness," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 3
(1943):453. The most extensive treatment of the James-Hodgson rela
tionship is provided in Perry's William James, (1:611-653), but a sys
tematic examination of Hodgson's impact on James's psychology has yet
to be undertaken.
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influence to matters of detail only with respect of James's philosophy
of pragmatism.

While this seems more reasonable, we are still left with

an incomplete account of the sources of James's philosophical psychology
in the Principles— a lacuna which contemporary phenomenologists are
quickly filling with remnants of the proto-phenomenological systems of
late nineteenth century Germans.

There are a number of problems with

a phenomenological interpretation of the Principles but perhaps the most
devastating is the effect that it has on'contemporary psychologists—
i.e., James's psychology comes to be viewed as removed from the concerns
of contemporary psychology and his system becomes unintelligible.
In this chapter it will be argued that a complex of related phil
osophical insights from Hodgson's system formed, not the details, but
the assumptive core of James's philosophical psychology in the Principles.
Specifically, it will be argued that a number of phenomenological themes
were clearly present in Hodgson's works as early as 1865 and, given
this, that these themes influenced James's formulations of: (1) the
psychologists' fallacy, (2) the distinction between knowledge by ac
quaintance and knowledge about and (3) the nature of the distinction
between subject and object.

At the same time that Hodgson embraced

these phenomenological themes however, we shall show that he also re
tained the ideal of creating a scientific psychology.

Before approach

ing these issues, however, some introductory remarks must be made con
cerning the domain of philosophical psychology, the approach taken in
this chapter and Hodgson's relationship to James.
The province of philosophical psychology is by no means selfevident.

Our first task, then, is to circumscribe the boundaries of

that discipline as it applies to the Principles. Following the lead
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of Andrew Reck, this chapter will consider the fundamental assumptions,
methodological orientation and the metaphysical implications of James's
psychology.

3

Philosophical psychology in general seeks to explicate

the fundamental concepts which psychologists employ as working assump
tions.

To the extent that these assumptions implicate fundamental world

views, philosophical psychology makes contact with the metaphysical
realm.

Conversely, to the extent that these assumptions guide and

direct the day to day activities of working psychologists, it considers
the fundamental concepts and methods of psychology.

In trying to do

justice to both these strains, philosophical psychology seeks to make
explicit what may only be implicit in a particular system of psycho
logical thought.

As stated, it should be apparent that philosophical

psychology is a hybrid discipline which lies in the area which bridges
metaphysics and the natural sciences— a kind of never-never-land within
which neither philosophers nor scientists are safe from molestation by
the other.
Though we shall be dealing with philosophical issues throughout
this chapter, the method employed is primarily historical.

This is an

important consideration because the last fifteen years has witnessed a
renaissance of scholarly activity on James's psychology from a phenom
enological frame of reference, e.g., Linschoten, Gurwitsch, Wilshire.^
3

Andrew Reck, "The Philosophical Psychology of William James,"
Southern Journal of Philosophy, 9 (1971):293-312.

4

Linschoten, Psychology of William James; Gurwitsch, Field of
Consciousness; Wild, Radical Empiricism of William James; Bruce Wilshire,
William James and Phenomenology; A Study of "The Principles of Psychology"
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968); Richard Stevens, James
and Husserl: The Foundations of Meaning (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1974).
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Edie has summarized the fundamental goal of this literature by stating
that it seeks to uncover "the intrinsic and logically necessary convergencies with James' philosophical discoveries and those of the phenomenologists.Although this body of literature is valuable in a number
of respects, it has been hampered by: (1) a tendency to tear James out
of his historical context and interpret the Principles as a primarily
philosophical rather than scientific treatise and (2 ) an impoverished
conception of the British empiricist tradition— a conception which por
trays that school as a monolithic ideas-are-atom-like-mental-things
movement.

As we shall try to show in this chapter, these shortcomings

do justice to neither Hodgson, James nor the empirical tradition.

Shadworth Hodgson
Shadworth Holloway Hodgson (1832— 1912) was first and foremost
a metaphysical system-builder whose system followed him into the grave.
He was remembered by his contemporaries as a gracious and contemplative
person who turned to metaphysics after the early deaths of his wife and
child. ^ Although he never held an academic position, he remained an
integral part of nineteenth century British philosophy from his home in
London.

He was the joint founder of a British philosophical club— the

"*Edie, "William James and Phenomenology," p. 486.
^Secondary accounts of Hodgson's thought are infrequent but see
Rudolf Merz's A Hundred Years of British Philosophy (London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1930), pp. 479-494. Obituaries also consider
Hodgson's system, see G. D. Hicks, "Shadworth Holloway Hodgson," Pro
ceedings of the British Academy, 6 (1913):508-516; William Carr,
Shadworth Holloway Hodgson," Mind, New Series, 21 (1912):473-485. Also
see G. E. Davie, "Shadworth Hodgson," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
8 vols., ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1972),
4:47-48 and George F. Stout, "The Philosophy of Shadworth Hodgson,"
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2 (1892-1893):107-119.
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Aristotelian societv--and was its first and longest president (1880-1894).
He was also a frequent contributor to the journal Mind, and his systema
tic works— Time and Space (1865), The Theory of Practice (1870), The
Philosophy of Reflection (1878) and The Metaphysics of Experience (1898)—
are testimony to his productivity, breadth and sheer persistence as a
philosopher.^
Hodgson's metaphysics is almost impossible to categorize in terms
of nineteenth century philosophical systems.

On one hand, he felt that

the only true metaphysics was being written from within the German tradi
tion and he was continuously critical of the attempt by empiricism to
reduce metaphysics to psychology, i.e., the psychologism of that school.
A contemporary noted that the Kantian tendency was especially evident in
his early works, which James encountered well before he began work on
g

the Principles in 1878.

At the same time, however, Hodgson was critical

of the a priori conclusions of the Kantian tradition and wrote in 1876
that a
. . . greater and more comprehensive philosophy can arise in
the line of Locke that can ever arise in the line of Leibniz;
but only on the condition of replacing our narrow psychological
horizon by an horizon of true philosophical range.°
Merz created a new category in calling Hodgson's metaphysics a 'critical
empiricism' to emphasize the Kantian and Lockean strains of his thought.

Shadworth H. Hodgson, Time and Space: A Metaphysical Essay (London:
Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green, 1865); Idem, The Theory of
Practice. 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1870); Idem, The Phi
losophy of Reflection, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1878); Idem,
The Metaphysics of Experience, 4 vols. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1898),
g

Carr, "Shadworth Hodgson," p. 475.
9
Shadworth Hodgson, "Philosophy and Science," Mind, 1 (1876):235.
^Merz, British Philosophy, p. 481.
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Hodgson himself called his philosophy an 'experientialism' in hopes of
distinguishing it from both the atomistic assumptions of the empirical
tradition and the a priori assumptions of the rational0tradition.

What

ever label one chooses, however, the synthetic and critical nature of
Hodgson's thought must be emphasized— along with his insistence that the
distinctive feature of philosophy is its method which involves an
assumptionless description of what is given in experience.
James's contact with Hodgson and his philosophy is easy to docu
ment, as a good deal of Perry's three chapters on the James-Hodgson
relationship consists of their correspondence and archival materials.
While the reader is encouraged to go directly to Perry, a brief outline
of his chapters will suffice for our purposes.^
Perry states that James's copy of Hodgson's Time and Space is
dated "December, 1875"

12

and James's first published reference to

Hodgson appears in a July, 1875 book review.

13

In a footnote in the

Principles, however, James makes reference to an article he tried writing
in 1869 in response to those philosophers who tacitly assumed that consciousness affects brain-processes.

14

While the article was never com

pleted, James lists Hodgson's Time and Space first in a list of authors
he sought to challenge.

That James had read Hodgson's works this early

in his career— at least five years before the publication of Brentano's
or Wundt's classic psychological treatises and at least nine years

^Perry, William James, 1:611-653.
12Ibid., p. 612.

13
William James, "Review of Wilhelm Wundt's Gruridzllge dei physiologischen Psychologie," North American Review, 12] (1875):201.
14
William James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1890; reprint ed. New York: Dover Publishing Co.,
1950), 1:130-131. Hereafter cited as James, Principles.
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before he was contracted to write a psychology text— is an important
point to keep in mind.
The James-Hodgson correspondence begins in 1879, became most heavy
during the decade of the 1880's and gradually dwindled until James's
death in 1910.

The tone of the early correspondence shows clearly that

Hodgson was the established philosopher and James was the struggling and
diffident student.

They first met in 1880 and James visited Hodgson on

a number of his European tours during the 1880's.

James's own estimate

of the importance of Hodgson can be seen in a letter dated March 11, 1879,
when he wrote to Hodgson that,
I regard [your books] as the greatest mine of philosophical
wealth now extant, though I find it hard to re-think your
thought— every sentence, yea, every clause being original.
I think some disciples must come and retail you in small change
before your influence becomes what it should be.15
This letter makes clear that James, in fact, labored over Hodgson's works
and found in them what he considered to be first-rate philosophical in
sights.

In the remainder of this chapter I hope to show that James's

personal assessment of Hodgson's philosophy was well-founded and that it
served as the foundation of his philosohpical psychology in the Principles.

James's Notion of the Psychologists' Fallacy
The first topic we shall consider— the psychologists' fallacy— is
methodological.

A number of recent commentators on James have described

this principle as a phenomenological insight of James's psychology, one
which pointed toward the importance of assumptionless description for
psychology.^

None of these writers, however, have considered the importance

^Perry, William James, 1:681.
^See Gurwitsch, Field of Consciousness, pp. 233-234; p. 243, and
Wild, Radical Empiricism, pp. 31-49.
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of Hodgson's thought in their examinations of James's notion of the psy
chologists' fallacy.

What James called the psychologists' fallacy lies at the heart of
his philosophical psychology for two reasons.

First, within it is con

tained the germ of a fundamental methodological insight which guided his
critique of previous philosophical formulations of the nature of mental
processes.

It was this realization that made the elements of empiricism

and the transcendental ego of rationalism unnecessary encumbrances for
James's psychology.

Second, this insight also set the conceptual founda

tion for James's own formulation of the nature of mental processes in
the Principles. After explicating James's distinction between the two
versions of the fallacy, it will be shown that: (1) a critical interpre
tation of the history of philosophy underlies this methodological prin
ciple, (2) it implicates a further distinction between perceptual and
conceptual knowledge and (3) James was indebted to Hodgson for both of
the above insights.
James introduces the notion of the psychologists' fallacy in chap
ter VII of the Principles, "The Methods and Snares of Psychology."

This

short chapter, together with chapter VIII— "The Relations of Minds to
Other Things"— can be viewed as a methodological introduction to James's
descriptive analyses of the stream of thought and the self, which follow
in chapters IX and X.

This statement can be justified historically by

noting that the kernal elements of chapters VII and VIII appeared as
introductory remarks to James's 1884 essay, "On Some Omissions of Intro
spective Psychology."^

It was in this article that James presented his

^William James, "On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology,"
Mind. 9 (1884):1-22.
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formulation of the stream of thought and his distinction between the
transitive and substantive portions of the stream and thus broke clearly
from the elementistic tradition of British empiricism.
In chapter VII James examines the experimental, comparative and,
most importantly, introspection as the three methods available to sci
entific psychologists.

His treatment of the first two is cursory and

skeptical at this juncture of the Principles. This skepticism, however,
is not with experimentation per se, whether it be with humans or animals.
Instead, James's hesitancy stems from the fundamental assumptions which
direct the activities of the evolutionary biologists and the 'new prism,
pendulum and chronograph philosophers'.

Thus James wrote that the prob

lem with the new psychology is not its 'brass instruments' but the fact
that the people who wield these instruments seem so "bent on studying
the elements of mental life, dissecting them out from the gross results
in which they are embedded, and . . . reducing them to a quantitative
scale."

18

But James's observations on the comparative and experimental

methods are closer to passing comments than careful analyses.

His real

concern in chapter VII is introspection, which, for scientific psychology,
James wrote, "is what we have to rely on first and foremost and always."

19

James first considers the extreme formulations of introspection—
that introspection is not humanly possible or, if it is, that it is not
possible to make a mistake introspecting.

Comte held the former position

and questioned the very possibility of introspection with the classic
argument that in reflecting on a passing thought or feeling we necessarily
distort and even destroy the experience.

Imagine reflecting on the

18
James, Principles, 1:192. (James's italics.)
19
Ibid., p. 185. (James's italics.)
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feeling of anger!

James cited Ueberweg and Brentano as representing the

opposite extreme, those who deny that a feeling of 'inner perception'
could be anything except what it appears to be.
A more moderate and representative view of introspection had been
20

presented by Sully in his Illusions: A Psychological Study.

Sully's

formulation is important since it represents the position of traditional
British empiricism and because James tells us that his 1884 article was
written "to supplement Mr. Sully's chapter on the Illusions of Introspection."

21

In that chapter Sullv distinguishes introspection from

perception and memory and confines it to the process of reflecting on
the 'contents of mind' in the time immediately after the moment some
thing has been experienced.

According to Sully, the most persistent

problem in this process is the confusion of what is actually present to
mind with some inference which is based on past experience.

While

Sully's statement, taken out of context, might sound like the notion of
the psychologists' fallacy, the examples Sully uses and his continual
reference to the 'elements' and 'components' of a complex feeling are
testimony to his tacit acceptance of the mental synthesis approach which
the psychologists' fallacy sought to refute.
Taken narrowly, the psychologists' fallacy is concerned with the
pitfalls of the introspective method.

In considering the difficulties

of this method, James tells us that the psychologists' fallacy has been
committed when the introspecting psychologist confuses "his own standpoint with that of the mental fact of which he is making a report."
20

James Sully, Illusions: A Psychological Study (New York:
Appleton, 1881).
21

James, "On Some Omissions," p. 2.

22
James, Principles, 1:196.

(James's italics.)

22
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As defined, the psychologists' fallacy is little more than a restatement
of Sully's admonishment.

It is what James does with this methodological

principle that makes it a central feature of his philosophical psychology
and an important anticipation of the phenomenological method.

That is,

with the psychologists' fallacy James pointed out that the elements
which nineteenth century empiricism found in experience, and upon which
they constructed their psychology, were little more than the expression
of their tacitly held assumption that experience really is composed of
discrete sensational elements.

Then came Kant and the rationalists who,

instead of questioning the reality of Hume's sensational elements,
presented a non-experiential transcendental ego to unite the discrete
elements which were, in the first place, created by Hume's unwarranted
assumption.
Taken in this broader, philosophical sense, the implications of
the psychologists' fallacy are far more pervasive than some of the more
mundane errors of introspection.

This is so because, as James recog

nized, in committing the psychologists' fallacy the psychologist (or
philosopher) creates and discloses the fundamental constituents of his
psychological system.

It is for this reason that James was less con

cerned with the particular experiments of the 'brass instrument' phi
losophers than he was with the elementistic assumptions which gave rise
to these experiments.

For if they assumed that experience is composite

in nature, the design, results and theories which emerged from their
experiments could do little to challenge that belief.

It is for this

reason that James stated unequivocally that the psychologists' fallacy
it
23
is "the great snare of the psychologist."
23

Ibid., p. 196.

(James's italics.)

Once committed, it becomes

60

self-perpetuating, self-justifying and self-fulfilling.
James distinguished between two forms of the psychologists'
fallacy, which we shall call the empiricist and rationalist versions.

24

In the empiricist version the psychologist mistakenly assumes that his
thought about the thought under study is the same as the thought itself.
As he never tired of reminding the introspecting psychologist, the
"psychologist . . . stands outside of the mental state he speaks of.
Both itself [the thought] and its object are objects for him."

25

The

problem arises from the fact that while the particular thought knows
its object from its own unique frame of reference, the psychologist,
. . . knowing the self-same object in his way, gets easily
led to suppose that the thought, which is jof it, knows it in the
same way in which he knows it, although this is very often far
from being the case.26
Let us attempt to clarify this methodological principle with an example
which Wild employed.

27

Imagine the psychologist trying to describe a

child's experience of a patch of woods in which he or she has recently
been frightened.

Of course, the psychologist knows a great deal about

the woods (e.g., the types of trees that are found there, how they grow,
that it is a relaxing place to take a walk through, etc.), but this
adult conceptual knowledge is more of a hindrance than an advantage in
his attempt to describe the child's experience of the woods.

If his goal

is description from the point of view of the child, then he must be
24
Wild, in his Radical Empiricism, has also called attention to
the two versions of the psychologists' fallacy, which he called the
empiricist and idealist versions. See pp. 31-49 of his work.
25
James, Principles, 1:195.
26Ibid., p. 196.

27
Wild, Radical Empiricism, pp. 36-37.
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careful to bracket his adult knowledge about the woods and keep to the
child’s understanding of the woods.

If our hypothetical psychologist

imposes his own knowledge about the woods onto his description of the
child's experience of the woods, then he is committing the empiricist
version of the psychologists’ fallacy.
We shall now turn to the historical context which surrounded
James's psychology and show that this type of fallacy stands at the foun
dation of the elementistic program of nineteenth century empiricism.
The problem, according to James, is rooted in a linguistic confusion—
the unguarded transference of our everyday use of words to the province
of psychological description.

28

James examines the empiricist descrip-

tion of the thought of a-pack-of-cards-on-the-table.

29

Within this tradi

tion this complex idea was thought to be composed of the simpler ideas
of the individual cards in the deck plus the four legs and horizontal
plane of a table etc., etc.

That is, each element of the object was

thought to be represented in the idea of the object.

This mode of descrip

tion, and the explanatory model which emerged from it, is patently absurd
for James, a fallacy which has little support in experience.

The result

for psychological description is that
. . . the continuous flow of the mental stream is sacrificed,
and in its place an atomism, a brickbat plan of construction, is
preached for the existence of which no good introspective grounds
can be brought forward . . . . 30
James saw that such a description is the product of the failure to main
tain the distinction between the way an object appears in thought and
what we know about those objects.

We know a great deal, for example, about

28
James, Principles, 1:194-195.
29
Ibid., pp. 278-279.

in
Ibid., p. 196.
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objects in the world.

One important feature of physical objects is that

they are composed of parts.

But just because we know that objects in

the world are composed of parts or elements we have no right to assume
that a thought of any object is composed of a corresponding set of ele
ments.

Such an assumed correspondence is the empiricist version of the

psychologists' fallacy and it leads to insurmountable problems for a
psychology.

It tacitly denies, for example, that thought can be sym

bolic in nature.
This version is distinctively empirical in the sense that the
empiricist school looked to the objective world, the worlds of objects,
to find the source and descriptive model for ideas.

If percepts are

passively impressed on a tabula rasa, what else could an idea be except
a mirror-like image which corresponded to the object in the world?

Even

Locke's classic metaphor of a blank tablet discloses a passive, repre
sentational view of mental life; a perspective in which ideas are mental
copies of some assumed reality.
James described the rationalist version of the psychologists'
fallacy as the "assumption that the mental state under study must be
conscious of itself as the psychologist is conscious of it."

31

Like

the empiricist, the rationalist fails to adopt the point of view of the
thought itself.

In both versions, James said, a 'wanton assumption' about

what the thought is composed of (for the empiricist) or conscious of
(for the rationalist) is imposed onto the description of the thought.
James was less anxious about the seductiveness of the rationalist version
than he was of the empiricist; the experimental psychology of his time

31Ibid., p. 197.
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was, after all, dominated by the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition.
And while allusions to the rationalist version are less frequent in the
Principles, he makes clear in his treatment of the stream of thought
that the distinction between the thinker and the object thought of is
not a necessary part of the process of knowing.

"Many philosophers,"

he wrote,
. . . hold that the reflective consciousness of the self is
essential to the cognitive function of thought. They hold that a
thought, in order to know a thing at all, must expressly distinguish
between the thing and its own self. . . . They know the object to
be one thing and the thought another; and they forthwith foist
their own knowledge into that of the thought of which they pretend
to give a true account.32
James pointed to Kant as the originator of the philosophical tradition
which was founded on the rationalist version of the psychologists' fal
lacy.

This fallacy is essentially rationalistic in the sense that it

assumes that the source of knowledge is contained in the a priori cate
gories of the knowing subject rather than the objects in the world.
Both the empiricist and rationalist versions share one important
methodological error, as well as an important metaphysical assumption.
Methodologically, both versions impose the observer's common-sense
knowledge about the world of subjects and objects onto their descrip
tions of thought.

Furthermore, at a deeper, assumptive level, both

philosophical traditions tacitly agree that there are two metaphysically
distinct substances in the universe— matter and mind (or subject and
object).

They differ only in their selection of the more fundamental

substance.

In the rationalist tradition the knower or self is the more

basic substance in the process of knowing.

In contrast, the empiricist

tradition looked to objects in the world for their fundamental model of
mental life.
32

Following the precedent of Descartes, however, both traditions

Ibid., pp. 274-275.
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assumed that epistemological questions were to be posed within a dualistic
framework and answered in terms of this fundamental dichotomy.

As we

shall see later, one of the primary aims of Hodgson's philosophy was to
challenge this metaphysical dualism.

The Hodgson-James Critique of Rationalism
and the Need for Distinguishing between
Two Types of Knowledge
James unambiguously rejected the rationalist version of the psy
chologists' fallacy in his chapter on "The Stream of Thought" in the
Principles. Then, in a footnote, James listed a number of British ration
alists who had adopted Kant's position with regard to the nature of
knowledge.

James Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic is among those

which James referred to and he quoted what that philosopher called the
First Proposition— "Along with whatever any intelligence knows it must,
as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some knowledge of
itself."

33

James's selection of Ferrier is significant because the

latter was Hodgson's mentor and Hodgson examined the problems with
Ferrier's First Proposition at length in his Time and Space and The
Philosophy of Reflection. Remember that it was these treatises which
James called "the greatest mine of philosophical wealth now extant."

34

In his Time and Space Hodgson was critical of Ferrier's proposi
tion because he felt it contained an unwarranted assumption and an
implicit and unjustified commitment to metaphysical dualism.

It tacitly

assumed, wrote Hodgson, that every feeling ever experienced is composed

33Ibid., p. 274.

34
Perry, William James, 1:681. For his critique of Ferrier's
First Proposition see Hodgson's Time and Space, pp. 45-52 and his
Philosophy of Reflection, 1:109-114.
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of, and therefore can be analyzed into, subjective and objective elements.
Such an assumption means that the distinction between subject and object
(self and not-self) is a fundamental and universal element or category
of experience.

According to Hodgson, the difficulty with this formula

tion is that the distinction between self and not-self is itself a pro
duct of experience, i.e., derived from experience.

That is, the child

at birth does not see a world of objects and a subject distinct from
these objects but some such proposition is contained in Ferrier's First
Proposition.

In his Philosophy of Reflection, Hodgson called the child's

pre-reflective experience primary consciousness, and described it as
"no more than a series of feelings and thoughts per se, unreferred (by
their subject) either to objects or to self."

35

In Hodgson's philosophy,

this world of pure or unreferred experience is developmentally prior to
our common-sense world of subjects and objects which only arises after
the child realizes that one particular object, the self, persists among
the flux of other objects in experience.

In making this distinction

the child enters what Hodgson called the world of direct consciousness.
The important point for Hodgson, however, was that the distinction
between the subjective and objective orders was itself discovered in
rather than given in primary consciousness.

And once discovered, this

distinction becomes an essential part of the child's everyday world.
This world of direct consciousness becomes elaborated into the world of
the common-sense adult and it stands at the foundation of science, which
attempts to formalize and make rigorous what might appear chaotic and
unconnected.

Hodgson's reason for distinguishing between primary and

direct consciousness was that he saw that subject matter of philosophy
35
Hodgson, Philosophy of Reflection, 1:109.
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being contaminated by the assumptions of direct consciousness.

For

Hodgson, the subject matter of philosophy was experience as it is given.
Within this frame of reference, which Hodgson called reflective con
sciousness, one seeks an assumptionless description of experience and
this goal entails a voluntary exclusion of our everyday and/or scientific
assumptions from our descriptions.

36

From this frame of reference,

Hodgson argued that Ferrier became unphilosophical by imposing his
everyday knowledge that the world is composed of subjects and objects
onto his description of what is given in experience.

Ferrier, in effect,

sought to institutionalize the common-sense distinction between self and
not-self.
The precision of Hodgson's criticism of Ferrier can be seen more
clearly by introducing a distinction that played an integral part in his
philosophical system.

This distinction is worth considering at length

because it also played an important role in James's psychological thought.
In Hodgson's system the distinction is between what he called first
intention and second intention statements.

37

First intention statements

are assumptionless descriptions of what is given in perception, or,
what would be called phenomenological descriptions of perceptual experience in contemporary terms.

38

In recognizing the importance of this

36
Ibid., pp. 9-13. Also see Hodgson, Time and Space, pp. 33-45.
Hodgson clearly recognized both the importance and uniqueness of his
distinction between first and second intention statements. Its impor
tance arises from the fact that it forms the basis for his distinction
between science and philosophy, a distinction which he stated is predi
cated on methodological grounds, i.e., the subject matter of philosophy
is composed of first intention descriptions while science deals with
second intention descriptions.
37
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type of description, Hodgson— as well as James after him— sought to
undercut Kant's dictum that 'percepts without concepts are blind'.

'Blind

percepts' may well be unimportant in the world of ordinary experience
but they play an essential role in the process of knowing and they are
part of the subject matter of philosophical inquiry.

For Hodgson, first

intention statements are descriptions of objects as they are given in
experience.

In his words,

. . . when we perceive an object as a man would perceive it
who saw in it an object for the first time, or when we voluntarily
abstract from a perceived object all that is imported into it by
our perceptions of other relations and objects, in both of these ^9
cases I call it having before us an object in its first intention.
What Hodgson is formulating here is a method of description within which
our conceptual knowledge is voluntarily abstracted; a return to what he
called primary consciousness.

This method— which Hodgson called the

method of reflection— becomes a necessary prerequisite for philosophical
analysis because without it our conceptual understandings confound our
descriptions.

Stuart Spicker has recently shown that Hodgson's method

of reflection influenced Husserl's formulation of the phenomenological
method.

40

This is an exciting and valuable line of research— a pre-

Husserl phenomenologist working from within the British empirical tradition!
39
Hodgson, Time and Space, pp. 38-39.

(Italics mine.)
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Stuart F. Spicker, "Shadworth Hodgson's Reduction as an Antic
ipation of Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology," Journal of the
British Society for Phenomenology, 2 (1971):57-73. Also see Stuart F.
Spicker, "The Fundamental Constituents of Consciousness: Process-contents
and the Erlebnisstrom," Man and World, 6 (1973):26-43. In the latter
article Spicker presents a convincing argument to the effect that Hodgson
had a direct influence on Husserl's thought. This thesis seems to
demand that the early history of phenomenology be rewritten. Taken
historically, it seems that Hodgson influenced both James and Husserl.
This interpretation also provides a basis for understanding why there
are a number of fundamental similarities between Husserl and James.
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which parallels our study of Hodgson's impact on James's philosophical
psychology.
Hodgson contrasted first intention statements with those of the
second intention.

And while the former take the percept in isolation

from others in consciousness, the latter are concerned with the object
of perception in relation to other objects in consciousness.

Put simply,

second intention statements are made from within some assumptive frame
of reference.

They may be causal, practical, genetic or ethical and

they may assume, for example, that the world is composed of subjects
distinct from objects.

As such, second intention statements are state

ments in which inferences about the objects of perception are mixed with
what is given in perception.

To use another set of Hodgson's terminology,

first intention statements are addressed to the purely descriptive ques
tion— 'What is it?'— while second intention statements seek to answer
the explanatory or functional query— 'How comes it?'.

41

In making this

distinction Hodgson sought to provide a methodological distinction
between science and philosophy.
Hodgson thought that the failure to make and keep this distinction
had resulted in a great deal of intellectual wheel-spinning in the his
tory of philosophy.

He employed this distinction, which is the fore

runner of James's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowl
edge about, to point out the contradiction in Ferrier's First Proposition.
To Hodgson, Ferrier's proposition represented a classic example of the
unconscious insertion of second intention— conceptual— knowledge into
41

Shadworth Hodgson, "The Metaphysical Method in Philosophy,"
Mind, 9 (1884):63. This article is an excellent overview of Hodgson's
formulation of the methodological basis of his philosophy; the phenom
enological themes are clearly evident.
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what was intended to be a first intention description.

In his Philosophy

of Reflection, he states that Ferrier's First Proposition contains what
42
he called the fallacy of incidental circumstance.

That is, in his

supposedly first intention description of the knowing process (i.e.,
what is given in that process), Ferrier inserts the concept of self,
which is itself an inference based on experience.

Since our knowledge

of self is an essentially second intention statement it has no place
in a description of what is given in experience.

Rather than staying

within the philosophical realm of what is given in experience, Ferrier
imposes his knowledge about the cognitive relation onto his description
of that relation.
The important point to recognize is that the rationalist version
of James's psychologists' fallacy is methodologically and conceptually
identical to the criticism of rationalism contained in Hodgson's fallacy
of incidental circumstance.

In a narrow sense, both are concerned with

a fallacy of introspection, a fallacy rooted in the common-sense use of
words to describe the flow of experience.

In a broader sense, both

criticisms point toward the importance of an assumptionless description
of experience, which Hodgson presented formally as the method of reflec
tion.

This method, however, is tied to and based on a further distinc

tion, a distinction between what is given in experience (first intention
statements) and what is imposed onto experience (second intention state
ments).

Furthermore, at the foundation of each is a skepticism of the

traditional forms of metaphysical dualism.
The problem of dualism will be considered in a later section.
Let us now solidify the relationship between James's distinction between
42
Hodgson, Philosophy of Reflection, 1:113.
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knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge about and Hodgson's distinction
between first and second intention statements.

With this completed we

shall return to the empiricist version of the psychologists' fallacy and
Hodgson's critique of traditional empiricism.
James introduced the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge about in an 1885 essay, "On the Function of Cognition."
In spite of its title, this essay is a work in critical philosophical
analysis and it is best viewed as a companion to his 1884 essay, "On
Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology."

44

His primary task in each

of these essays is a precise and unadultered description of mental life,
a description free of the paralyzing assumptions which had misled the
traditional schools of philosophical thought.

It is interesting to

note that these essays complement one another in one important respect.
In the 1884 essay James argued against the empiricists' assumption that
percepts and thoughts are distinct entities composed of separate ele
ments.

He countered this position by pointing to the inarticulate

'fringes' which surround, suffuse and give meaning to the more stable
images of thought.

Then, in his 1885 essay, James turned his descrip

tive skills to two omissions of the rationalists' conception of mind:
43
William James, "On the Function of Cognition," Mind, 10 (1885):
27-44. It should be noted that Jaems quotes John Grote in giving voice
to the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge about.
My reasons for ignoring Grote and giving precedence to Hodgson's formu
lation of the distinction are twofold. First, Hodgson's general
influence on James and his acknowledgement of this influence were
considered. Second, and more importantly, is that Hodgson's distinc
tion is an integral part of a complex of related philosophical in
sights which appear in the Principles but are clearly absent in Grote.
Perhaps I am doing Grote an injustice, but I think not. In spite of
my belief, however, I would welcome a well-documented examination of
the Grote-James relationship.
James, "On Some Omissions."
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(1) the assumption that a self is a sine qua non of knowledge and
(2) the assumption that immediate, relationless feelings are unimpor
tant to the process of knowing.

If the themes of these two essays are

taken together we are provided a bird's-eye view of James's critique
of nineteenth century philosophy.

As such, we have a unique and valuable

perspective on James's position on a number of philosophical issues
which stand at the foundation of the Principles.

And while James went

beyond Hodgson in a number of ways (e.g., in positing that relations
are themselves given in experience), his debt to that English philos
opher is significant and unmistakable.
We know that James was aware of the similarity between his con
cept of knowledge by acquaintance and Hodgson's first intention descrip
tions because he used the terms interchangeably in his 1885 essay, as
45
well as in the Principles and his Psychology: A Briefer Course.

In

the Principles he states that knowledge by acquaintance is provided by
the senses and is intimately related to bodily feelings.

He gives us

a number of examples of knowledge of this sort— the color of blue, the
taste of a pear, the feeling of an inch or the feeling of a toothache.

46

James was fully aware that language was working against him in describing
the essence of this type of knowledge.

Cognizant of this difficulty, he

analyzes the types of knowledge that are contained in an ordinary sen
tence.

Take the example of the phrase, "the taste of a pear."

The

grammatical subject of the phrase (i.e., the taste, or better yet, simply
that taste) is the blind object of acquaintance while the prepositional
45
See James, "Function of Cognition," p. 32; Principles, 1:588;
Principles, 2:4; 153; and William James, Psychology (New York: Henry
Holt and Co., 1892), p. 14.
46
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phrase (i.e., of the pear) adds knowledge about that dumb little unnamed
and unclassified feeling.

47

It is simply that taste, taken as a feeling

grounded in bodily experience and incommunicable to a person who has
never actually tasted that class of fruit, which James is referring to
as knowledge of the acquaintance type.

His genius was in recognizing

that this level of knowledge stood at the foundation of all our concep
tual knowledge.

As he said,

All the elementary natures of the world, its highest genera,
the simple qualities of matter and mind, together with the kinds
of relation that subsist between them, must not be known at all
or known in this dumb way of acquaintance without knowledge
about.48
That is, any knowledge, however abstract, is grounded in bodily feeling.
James transformed Hodgson's concept of first intention descriptions in
at least one important respect in bringing it into the psychological
realm.

That is, Hodgson's first intention descriptions are held to be

absolutely distinct from second intention descriptions in the sense
that they are intended to be absolutely pure or assumptionless.

In

contrast, James uses the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance/
knowledge about as a way of indicating opposite extremes of a continuum
rather than an iron-clad dichotomy.

Thus he wrote that

. . . in general, the less we analyze a thing, and the fewer of
its relations we perceive, the less we know about it and the more
our knowledge is of the acquaintance type. The two kinds of knowl
edge are, therefore, as the mind practically exerts them, relative
terms.49
By relativizing and softening Hodgson's distinction James could point to
the importance of this level of experience without having to defend the
position that an absolutely assumptionless description of experience is
possible.

47Ibid., p. 186.

48Ibid., p. 222.

49Ibid., p. 221.
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The relation between James's knowledge about or conceptual knowl
edge and Hodgson's second intention statements is less important and
distinctive.

Almost every nineteenth century philosopher recognized

that the data of sense is in some way transformed by our conceptual under
standings, and Hodgson and James are no exception.

For Hodgson, this is

the second intention knowledge of ordinary thinking and science, where
statements are made from some assumptive frame of reference.

Similarly,

knowledge about for James is a
. . . result of the thoughts' operating on the data of sense . . .
to transform the order in which experience comes, into an entirely
different order, that of the conceived world.

The Hodgson-James Critique of Empiricism:
the Empiricist Version of the
Psychologists' Fallacy
Thus far we have considered the importance of Hodgson for James's
formulation of the rationalist version of the psychologists' fallacy as
well as the related distinction between knowledge by acquaintance/
knowledge about.

While acknowledging these similarities, the critical

reader will demand more.

Hume, as well as Sully, saw the difficulty

with positing a substantial self, which is the thrust of the rationalist
version of the psychologists' fallacy.

The point is well taken, for

Hodgson, as a member of the empirical tradition, was certainly not alone
in recognizing the difficulty with the rationalists' formulation of
knowledge, i.e., that they implicitly assume the self, which they had
originally set out to prove.

This argument against a substantial self

or soul was part of the standard polemics of the empiricist school.
My retort to the critical reader is that Hodgson, unlike any empiricist

50Ibid., p. 482.
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before him, also applied his distinction between first and second inten
tion statements to the fundamental tenets of the empiricist tradition.
This is why Hodgson's formalization of this distinction into a philo
sophical method which could be applied to any philosophical system is
so important.

The result was that he unambiguously rejected the ele-

mentistic and atomistic conception of mind which he found in the empir
icist tradition.

In the process, Hodgson set the foundation for James's

empiricist version of the psychologists' fallacy and his formulation of
the stream of thought.
Linschoten has written that James's formulation of the stream
of thought "is the most fundamental notion in James' psychology.""^
From a descriptive point of view, this statement is incontestable.
Linschoten goes on to write, however, speaking of Brentano's chapter
on the "Unity of Consciousness," that
. . . although James does not say so, that chapter is the
foundation on which he [James] established his theory of the
stream of experience, his theory of the Self and of the perception
of time.52
Although Brentano's Psychology of 1874 may well have been important in
James's treatments of these topics, Linschoten's failure to even mention
Hodgson with regard to these topics has a distorting effect that is
characteristic of recent phenomenological interpretations of James.

In

fact, there are historical as well as conceptual reasons which suggest
that Hodgson rather than Brentano was more important in James's formu
lation of the stream of thought.

We have already noted that James had

read Hodgson's Time and Space at least five years before Brentano's

^Linschoten, The Psychology of James, p. 62.
52Ibid., p. 144.
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masterpiece was published.

The core of Hodgson's criticism of Hume's

sensationalistic atomism, as well as his description of experience as a
53
stream are contained in Time and Space.

More convincing, however, is

the fact that the methodological distinction between knowledge by
acquaintance/knowledge about underlies James's notion of the stream of
thought and this distinction is contained in Hodgson's pre-1874 works
but absent in Brentano's Psychology.

In fact, we find James criticizing

Brentano's method of introspection in an 1884 essay precisely because
it does not contain the distinction between the "immediate feltness" of
experience and one's "reflection on" this experience.^

Thus, while

James shared Brentano's aversion to the elementism and discontinuity of
the empiricist conception of mind, his book did not, in James's eyes,
present a method which supported the notion that the empiricists' ele
ments were supercilious to the science of psychology.
In introducing Hodgson we quoted him stating that a "greater and
more comprehensive philosophy can arise in the line of Locke than . . .
L e i b n i z . T h i s makes clear that Hodgson was more sympathetic to the
empiricist tradition.

In stating this, however, it must be made clear

that he was critical of a number of the fundamental tenets of the
empiricist tradition.

In the foreground of these criticisms is Hodgson's

early (beginning in 1865) and continual (spanning his entire philosophi
cal career) rejection of the psychologism and elementism of the British
tradition.

These criticisms were rooted in what he saw as the empiri

cists' failure to adopt the method of reflection, i.e., an assumptionless
53
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description of experience.
In his first excursion into philosophy in 1865 Hodgson made clear
that for him, metaphysics is a logical or static discipline while psy
chology is essentially dynamic.

The subject matter of both is conscious

ness but, according to Hodgson, the methods and goals of metaphysics and
psychology are fundamentally different.

Psychology, as a dynamic and

empirical science, studies "consciousness in relation to [the] bodily
organs which are its seat.""*^

It is concerned with finding the physical

correlates of mental processes and the means by which the objects of
perception are produced.

In contrast, metaphysics studies "consciousness

in relation to its objects," i.e., the relation between the knower and
the known.^

In fulfilling its goal metaphysics must approach its sub

ject matter without assumptions while psychology, as an empirical science,
must assume that there are physical correlates of consciousness in the
brain as well as in the world.

And while Hodgson stated that the goal

of metaphysics is "to analyze the structure of objects . . . and to
resolve them into elements," he added that
. . . it does not pretend to determine whether the elements
which it reaches in its analysis existed prior to the whole or
empirical objects which are their synthesis. . . . Such a problem
would be of a dynamic nature. There is no reason in metaphysics
for supposing that historically, in the order of nature, the
simple existed before the compounds.58
The issue which Hodgson is addressing here is the psychologism, and its
concomitant elementism and mental synthesis, which characterized nine
teenth century empirical psychology.

That is, in analyzing an object

of perception it is natural to assume that the object under consideration
56
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Ibid., p. 31.
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Ibid.

(Italics mine.)

77

became an object through the same stages which are uncovered in the
reflective analysis of the object. In other words, that the elements of
analysis are psychologically real. This is the tacit assumption upon
which the entire tradition of British empiricism rested, i.e., that
reflective analysis of an object or idea produced an exact simulation
of the means by which the idea was produced.
was reduced to psychology.

In the process, philosophy

In Hodgson's language, the empiricists found

distinguishable parts of the flow of experience and wrongly assumed that
what is distinguishable must also be given separately and distinctly.
Hodgson rejected this formulation whole-heartedly.

59

The importance of

Hodgson's argument was acknowledged by James in the Principles when he
said that the space perception theories of Lipps, Spencer and Bain "seem
guilty of that confusion which Mr. Shadworth Hodgson has done so much
to clear away, viz., the confounding the analysis of an idea with the
means of its p r o d u c t i o n . J a m e s wrote that such an assumption is an
example of the psychologists' fallacy.

But this is not the rationalist

The basis of Hodgson's rejection of the psychological elementism
of British empiricism can be seen in his Time and Space, (pp. 87-115),
in sections entitled "The Unity of Phenomena in Space" and "The Unity of
Phenomena in Time." Hodgson's rejection of elementism can also be seen
in his critical examination of the laws of associationism in that work,
(pp. 256-294). Although this topic deserves to be considered at length,
one passage will make clear that Hodgson was dealing with a conception
of mind which was temporally interconnected and united and thus funda
mentally different from the traditional empiricist description. Hodgson
wrote that
". . . when once the conception arose of consciousness being one
connected series, lengthening itself each moment, and growing out
of its former self and out of its previous content, as a plant of
its seed, so that the moments of consciousness are not separate ob
jects . . . but organic parts of one living whole . . . then the
inquiry was directed into its proper channel." [pp. 263-264]
This passage is reminiscent of James's conception of self as passing
thought.
60
James, Principles, 2:281.
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version of that fallacy.

Here James is concerned with the empiricist

version, when the psychologists' conceptual knowledge of objects in the
world confounds their description of what is given in experience.

The

fallacious nature of this assumption is most clearly seen in James's
unequivocal and continual rejection of the elementism and mental syn
thesis of the empiricist tradition throughout the Principles.*^
In an 1876 article in Mind Hodgson made clear that he agreed with
Locke's dictum, Nihil ist in intellectu quod non prius in sensu.

In

Hodgson's eyes, the problem with the empirical tradition is that it had
62
not yet come to grips with the question of what is given in sensu!
Are the isolated sensational elements of the empirical school given as
distinct impressions?

According to Wundt's GrUndzuge, which Hodgson

quotes at length in his Philosophy of Reflection,
Pure sensation (Empfindung) is an abstraction which never comes
forward in our consciousness. Consciousness possesses only per
ceptions (Vorstellungen): the sensations are in it always
arranged according to the general forms of intuition, time and
space. Nevertheless we are compelled by an overwhelming number
of psychological facts . . . to suppose the existence of pure
sensation, and to assume that perceptions everywhere form them
selves, by a psychological synthesis, out of sensations.63
In being compelled to posit the existence of pure sensations and to
assume that percepts are formed by a psychological synthesis of those
sensations, Wundt was following in the venerable tradition of John
Stuart Mill's mental chemistry approach to psychology.

Hodgson's retort

to Wundt's formulation was,
I am not convinced of the necessity [i.e., to posit pure sensations
and a psychological synthesis] because I find sensations always

61Ibid., 1:161.
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combined with rudiments of time or of time and space, which I
call the formal element. These rudiments it is from which they
are never found pure. A state previous to perception, in which
sensations are pure, is a fiction.64
Wundt's method of introspection, which Hodgson analyzes in his Philo
sophy of Reflection, demanded that the description of experience be
reduced to the purely contentual or material properties of sensations,
intensity and quality.

65

Thus for Wundt, any part of experience could

be fully described in terms of its particular sensory qualities (e.g.,
colors, sounds, etc.) of a given intensity or magnitude.

The properties

of intensity and quality are logically distinguishable but empirically
inseparable since any particular sensory quality must have some magni
tude to be experienced.

The problem with this method, wrote Hodgson,

was that it tacitly assumed that all that is given in experience could,
in fact, be fully and accurately described in terms of these two con
tentual properties.

This method was literally founded upon the assump

tion that what is given in experience could be accurately described in
terms of the contentual properties Which are directly dependent upon
objects in the world. That is, Wundt's method of introspection assumed,
following the tradition of Locke and Hume, that what is given in sensu
is a mere reflection of the properties of objects, which happen to be
discrete and separate in the world.

Thus Wundt, like Ferrier, imposes

his conceptual knowledge onto his description.

According to Hodgson,

the elementism of the empiricist tradition arose from their unwarranted
and unrecognized exclusion of the formal element of time from what is
given in sensu. That is, in failing to recognize the givenness of the
temporal element, empiricism divested experience of the unity and

64Ibid., pp. 260-261.

65Ibid., pp. 248-272.

80

continuity which this formal element provides and which is felt in experi
ence.
Once this atemporal and elementistic assumption was introduced
two paths seemed open to philosophers.

Hume's path involved making dis

continuity an essential, though unnoticed, feature of his system.

Then

Kant, seeing the need for unifying experience, made space and time a priori
forms which give unity and continuity to the chaos of sensory elements.
The problem is that Kant made these formal elements logically prior to
experience.

Hodgson rejected both alternatives and argued that time-

duration is an inseparable element that is given, along with the conten
tual qualities of objects, in experience.

That is, any object appearing

in experience must appear in some moment of time as well as have the
properties of quality and intensity.

66

As Spicker tells us, Hodgson's

recognition that time-duration is an inseparable element of experience
gives his philosophy a "nexus between all former and latter moments,
and makes experience a continuous process."

67

And, within the context

of the history of philosophy, this continuity was obtained without re
course to Kant's a priori forms of intuition or Wundt's mysterious psy
chological synthesis.

Thus for Hodgson, the lowest empirical unit of

experience, what he called the 'minimum of consciousness', contained
feelings (contents) which appear in time (process).

Therefore, in the

place of pure sensations, Hodgson argued for the recognition of the
intrinsically temporal (process-content) nature of experience.
Hodgson was also aware that the root of the empiricists' elementism

66Ibid., pp. 259-264.
67
Spicker, "The Fundamental Constituents of Consciousness,"
p. 35.
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was their failure to approach the description of experience without assump
tions.

As he wrote,

. . . the true objection to Hume should have run somewhat as
follows: You are really including an orderliness in your terms
experience, and you are assuming that it is a contingent orderli
ness ad extra though you think you are making no assumption at
all. You are only entitled to assume experience, undetermined as
to whether it is chaotic or orderly. . . . You must analyze experi
ence without assuming orderliness or an original chaos, and then
you will possibly see in what its orderliness consists.68
In Hodgson's eyes, empiricism, beginning with Hume, had unconsciously
imposed our knowledge about objects onto a supposedly assumptionless
description of experience.
My task at this juncture is not to analyze the impact of Hodgson's
treatment of time on James's psychology but to show how Hodgson's critique
of empiricism formed the basis of James's notion of the empiricist no
tion of the psychologists' fallacy and the stream of thought.

What

must not be overlooked, however, is that both James's and Hodgson's
criticisms of empiricism are rooted in their recognition of the empiri
cists' failure to consider the temporal element as given along with any
object in experience.

Thus James's notion of the stream of thought is

intimately tied to his treatment of time.

If this is true, and James

was indebted to Hodgson for his temporalism, it should not be surprising
that he provides the reader with lengthly passages from Hodgson in his
chapters on "The Stream of Thought" and "The Perception of Time."^
And it should not be surprising that Hodgson's lowest empirical unit of
experience, the 'minimum of consciousness', becomes the 'specious present'
in James's treatment of time and the 'passing thought' in his treatment
68
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of self.

Also, it was James's recognition of the importance of the tem

poral aspect which moved him to argue that an essential characteristic of
the stream of thought is that it is "sensibly continuous;" that thought,
as it appears immediately, is felt as temporally inter-penetrated.
Into the awareness of the thunder itself the awareness of the
previous silence creeps and continues; for what we hear when
the thunder crashes is not thunder pure, but thunder-breakingupon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it.70
The intimate relationship between James's temporalism and critique
of empiricism can be seen in his lengthly argument that exactly the same
feeling or idea can never be experienced twice.

The proposition seems

almost trivial at some level but James reminds the reader that it "is
more important theoretically than it at first sight seems."

This is the

case because it
. . . makes it already impossible for us to follow obediently
in the footprints of either the Lockean or Herbartian school. . . .
A permanently existing [and thus atemporal] 'idea' or 'Vorstellung'
which makes its appearance before the footlights of consciousness
at periodical intervals, is as mythological an entity as the Jack
of Spades.71
We quoted James earlier as describing the empiricist version of the psy
chologists' fallacy as "the confusion . . . between the thoughts them
selves, taken as subjective facts, and the things of which they are
aware."

It was this confusion, he argues, that led Hume to describe

experience as a discontinuous train and Wundt to posit the need for a
psychological synthesis.

That a temporalism stands at the foundation of

this fallacy can be seen in the following interpretation.

James admits

that objects in the world can be conceived objectively and thus as tem
porally distinct, i.e., as "discrete and discontinuous; they do pass before

7°Ibid., p. 240.

71Ibid., pp. 235-236.
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us in a train or chain, making explosive appearances and rending each
other in the twain."

72

But when these objects are considered sub.jec-

tively, as part of the stream of thought, they appear as a segment of
an essentially continuous temporal process.

Thus the absolute separation

of successive objects is fundamentally different from the melting-together
and inter-penetrating character of those objects considered as subjective

facts.

And that this melting-togetherness is a product of the temporal

nature of experience can be seen in James's suggestion that
The thunder itself we believe to abolish and exclude the silence;
but the feeling of the thunder is also a feeling of the silence as
just gone; and it would be difficult to find in the actual concrete
consciousness of a man a feeling so limited to the present as not
to have an inkling of anything that went before.73
That is, at times it is valuable to conceive of thunder objectively, as
a timeless conceptual entity that is isolated from the flux of experi
ence.

But if the thunder is taken subjectively, we must attempt to

describe it as it appears, as a sound embedded in and conditioned by
what immediately preceded and follows it.

It is this before-and-after

that feeds into and helps create the peculiar experience of a particular
experience.

Thus, it is a temporalistic argument that stands at the

foundation of James's denial of the possibility of a part-for-part cor
respondence between what we know about objects and the way they appear
in experience. And it is this distinction we have tried to show, that
James obtained from Hodgson's distinction between first and second in
tention descriptions.

Similarly, it is because of the essentially tem

poral nature of mental life that James argues that objects, as they appear
in the world, must be kept at least methodologically distinct from the
objects of thought.

72lbid., p. 240.

73Ibid., p. 241.

Hodgson and the Dualisms of James's
Psychological Thought
The qualifier 'at least methodologically distinct' is an important
one in terms of James's treatment of dualism before 1892.

We have pre

viously argued that his critique of introspection emerged from the unam
biguously monistic strain in Hodgson's philosophy.

We shall now approach

James's treatment of the mind/body problem directly.
The position which James adopted on the mind/body problem in the
Principles has itself been an object of debate since 1890.

John Dewey

and G. Stanley Hall, for example, who insisted that a scientific psychol
ogy must renounce Cartesian dualism, were quick to point out that James's
proposed psycho-physical dualism crumbles into an interactionism in his
treatments of will, automaton theory and attention.
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And it seems that

George T. Ladd had the mind/body problem in mind when he spoke dispar
agingly of the
. . . great difficulty the critical reader will find in ascer
taining just what is Professor James' latest, not to say, his final
view upon several difficult and disputed questions.75
Such criticisms by his American contemporaries makes clear that the
author of the Principles failed to offer an integrated or consistent
program for a scientific psychology.

In fact, the Principles reads, at

times, like a kaleidoscope of divergent opinions— where one formulation
of dualism transforms itself without warning into another, seemingly con
tradictory, position.
74
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The literature which has accumulated on James's treatment of dual
ism in the Principles seems as contradictory and confusing as the Prin
ciples itself.

Almost fifty years after his initial criticism, for

example, Dewey returned to the Principles in his "The Vanishing Subject
in the Psychology of James."7^

In that essay he maintained that there

are two incompatible strains in the Principles; one which is an "official
acceptance of epistemological dualism" and another in which "subject and
object do not stand for separate orders or kinds of existence but at
most for certain distinctions made for a definite purpose within experi
ence."^

Dewey argued, at the height of the attempt in American philos

ophy to overcome dualism, that James's later philosophy was an elabora
tion of the second, 'objectivistic' or 'behavioral' formulation of
knowledge.

This thesis was challenged brilliantly by Capek, who showed

that a subjective strain continued throughout James's later philosophij

cal work.7** The debate did not stop however.

Wilshire's 1968 monograph,

written when phenomenology began making inroads into the American scene,
seeks to show that the psycho-physical parallelism of the Principles
breaks down and a distinctively anti-dualistic (i.e., phenomenological)
strain emerges.

79

From Wilshire's perspective, the problem with James

is that he does not carry this phenomenological strain far enough to
escape the inconsistencies inherent in dualism.

Then, independent of

7**John Dewey, "The Vanishing Subject in the Psychology of William
James," Journal of Philosophy, 37 (1940):589-599.
77Ibid., p. 589.
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Wilshire, Morris argued that the dualism of the Principles is a methodological postulate rather than a metaphysical position.

80

This interpreta

tion, which becomes plausible in light of James's later rejection of
dualism, was recently challenged in a important article by Andrew Reck.
Reek's paper sought to "correct any hasty inference that James
was always anti-dualistic and to reveal . . . just how entrenched dual-

81

cyv

ism was, even in the mind of one of its leading adversaries."

It is

Reek's thesis that calling James's dualism methodological obscures both
the "complexity and depth of James' dualism at the time he wrote the
82
Principles."

He supported his position by attempting to show that

James was entrenched in both a psycho-physical and epistemological dual
ism throughout the Principles. This distinction is central to our expo
sition and thus deserves to be made explicit.

By psycho-physical dualism

Reck means the classical position that there are two fundamentally dis
tinct processes in the universe, body and mind.

By epistemological

dualism he means that the knowing process consists of relations between
two irreducible terms, the knower and the known.
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Before presenting yet another interpretation, a number of circum
stances which have clouded the debate ought to be noted.

First, and most

importantly, James's treatment of dualism in the Principles really is
ambiguous.

Second, in an article written in 1904 James publically

abandoned dualism in favor of a monism of pure experience.^

Third,
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in that article he stated that he had 'mistrusted' the formulation of
"consciousness as an entity" for "twenty years."

85

This would bring us

back to 1884, the period in which James was writing the Principles.
Thus this large body of literature can be viewed as a search for, or
denial of, 'anticipations' in James's psychological thought of the monism
which he opted for in his later philosophical thought.

One way of

approaching this issue is to attempt to articulate the logical parallels
between James's post-1900 monism and aspects of his pre-1900 work in
psychology.

The problem with this strategy is that parts of the Prin

ciples really are ambiguous and contradictory and thus open to a number
of interpretations.
One way of resolving ambiguity is to uncover the context within
which an event took place.

Commentators on James have sought to do just

this by considering his statements on dualism in the context of either
the Principles as a whole or his later thought.

Neither approach has

brought clarity to our ambiguous stimulus, i.e., James's treatment of
dualism in the Principles. One context which this literature has ignored,
however, is the historical context, the accumulated frame of reference
from which he approached the problem of dualism in the Principles. More
specifically, none of these writers have looked to Hodgson to shed light
on James's treatment of dualism.
In this section it will be argued that the epistemological dualism
°f the Principles is most accurately viewed as a methodological postulate
rather than a commitment to a metaphysical distinction between the sub
ject and the object.
85

Ibid., p. 3.

This interpretation is directly contrary to Reek's

88

suggestion that James was entrenched in an epistemological dualism in the
Principles. At the same time, however, it must be admitted that James
does seem to be entrenched in a psycho-physical dualism and this strain
of his psychology reveals a commitment to a metaphysical dualism.

86

While this combination of positions is contradictory at one level, it
is fully compatible with the interpretation offered in the last chapter—
that James's moral philosophy demands an interactionism between mind
and body.

This interpretation will be supported by first examining

Hodgson's justification for maintaining both an epistemological and
psycho-physical dualism for scientific psychology while positing an
experiential monism for philosophy.

With this historical context artic

ulated, James's treatment of dualism will be examined as it evolved with
the help of, and in opposition to, Hodgson's thought between 1884 and
1892.
Hodgson's unequivocal endorsement of psycho-physical dualism for
87
scientific psychology came as early as 1870, in his Theory of Practice.
This position appears frequently in Hodgson's works and is succinctly
formulated in his presidential address to the Aristotelian Society in
1886.

In distinguishing the new physiological psychology from the old

faculty approach, he wrote that
The principle upon which the new school of psychology is founded . . .
is, first to examine, analyze and classify, the content of con
sciousness as a conditionate . . . and the structure, organiza
tion and functioning, of the nerve-organism as its condition and
then in the second place to apply the one analysis to the other,
and to determine what organs, what processes, what interactions
of parts and processes, in the organism, are devoted to the
86
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production and maintaining of what modes and processes of con
sciousness and conscious action . . . . 88
The principle which Hodgson is offering here became known as epiphenomenalism.

According to this doctrine, mental states are wholly dependent

upon and conditioned by physical (i.e., brain) states.

Epiphenomenalism

envisioned an interaction from the physical to the mental and stated
explicitly that mental states must not be conceived as causing either
other mental states or brain states.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth

century epiphenomenalism was synonymous with the automaton theorists
William K. Clifford,Thomas H. Huxley and John Tyndall.

As we have seen

in the first chapter, James argued against this formulation in the
Principles, thus committing himself to a dualistic interactionism.

And

while Huxley labeled this position epiphenomenalism in 1874, James recog
nized that Hodgson had presented the earliest and most rigorous formulation of this doctrine.
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Hodgson also recognized that a scientific psychology must also
assume an epistemological dualism.

Writing of psychology's search for

lawful relationships, he stated that
. . . this search . . . is at once guided by facts to the
objective aspect of states of consciousness, excluding their
subjective aspect. It is 'things' outside the body which appear
to cause 'subjective states' within the body. The search for
laws of dependency forces us . . . to separate states of subjective
88
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aspects from their objective aspect, that is, to separate Subjects
generally from Objects generally.90
Before considering Hodgson's distinction between the objective and sub
jective aspects of experience, it should be noted that Hodgson was clear
on why psychology, as a science, must assume such a dualism between
subject and object.

This assumption is necessary, wrote Hodgson,

• • • ^or the relations of dependency have in all other
sciences been found to exist only where the thing from which
the dependence moved, that is, the condition of cause, was of
a solid and material nature, a substance. . . . Psychology
therefore, in seeking the conditions existendi of subjective
states, seeks them in the laws or in the nature of substances.
Thus for Hodgson, both epistemological and psycho-physical dualisms were,
in Morris's phrase, 'methodological postulates'; working assumptions
which psychology as a scientific discipline must adopt.

That such assump

tions do not entail a commitment to any form of metaphysical dualism can
be seen from Hodgson's formulation of the distinction between science
and philosophy.
Hodgson's distinction between the objective and subjective aspects
of phenomena stands at the core of the experiential monism of his philo
sophical thought.

As such, it is intimately related to both his phenom

enological method, the method of reflection, and his distinction between
philosophy and the natural sciences.

In other words, his monism was the

product of his method of reflection, which sought an assumptionless
description of experience; and in adopting this method, philosophy be
comes distinguished from the natural sciences, which must adopt some
assumptions to carry out its task.
90
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As we have seen, any state of consciousness in Hodgson’s system
could be viewed as either an 'object of consciousness alone' (i.e., in
its first intention) or as a 'real existence' (i.e., in its second inten
tion) . In adopting a method of assumptionless description philosophy
deals with phenomena from a purely subjective point of view and seeks to
reduce such phenomena to their metaphysical or logical elements.
Hodgson contended that two metaphysical elements, the formal (time and
space) and the material (feeling), could be distinguished in the first
intention description of phenomena, although he took pains to note that
these elements are inseparable as they are given in experience.
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An

essential and historically unique feature of Hodgson's analysis is that
the distinction between subject and object does not appear as metaphys
ical elements.

Instead, Hodgson argued that the subject-object dis

tinction is derived from experience (i.e., has only second intention
status) and thus has no place in metaphysics.

Thus, in looking to

experience without assumptions Hodgson founded an experiential monism;
with the method of reflection he saw simply 'a sequence of different
feelings' unreferred to either the subjective or objective orders.

For

Hodgson, the subject-object distinction appears only when the phenomena
of experience are viewed from an objective point of view, i.e., as
second intention objects.

This objective aspect of phenomena is the

perspective of common sense and science, what Husserl later called the
i
93
natural standpoint'.
The system which emerged from this series of
distinctions could be called a dual-element (form and matter), dual-aspect
92
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(subjective and objective) monism, which Hodgson represented with the
diagram below:

objective
point
of view

subjective
point
of view
formal

Hodgson's methodological distinction between science and philosophy can
be formulated within the terms presented in this diagram.
Philosophy deals with phenomena taken from a subjective point of
view, as first intention objects, and seeks to analyze phenomena into
their metaphysical elements.

In contrast, the natural sciences deal

with phenomena from an objective point of view and in doing so must make
assumptions which the philosopher has no right to make.

The terms, methods

and goals of the natural sciences literally demand that the scientist
make assumptions about his subject matter.

The physicist, for example,

must assume that physical objects exist in the world and that they are
causally inter-connected.

Without such assumptions the search for mate

rial causes and general laws is impossible.

And as a scientist, the

physicist need not concern himself with justifying the existence of the
real objects of his science or with his use of the notion of cause.
These are philosophical rather than scientific questions.

Similarly,

Hodgson saw that the psychologist must assume the subject matter of his
science, consciousness taken from an objective point of view (i.e., as
94.
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an object of scientific inquiry).

From this point of view, Hodgson argued

that consciousness is considered as an object of investigation that is
related to other assumed objects in a twofold sense.

First, conscious

ness must be assumed to be related to other objects in the world which
psychology, as well as physics, must assume.

This epistemological dual

ism is, for Hodgson, a general characteristic of science and is a direct
result of the fact that science considers only the objective aspect of
phenomena.

Secondly, scientific psychology assumes that consciousness

is related to physical states (i.e., bodily or brain states) which are
the necessary and sufficient conditions of its appearance.

This psycho

physical dualism is a distinctive characteristic of the science of
psychology, since its subject matter is consciousness.

Thus Hodgson

found no alternative to maintaining an experiential monism in philosophy
along with both an epistemological and psycho-physical dualism in sci
entific psychology.
This distinction is important because Reck argues that the methods
of James's psychology (i.e., introspection, as well as the comparative
and experimental methods) and his critical analysis of introspection
(what we have called the psychologists' fallacy) provide evidence of
James's entrenchment in a metaphysical dualism.
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Reek's thesis seems

to be based on the hasty and, given Hodgson's precedent, faulty assump
tion that a person's assumptions for a scientific psychology are accurate
representations of his metaphysics.

The example of Hodgson should make

abundantly clear that positing an epistemological and psycho-physical
dualism for a scientific discipline does not preclude the adoption of
a philosophical monism!

Instead, in Hodgson's system we find dualisms
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being offered as 'methodological postulates' which are subordinate to
the monism of his philosophy.
Let us now return to James's psychological writings between 1884
and 1892 to see whether Hodgson's system influenced James's position on
epistemology.

These years span his career as a psychologist, ending in

96
the year of the publication of his Psychology: A Briefer Course.

It is

also important to note that proclaiming either form of dualism for sci
entific psychology can not, in and of itself, be taken as evidence of his
commitment to any form of metaphysical dualism.
What we find in James's writings during these years is a clear
movement away from epistemological dualism.

The first clear-cut sign of

such a movement can be seen in his 1884 essay, "On Some Omissions of
Introspective Psychology."
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Not surprisingly, this is also the first

time one finds unequivocal signs of his adoption of Hodgson's methodo
logical distinction between first and second intention statements, as
well as his critical interpretation of rationalism and empiricism.
James's goal in this essay is a description of what he called the "im
mediate feltness of a mental state," i.e., the stream-like quality of
experience.

98

Neither the Kantian nor Humean traditions had done full

justice to this level of experience.

The important issue for our pur

pose, however, is whether James, in adopting the method of Hodgson, finds
the same epistemological monism which the British philosopher found
through this method.

An interesting and revealing footnote suggests

that James had, in fact, abandoned the metaphysical distinction between

^James, Psychology.
97
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subject and object and the alternative he formulates reveals his indebt
edness to Hodgson.

In the context of criticizing the epistemological

dualism of rationalism, which separates the ’act' from the sensory 'con
tent' of consciousness, James wrote that the
. . . contrast is really between two aspects, in which all
mental facts without exception may be taken; their structural
aspect, as being subjective, and their functional aspect, as being
cognitions. In the former aspect, the highest as well as the
lowest is a feeling, a peculiarly tinged segment of the stream.
This tinging [sic] is its sensitive body, the wie ihm zu Muthe
ist, the way it feels whilst passing. In the latter aspect, the
lowest mental fact as well as the highest grasps some bit of
universal truth as its contents. . . . From the cognitive point
of view, all mental facts are intellections. From the subjective
point of view all are feelings.^
The distinction which we find James making here, between the subjective
and cognitive or functional aspects, parallels Hodgson's distinction
between the subjective and objective aspects of phenomena.

It seems that

James learned from Hodgson that one can, and, in fact, must, posit a
thorough-going epistemological dualism for scientific psychology— but
that such a position need not entail a commitment to a metaphysical
distinction between subject and object.

But a problem which surfaces

in the Principles is that James never explicitly makes the distinction
between philosophy and science on methodological grounds, as Hodgson
did.

The result is that James leaves himself open for misinterpretation.
One such area of confusion can be seen by noting that his 1884

distinction between the two aspects of mental states allows him to employ
the word feeling in two fundamentally different senses.

That is, feeling

can be employed as a philosophical (or phenomenological) description of
any particular segment of the stream of experience taken in its subjec
tive aspect.
99

In this sense, James could write, as he did in 1884, that
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"from the subjective point of view all [mental facts] are feelings;"
meaning that a portion of the stream is being taken as it immediately
appears, without reference to its relation to its object or subject.
In fact, there are places in the Principles where he seems to be using
the word feeling in this monistic sense.

For the most part, however,

he used the word feeling in the Principles in what he called the psy
chological or cognitive sense as a synonym for knowledge by acquaintance.
In this sense, feeling refers to a primitive type of sense data and, as
such, it is an essentially dualistic concept.
James's failure to make clear the two senses of

the word feeling,

and hold to it, has resulted in a confusion among a number of commenta
tors. Linschoten, for example, states that 'thought1, for James, is an
essentially dualistic concept while 'feeling' is essentially monistic.

103

But this characterization ignores large tracts of the Principles in
which James uses feeling or knowledge by acquaintance in an explicitly
dualistic sense.

Given this initial confusion, Linschoten, in consider

ing James's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge
about, came to the inelegant conclusion that James is "simply contradict
ing himself but this is not to be wondered at if we remember how unsys
tematic James is."^^

Rather than contradicting himself, it seems more

accurate to say that James, at times, adopts a method of describing
experience that is reminiscent of Hodgson's method of reflection in the
Principles. And in carrying out this method James too reveals his dis
satisfaction with metaphysical dualism and his movement toward a monism

^^Ibid., p. 19.
102
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of pure experience.

By not recognizing this strain of the Principles,

Reck set forth the untenable thesis that James is entrenched in an epistemologically dualistic metaphysics in the Principles.
That James did adopt an epistemological dualism for scientific
psychology in the Principles is incontestable.

He tells us in the preface,

for example, in language reminiscent of Hodgson, that
Every natural science assumes certain data uncritically, and
declines to challenge the elements between which its own 'laws'
obtain, and from which its own deductions are carried on.105
Then in summarizing his chapter on the "Methods and Snares of Psychology"
he writes that "psychology assumes that thoughts successively occur, and
that they know objects in the world."
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His epistemological dualism is

clear in this passage, but in the next passage he states clearly that
such a dualism is not incompatible with a monistic philosophy,
. . . the dualism of Object and Subject and their preestablished harmony are what the psychologist as such must assume,
whatever ulterior monistic philosophy he may, as a metaphysician
have in reserve.1®^
James's repeated reference to the fact that a scientific psychology must
assume its subject matter and their causes is important in light of
Hodgson's distinction between philosophy and the natural sciences.

With

in Hodgson's system, the distinction between these disciplines is that
science, but not philosophy, has the right to make a series of methodo
logical assumptions.

And for both James and Hodgson, an epistemological

dualism is part and parcel of these assumptions.
The important question for Reek's thesis is whether this methodo
logical assumption is symptomatic of James's entrenchment in a deeper,

^James, Principles, l:v-vi.
^^Ibid., p. 197.

(Italics mine.)

^^Ibid., p. 220.

(Italics mine.)
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metaphysical distinction between subject and object.

The passage from

his 1884 essay would lead us to be skeptical of such a position.

This

skepticism is reinforced by one of James's fleeting excursions into the
metaphysical realm in his chapter on "The Stream of Thought."

His

answer, which is presented in the section entitled 'Human thought appears
to deal with objects independent of itself', leaves no doubt that he had
overcome a dualistic metaphysics by the time of the Principles.

In

considering an altogether unprecedented experience, a "new taste in the
throat," he asks a question which goes to the heart of the metaphysical
status of the distinction between subject and object— "Is it [the new
taste] a subjective quality of feeling, or an objective quality felt?"
His answer is uncharacteristically clear.
You do not even ask the question at this point. It is simply
that taste. But if a doctor hears you describe it, and says:
'Ha! Now you know what heartburn is', then it becomes a quality
already existent extra mentem tuam. . . . The first spaces,
times, things and qualities experienced by the child probably
appear, like this heartburn, as simple beings, neither in nor
out of thought.
Dewey recognized the similarity of this passage to James's later monism
of pure experience, where the subject-object distinction was conceived
of as a functional distinction made for a specific purpose within experi
ence.

What Dewey did not recognize, however, was the similarity between

the metaphysics which underlies this passage and Hodgson's monistic
metaphysics.
With regard to this passage, it is also interesting to note that
James saw himself adopting a philosophical point of view in this descrip
tion, one which abstracted away the epistemological dualism of adult
common-sense.

In terms of the language he used in 1884, he is describing

108
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a feeling here from a purely subjective point of view.
ing a monistic conception of experience, he

Thus, after offer

retreats into the psychologi

cal point of view
But later, having other thoughts than this present one, and
making repeated judgements of sameness among their objects,
he [the child] corroborates in himself the notion of reali
ties. . . . This . . . is the psychological point of view,
the relatively non-critical point of view of all natural sci
ences, beyond which this book cannot go.109
The most glaring signs of James's disenchantment with epistemo
logical dualism can be seen by examining the differences between his
treatments of the flow of experience in the Principles and his Psychology
of 1892.

In the two years which separated these works James saw the

need for two important changes in his characterization of experience;
both of which seem compatible with the interpretation that James was
moving away from the metaphysical distinction between subject and object.
In fact, both these changes suggest that by 1892 the movement had cul
minated and James had done away with any remnants of a metaphysical
dualism.

First, in the Principles James diffidently offered the fact

that "thought seems to deal with objects independent of itself" as one
of the five essential characteristics and its dualistic nature is the
feature which James omitted.

Second, the title of the chapter in

Psychology called "The Stream of Consciousness," changed from "The
Stream of Thought" in the Principles. These changes are obviously
related; if the subject-object distinction is not an essential charac
teristic of the stream then the word thought must be dropped since
thought, for James, had clearly dualistic connotations.

As he wrote in

the Principles, thought "suggests the . . . reference to an object

109Ibid., pp. 296-297.
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other than the mental state itself.11

Given this, James's choice of

the word consciousness in 1892 can be taken as a sign of his desire to
employ an epistemologically neutral term to describe the flow of experi
ence.

Neither of these changes could be made by a person entrenched in

a dualistic metaphysics.

Instead, these revisions are those of a skep

tic, whose epistemological heresies were nurtured by the philosophy of
Shadworth Hodgson.
Thus, in examining James's treatment of epistemological dualism
between 1884 and 1892 we have found evidence of a psychologist-philosopher in the process of transition.

That is, we have seen James question

ing the ultimateness of the distinction between subject and object as
early as 1884, offering an alternative in 1890 and finally putting
epistemological dualism aside in 1892.

Thus James does not seem to have

been entrenched in the metaphysical distinction between subject and
object in the period he was writing the Principles, as Reck has argued.
This can be said in spite of the fact that he retained an epistemologi
cal dualism as a methodological postulate for scientific psychology.
In this important respect we have shown that James was following Hodgson's
distinction between philosophy and science.
We have presented a rather detailed argument for the importance
of Hodgson's system on James's philosophical psychology but the agreement
in detail can itself be taken as support for the interpretation.

Things

become even more complicated, and confusing, when it is recognized that
the monistic strain of the Principles is in conflict with James's argu
ment for the efficacy of consciousness in the Principles. This is the
case because the efficacy of consciousness does, in fact, implicate a

110Ibid., p. 186.
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dualism between rnlnd and body, I.e., a psycho-physical interactlonlsm.

In this respect, James was In fundamental disagreement with Hodgson and
was, as Reck argued, entrenched in a dualistic metaphysics.

What must

be made clear, however, as we have sought to do in the first chapter, is
that James defended the efficacy of consciousness for moral reasons— to
challenge what he saw as the presumptious speculation of materialistic
scientists.

CHAPTER 3

ASSOCIATION, REASONING AND THE A PRIORI:
THE TELEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF JAMES'S
PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING

Pretend what we may, the whole man within us is at work when
we form our philosophical opinions. Intellect, will, taste
and passion cooperate just as they do in parctical affairs,
and lucky it is if the passion be not something as petty as
a love of personal conquest over the philosopher across the
way. . . . It is almost impossible that men who are themselves
working philosophers should pretend that any philosophy can
be, or ever has been, constructed without the help of personal
preference, belief, or divination.1
This is an excerpt from an essay which James wrote in the late
1870's and published in 1882 under the title "Rationality, Activity and
Faith."

Thematically, this article is intimately related to his "Senti

ment of Rationality," which we examined in some detail in the first
chapter.

Both analyzed the motives of philosophical belief, seeking to

make clear to an age which was dominated by a scientific credo that the
subjective ideals of the thinker play an essential role in determining
the contents of his system.
Let us turn now to the concluding chapter of the Principles, to
James's response to Helmholtz's observation that, as scientists, we must
assume that the "phenomena of nature must be reduced to motions of material points with inalterable motor forces acting."

2

To this proposition

^William James, "Rationality, Activity and Faith," Princeton
Review 2 (1882):58-86, p. 74.
2
William James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York:
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he remarked that:
The subjective interest leading to the assumption could not be
more candidly expressed. What makes the assumption 'scientific'
and not merely poetic, what makes Helmholtz and his kin dis
coverers, is that the things of Nature turn out to act as if
they were of the kind assumed. They behave as . . . mere draw
ing and driving atoms would behave . . . .^
James is obviously excited by the proclamation of the great German physio
logical psychologist, he saw it as a confirmation of the formulation of
the motives of philosophical belief which he offered in the late 1870's.
Subjective ideals are expressed in the fundamental assumptions of one's
system and these assumptions, in turn, structure the contents of a given
system.

But James is not writing as a philosopher in this section of

the Principles.

Instead, he is a psychologist offering his concluding

remarks on the psychology of thinking.

Within this context, too, however,

Helmholtz's statement confirms James's fundamental thesis, for a teleology
pervades Helmholtz's proposition.

Assumptions are acts of faith which

are rooted in the emotional commitments of the thinker; thus a teleological commitment underlies the thought of even the most rigorously mechanis
tic thinkers.
There is, therefore, a fundamental continuity in the development
of James's thought from the late 1870's to 1890, from his analysis of the
motives of philosophical belief to his psychology of human thinking.

This

continuity is rooted in a commitment to a teleological conception of the
higher mental processes.

This chapter will examine the origins, develop

ment and essential features of James's formulation of the higher mental
processes in the Principles. To the extent that a teleology pervades

Henry Holt and Co., 1890; reprint ed. New York: Dover Publishing Co.,
1950), 2:688. Hereafter cited as James, Principles.
3Ibid.
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this formulation, this chapter might be viewed as a continuation of the
first chapter of this study.

This chapter goes beyond the first chapter,

however, by examining the details of James's psychology of the higher
mental processes in the Principles.
This chapter is divided into three sections.

We shall first

examine the impact of Hodgson's thought on James's reformulation of the
laws of association.

We shall argue that the central feature of James's

Interpretation of association is that the knower is conceived as actively
selecting those aspects of experience which are important and interesting
for him.

In the second section we shall examine James's formulation of

human reasoning, a formulation which emphasizes the interested, teleological nature of thinking.

In this section we shall also find James

going beyond Hodgson in his biological interpretation of the a priori.
In the third section we shall examine the relationship between believing
and thinking in the Principles, attempting to articulate the sense in
which James conceived of thinking as embedded in and conditioned by the
emotional and aesthetic ideals of the thinker.

In doing so, James's

psychology of thinking will be presented as an extension and elaboration
of the model he first presented in his early essays on the motives of
philosophical belief.

The value of this interpretation is that it inte

grates the descriptive and explanatory aspects of James's system.

A Dynamic Interpretation of Association
In the first chapter we saw that the notion of subjective interests
pervaded James's early work on the motives of philosophical belief.

The

chronological, as well as conceptual, priority of this theme in James's
psychological thought can be seen by turning to his review of Wilhelm Wundt's
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4
GrundzUge der physiologlschen Psychologie.

This work is generally recog

nized as the first systematic experimental treatise in psychology.

It

is significant to note that James chose to describe Wundt's work on selec
tive attention in some detail in this 1875 review.

Given his own inclina

tions toward an empirical philosophy, his intention is clear.

He wanted

to emphasize the importance of the activity of the knower, a phenomenon
which had long been overlooked in the British school of empiricism.

Thus

he wrote that
. . . these acts [selective attention and recognition] postu
late interests on the part of the subject— interests which, as
ends or purposes set the emotional constitution, keep interfering
the pure flow of impressions and their associations. . . . It is
amusing to see how Spencer shrinks from explicit recognition of
this law . . . Mr. Bain, in principle, admits it, but does not
work it out . . . .5
Since James's aim was to reform British empiricism, it is important that
he could contrast the crude empiricism of Herbert Spencer with the more
progressive empiricism of Alexander Bain.

With Spencer, the importance

of subjective interests is lost in the midst of assiciationistic reduc
tions.

His definition of mind as the 'correspondence of inner to outer

relations' minimizes, if not wholly ignores, the role of the subject in
the process of knowing.

In Bain's Emotions and Will, however, James

found the hegemony of British associationism cracking in a number of
areas.

6

In describing Bain in this review, James probably had the last

chapter of Emotions and Will in mind.

There Bain reluctantly admits that

^[William James], review of GrundzUge der physiologlschen Psy
chologie. by Wilhelm Wundt, in North American Review, 121 (1874):195-201.
5Ibid., p. 201 .

^Alexander Bain, The Emotions and the Will (London: J. W. Parker
and Son, 1859). Bain broke with traditional philosophical association
ism by bringing the motor aspect into the foreground of his psychology.
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the emotional interests of the knower can affect his beliefs by directing
his attention selectively.^
heavily qualified.

But Bain's acknowledgement is guarded and

More importantly, he fails to recognize that his

acknowledgement, however qualified, has important implications for his
interpretation of the laws of association.

But while James saw a hesi

tant recognition of the importance of subjective interests in empiricism,
the position he opted for in the Principles was far more radical than
either Wundt or Bain.

There he argued that the interests of the knower

are an essential ingredient in all levels of experience.

Such a position

made a passive interpretation of the laws of association untenable, it
demanded an interpretation which placed selective attention on an equal
theoretical footing with associative relations.

It is just such an

interpretation which James offered in the Principles.
James's "Association" chapter is an elaboration of an essay he
g

published in 1880.

This chapter is remarkable in a number of respects.

First, it provides the reader with a succinct illustration of the contrasting-bordering-on-contradictory tendencies of the Principles.
Second, James gives Hodgson the highest of compliments in the historical
section of the chapter, writing that: "Dr. Hodgson's account of associa9

tionism is by all odds the best yet propounded in English."

Beyond these,

^Ibid., pp. 599-641. Bain wrote, for example, that:
11. . .different minds have a different motive of selection out
of the countless multitude of impressions that we all alike open
to. It is, therefore, a material consideration of the problem
of knowledge, to ascertain what are the motives to the special
ized consciousness, or the forces governing attention, as something
over and above disinterested and equal sensation." p. 637.
g

William James, "The Association of Ideas," Popular Science Monthly
16 (1880):577-593.
9
James, Principles, 1:603.
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however, there is a fundamental conceptual reason which makes this chap
ter an ideal gateway to James's treatment of the higher mental processes.
That is, the laws of association stood at the foundation of empiricism's
account of thinking.

If that tradition was to be reformed, the laws of

association would first have to be reformulated.
The curiously ambivalent tone of this chapter is evidenced by
James's reduction of the laws of association to a neural mechanism,
. . . the psychological law of association . . . would
thus be an effect, within the mind, of the physical fact that
nerve-currents propagate themselves easiest through those
[brain] tracts . . . which have been already most in use.10
This is nothing more than what was then called the law of neural habit
or law of least resistance, a principle which any automaton theorist
would have whole-heartedly endorsed.

This law seeks to assign physical

causes to the observation that thought Y succeeds thought X because it
has been most frequently associated with X in the past.

There is cer

tainly nothing revolutionary in this principle.
But before we write James off as contradicting himself, two obser
vations must be made.

First, James's discussion of the laws of associa

tion takes place within a very circumscribed region of experience, what
he called the spontaneous or involuntary driftings of t h o u g h t . T h e s e
experiences are epitomized by what would be called thoughtless musings
and reveries.

Thus rather than positing that association could account

for the highest forms of human thinking, James relegates it to a subor
dinate role in his psychology.

The second point is even more important,

however, because it became the basis of his challenge to traditional
associationism.

This is James's claim that any particular association

10lbid. , p. 563.

U Ibid., p. 567.
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presupposes a prior selection of the objects to be associated. In other
words, before two objects can be associated in experience they must be
attended to by the organism.

And as we have seen, attention, for James,

implicates the subjective interests of the knower.

In recognizing the

importance of selectivity and subjective interests, James inserted an
active subject into the most primitive levels of experience:
Just as in the original sensible experience our attention focal
ized itself [sic] upon a few of the impressions of the scene
before us, so here in the reproduction of those impressions an
equal partiality is shown, and some parts are emphasized above
the rest.^
Thus a distinctive conception of experience underlies James's treatment
of association in the Principles.

Subject and object are no longer dis

tinct entities; the distinction between a tabula rasa, upon which objects
are impressed, and external objects is collapsed into the interactive
process of attention within a field of experience.

For James, experience

is given as a 'swarming continuum' which is fundamentally ambiguous and
devoid of meaning.

At the subject pole of this field James found a

multitude of simultaneously existing subjective interests which are limited
only by the knower's biological capacities, knowledge and ideals.

At the

object pole he found a corresponding diversity, in his words, a 'teeming
multiplicity of objects and relations'.

Given this description, the role

of selective activity of the knower comes to the foreground.

There are

literally too many possibilities offered to assume that knowledge is a
passive mirroring of the relations given in the external world.
Paradoxically, James's recognition of the importance of selective
attention seems tied to a method which involves the voluntary suspension
of attention.

Although he uses this method rather unsystematically in

12Ibid., p. 572.
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the Principles, it is clearly related to what we called Hodgson's method
of reflection in the last chapter.

James's description of experience

without normal attention is worth quoting at length:
We all know of this . . . state, even of its extreme degree.
Most people probably fall several times a day into a fit of
something like this: the eyes are fixated on vacancy, the
sounds of the world melt into a confused unity, the attention
is so dispersed that the whole body is felt . . . at once,
and the foreground of consciousness is filled, if by anything,
by a solemn sense of surrender to the empty passing of time.
In the background of our mind we know meanwhile what we ought
to be doing... . . Every moment we expect the spell to break.
. . . But it does continue, pulse after pulse . . . until . . .
an energy is given, something . . . enables us to gather our
selves together . . . . 13
James's description of visual and auditory experience when attention is
dispersed is particularly important.

Without an act of attention such

experience is devoid of the structure and organization which character
izes our normal state of mind— "the eyes are fixated on vacancy, the
sounds of the world melt together into confused unity."
world of sensory experience.

This is the

But when we attend to some particular

portion of this original flux— "an energy is given"— the world of related
objects reappears.

Thus an act of attention becomes essential to our

normal experience.

Whole, related, stable objects are not impressed

upon us from the outside world.

Instead, James wrote that:

Out of what is in itself an undistinguished, swarming continuum,
devoid of structure or emphasis, our senses make for us, by
attending, a world full of contrasts, of sharp accents, of
abrupt changes, of picturesque light and shade.14
It must be made clear that James's emphasis upon selective atten
tion by no means commits him to the psycho-physical interactionism which
we found evidenced in some parts of the Principles.
13
Ibid., p. 404.

(Italics mine.)

14
Ibid., pp. 284-285.

(Italics mine.)
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we took pains to distinguish two forms of selectivity in James*s early
thought; one which is deterministic and another which is ambiguous but
seems to imply some form of interactionism.

In his formulation of asso

ciation it is clear that he had the deterministic notion of selectivity
in mind.

In fact, he speculated, following Hodgson*s precedent, that

subjective interests have a neurological basis in the prepotency of
particular brain processes.

This point is important because it clears

the way for an examination of Hodgson's impact on James's formulation
of association; for while Hodgson also steered clear of interactionism
he, unlike other empiricists of his day, argued eloquently for the need
to include the interests of the organism in an account of association.
In the process, he offered a devastating critique of associationism
which had a clear impact on James.
The process of formulating a definitive list of associative laws
is almost as ancient an enterprise as philosophy itself.

Aristotle's

list, which included contiguity, similarity and contrast, may well be
the best known but different epochs gave more or less prominence to one
or another of these laws.

A representative list for the mid-nineteenth

century might include contiguity, similarity, cause and effect and con
trast.

For Hodgson, the crucial characteristic of this, or any other,

list of associative laws was that they tacitly assumed that mind passively
mirrors the relations given in the external world.

James Mill, for

example, thought that belief could be fully explained in purely intel
lectual terms, as a function of the frequency which a proposition's sub
ject and predicate had been experienced together in the past.
Brett wrote of Mill's system,

15Ibid., p. 572; p. 583.

As George
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. . . he thinks the sequence of ideas reproduce the sequence
of sensations; [and] if we add vividness and frequency to explain
the strength of association, the whole theory may be considered
complete.16
If we insert a few biological terms into this description it would apply
equally well to Spencer's evolutionary associationism.

Thus Hodgson was

providing an essentially accurate description of orthodox associationIstic empiricism when he noted that it assumes that the
. . . mind in producing her images in association . . . was
imitating and repeating . . . the operations of nature, making
use of certain laws which she observed originally from the obser
vations of the sequences and coexistences of external things.17
The selectivity of the subject is omitted in this formulation and imita
tion becomes the modus operandi of the human mind.

In the last chapter

we examined Hodgson's critique of the empiricist notion of ideas.

Now

we shall turn to his critique of its intellectual counterpart, the laws
of association.
Hodgson saw a twofold vagueness in the traditional formulation
of the laws of association.

First, a list of associative laws provides

no explicit way of explaining why one particular relation (i.e., associa
tive connection) takes precedence over another in a given situation.
That is, associationism never directly confronts the question of why
object A is sometimes followed by object B, which has been experienced
in spatial and temporal contiguity with A, but is at other times followed
by object X, which resembles A.

Why, for example, does an orange some

times remind me of orange juice and other times of a baseball?

While

Thomas Brown introduced the secondary laws of association to account for

^R. S. Peters, Brett's History of Psychology (Boston: MIT Press,
1965), p. 451.
^Hodgson, Time and Space, p. 263.
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this phenomenon, Hodgson approached this question in terns of the inter
ests of the knower.
In his Philosophy of Reflection in 1878, Hodgson made clear that
he viewed the laws of association as empirical generalizations which describe the possible routes of the stream of thought.

18

And while he

recognized that such generalizations are essential to thought— they pro
vide the basic materials of thought— Hodgson also recognized that they
cannot, in and of themselves, explain the selection of the actual route
taken. It was this shortcoming of William Hamilton's reduction of the
laws of association to a general law of affinity which led Hodgson to
write that:
If . . . we distinguish this general law of affinity into classes
of contrast, resemblance and contiguity . . . this gives us no
law of preference of contrast to resemblance . . . or, in short,
of the preference of any of these [associative relations] to any
other of them.19
In Hodgson's view, an associational account of the sequence of thought
becomes plausible only if one ignores the fact that a particular object
of experience has been associated with a large number of different
objects through the various modes of associative connection.

Put simply,

associationism tended to ignore the multiplicity of possible relations
which exist simultaneously in the stream of thought.

For Hodgson, this

multiplicity is an essential feature of the stream:
Any object . . . is connected by affinity [i.e., association]
with all other objects whatever; and any object whatever stands
in relation [of some sort] to any other object . . . and con
sequently to point out that they stand in some one or more of
these relations . . . is no explanation at all . . . no discovery
of the link between objects in redintegration.20

18Ibid., pp. 265-266.
20

Ibid., p. 259.

19Ibid., p. 258.

(Italics mine.)
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And this fact makes it necessary to make explicit reference to what Hodgson
called the law of preference or Interest, that is, the emotional Interests
of the knower.
Thus Hodgson objected to two complementary tendencies in orthodox
associationism: (1) the over-emphasis of intellectual/associative factors
and (2) the subsequent neglect of the dynamic, interested aspect of the
stream of thought.

Both features are manifest in the ad hoc nature of the

associationist.'s explanation of particular sequences of thought.

Within

■5

our example, the associatlonist might point out that orange juice had been
experienced as an effect of operating on an orange in a particular way and
therefore it is understandable that one should follow the other in thought.
But such an explanation can be seen to be an oversimplification when it
is recognized that the idea of an orange has also been experienced through
a myriad of other associative relations with other objects.

Why is it,

Hodgson is asking, that the relation of cause and effect is selected?
Hodgson went on to argue that a complete explanation of the sequence in
volves a consideration of the emotional interests of the knower.

Let us

approach this dynamic aspect of the stream, which loomed so large in
James’s psychology, by examining the second sense which Hodgson thought
the associationist account to be vague.
Imagine, for a moment, that associationism is able to provide a
plausible theoretical basis— e.g., frequency— for the selection of one
type of associative relation rather than another.

In fact, frequency stood

at the foundation of the systems of James Mill, Herbert Spencer and even
Hodgson, who defined the interests of the organism in terms of frequency.
But even if the power of frequency is granted at the level of the selec
tion between the types of associative relations, one is still left with
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explaining why one object, out of a multitude of possible objects in the
stream, is attended to.

Here again we find that one's description of

experience has a tremendous impact on how one explains it.

Orthodox asso

ciationism tended to describe the movement of thought as a kind of
linear sequence of objects held together by associative links.

For if

thought really is a 'train of ideas', where one whole object is displaced
by another, then the sense of multiple possibilities— the spatial spreadoutness— which appears at every pulse of experience is either considerably
narrowed or simply absorbed by associative connections.

But if thought

is described as a stream of teeming possibilities, then the selection of
some objects and the ignoring of others can be seen as an essential part
of normal experience.

Thus both Hodgson and James saw that distinctness

and clarity in thought is created by selecting one portion through an
act of attention.
of the knower.

21

And this attentional act is guided by the interests

Thus Hodgson did not merely deny the central tenet of

associationism, i.e., the importance of habit or custom.

His most im

portant contribution was that he placed an act of interested attention
alongside habit in explaining the direction of thought.

The result for

psychology was that the stream came to be seen as a joint product of
what Hodgson called "retentive" and "reactive" factors.

22

The knower not

only reproduced the past, he reacted to the present in a selective manner.
In this sense, Hodgson made past experience (our accumulated habits) sub
servient to the present interests of the knower.
It is important to note that for both Hodgson and James, the
21

See James, Principles, 1:461; Hodgson, Philosophy of Reflection,
1:288-297.
22

Hodgson, Theory of Practice, 1:382.
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'reactive' or interested nature of experience made a passive formulation
of the associative laws unacceptable.

As Hodgson wrote in the Philosophy

of Reflection;
Consciousness itself appears to involve some reaction on our
part, on the part of the organism. . . . To feel is to react.
Pure passivity is as impossible as pure activity.23
Dichotomizing between pure activity and pure passivity is, in truth,
partly rhetorical but it is important in that both James and Hodgson
hoped to integrate the two dominant philosophical traditions with a re
vised formulation of activity.

Each hoped to avoid the extremes of the

Humean and Kantian traditions and emphasize the selective activity of
the knower while rooting it in the brain.
In the Principles we find an explicit recognition of the reactive
as well as the retentive nature of human experience.

In fact, the three

chapters which precede James's treatment of association— "Discrimination
and Comparison," "Attention" and "Conception"— emphasize the reactive,
interested aspect of experience.

With such a preparation it is not sur

prising that James also began his critique of orthodox associationism by
describing the multiplicity and complexity of experience:
. . . the same outer object may suggest either of many re
alities formerly associated with it . . . and a philosophy of
association that should merely say that it will suggest one of
these, or even the one of them which it has oftenest accompanied,
would go but a very short way into the rationale of the subject.24
As we have noted earlier, Hodgson was willing to reduce interests to
frequency and thus remain, at least in spirit, within the associationistic tradition.

James, however, was unwilling to make such a reduction.

In his examination of the laws of association he mentioned recency,
23
Hodgson, Philosophy of Reflection, 1:292.
24
James, Principles, 1:565.

(Italics mine.)
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vividness, congruity in emotional tone and chance as factors which are
not reducible to frequency.

In terms of a full account of the higher

mental processes, however, James's unique formulation of the a priori
capacities of the human brain made his departure from the empiricist
tradition inevitable and absolute.
next section.

We shall take up this topic in the

For now it should be recognized that James too pointed

critically to the ad hoc nature of a purely associationistic explanation.
Granted an object A, they [the associationists] never tell us
beforehand which of its associates it will suggest; their wisdom
is limited to showing, after it has suggested a second object,
that that object was once an associate725
But, as we have seen with Hodgson, since any object whatsoever has stood
in any number of relations with any number of other objects in experience,
merely pointing to that one object begs the question of why that particu
lar object was, in fact, selected.

The passive model of empiricistic

associationism seems caught in a vicious explanatory circle when the rich
ness and complexity of experience is articulated.

And for Hodgson and

James, an explicit recognition of the interests of the knowing subject
was the only way out of this loop.
James's essentially active, dynamic reformulation of the laws of
association becomes intelligible from this context.

In the Principles

he distinguishes three types of association which he arranges along a
continuum of what might be called the specificity of interest. He took
pains to root the concept of interests in neural terms, as the "difference
in the amount of that portion of the nerve tract . . . which is operative
in calling up the thought which comes."

^Ibid.

(Italics mine.)

26

Most importantly, however, the

^Ibid., pp. 572-573.
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emotional interests of the knower are now conceived as an essential as
pect of the process of association.

James called the first type "impar

tial redintegration" [or association by contiguity]; here the interest
seems diffuse and unfocused.

This is the most concrete type of associ

ative reproduction, where there is a detailed "reinstatement in thought
of the entire content of large trains of past experience."

27

The im

portant point is that while he posited this as a theoretical extreme,
he doubted that it ever actually appeared in its pure form in human
experience.

At the same time, however, he suggested that this mode was

"the usual state of brutes when [they] were not actively engaged in
some pursuit."

28

In fact, he stated that this passive, non-selective

reproduction of the past is most nearly approximated in human experience
when a person consciously adopts an interest in such a reproduction.
The more usual state is what James called "ordinary or mixed associa29
tion."

Here some more or less clearly defined object is torn out of

the stream and its associates gradually surround it until another, more
interesting object appears and dominates.

This form of experience is

epitomized by the free-floating movement from object to object without
ostensible direction.

He offered the third type of association— associ

ation by similarity— as one of the distinguishing characteristics of
human, as opposed to non-human, mental life.

For James, human thought

is literally founded upon the continual surfacing of similarities which
transgress the limitations of spatial and temporal contiguity.

In asso

ciation by similarity the interesting portion of the stream is very narrow
and specific, as, for example, when a football gives way to the thought
27

Ibid., p. 570.

Ibid., 2:353.

*Ibid., pp. 571-572.

118

of the moon because we momentarily focus on the rotund nature of the
former.

This form of association is the basis of creativity, the meta

phor and the recognition of abstract similarities in the face of percep
tual difference.
We can summarize James's indebtedness to Hodgson's treatment of
the laws of association by pointing to a series of assumptive, critical
and explanatory features which both their interpretations shared.

At

the assumptive level, both began with a conception of experience as a
flowing stream of simultaneous possibilities rather than a linear
sequence of discrete objects.

From this shared perspective both were

critical of what they saw as an essential vagueness in orthodox associationism, a vagueness which: (1) acted to obscure the role of selection
based on subjective interests and (2) made ad hoc explanation necessary.
Cognizant of these shortcomings, both brought the notion of interests
into the foreground of their psychologies and both rooted it in brain
processes.

In fact, a large part of the remainder of this chapter

examines James's attempt to work out the implications of the notion of
selectivity in his psychology of the higher mental processes.

Reasoning: James's Biological Interpretation
of the A Priori
James's interpretation of the laws of association formed the
foundation for his formulation of voluntary thought or reasoning.

This

formulation, however, does not appear self-contained in one chapter or
even one section of the Principles. In fact, it is scattered through no
less than ten chapters of that work.

In this section we shall consider

only three of those chapters in detail— "Reasoning," "Conception" and
Necessary Truths and the Effects of Experience."

Our objectives are
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twofold.

First, we shall attempt to sketch James’s basic model of reason

ing. We shall then ask how it is that James thought that humans came to
be able to think.

In presenting his answer to this question, we shall

find him going beyond both the letter and spirit of Hodgson, and empiri
cism in general, and formulating a unique version of the a priori.
James opens his "Reasoning" chapter with a statement which reveals
both the goal of his account of human thinking as well as the importance
of his interpretation of association.

In contrasting the mental activ

ities of humans with animals he wrote that
. . . it is by no means easy to decide just what is meant by
reason, or how the peculiar thinking process called reasoning
differs from other thought-sequences which may lead to similar
results.30
This remark gives voice to one theme which pervades James's account of
human thinking.

That is, he is less concerned with the results of rea

soning than he is with articulating the distinctive psychological pro
cesses which humans employ in thinking.

There are obvious historical

reasons for James to have begun as he does.

Evolutionary theory produced

a mass of mostly anecdotal accounts of animal intelligence which tended
to glorify the reasoning powers of animals.

This approach seemed to

assume that since animals, at times, perform remarkably intelligent
feats, the processes through which these accomplishments are brought
about must be similar to those evidenced in human thought.

In essence,

the pioneers of animal psychology either assumed or argued for a simi
larity of processes from an occasional similarity of results.

As we

shall see, James rejected this position and offered a formulation of human
thinking which was fundamentally different from animal intelligence.
30
James, Principles, 2:325.
31Ibid., pp. 329-330.

(Italics mine.)
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Perhaps the best way to approach this fundamental distinction is
to first examine the one very general sense in which James acknowledged
a similarity between human and animal thought.

This can be seen most

clearly in what James called "empirical thinking," the "simpler kind of
rational thinking which consists in the concrete objects of past experience merely suggesting each other."

32

The empirical thinker is the

rule-of-thumb thinker, who reacts to the present by reproducing the past.
The one similarity between animal and this crude form of human intelli
gence is that both are bound to the repetition of the past. But as soon
as we speak of the processes involved, a difference overrides even this
general similarity.

That is, James maintained throughout the Principles

that even the most prosaic human mind has a larger number of interests
than the most intelligent animal and his thought is dominated by associ
ation by similarity rather than contiguity.

Anyone who has heard a

person free-associate can attest to the fact that the human mind moves
between abstract categories rather than reproducing events which are
contiguous with one another.
The distinctive processes of what James called "reasoning proper"
are abstraction and analysis.

33

First, rather than being bound to the

concomitant or even similar associates of the whole object, the reasoner
is able to select an abstract property of the object and substitute it
for the whole object.

That is, the reasoner is able to deal with objects

in terms of their essential properties, to intend an object from an ab
stract frame of reference.

This is the case because abstraction brings

the person into contact with conceptual networks which might have no

32Ibid., p. 329.

33Ibid., p. 330.
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Intrinsic spatio-temporal relation to the object as a whole.

Thus, for

example, both a dog and a human may approach a limping stranger but only
the human knows the limp means that the person needs help.

In fact, for

James, abstraction is synonymous with the act of conception— "our atten
tion singling out some part of the mass of matter for thought . . . and
holding fast to it, without confusion"— and both are intimately related
to the interests of the knower.

34

And every act of attention implicates

inattention and therefore in abstracting one aspect of the object we
'mutilate the fullness of reality'.

That is, every time we conceive of

a thing in a particular way we classify it as an instance of a general
class of phenomena.

In doing so we break up the stream of thought into

discrete, permanent conceptual units and ignore, for the moment, the
other possible relations.

As James wrote:

Whichever one of these aspects of its being I temporarily class
it under, makes me unjust to the other aspects. But as I al
ways am classing it under one aspect or another, I am always
unjust, always partial, always exclusive. My excuse is neces
sity. . . . My thinking is first and last and always for the
sake of my doing.35
This observation is important from a number of perspectives.

With regard

to the thinker, the process of abstraction and classification has obvious
advantages since an abstract attribute has fewer and more general prop
erties than the object as a whole.

With respect to James's theory of

thinking, this brings the internal activity of the thinker to the fore
ground; as we shall see, James posited that the processes of abstraction
and classification must be a priori capacities of homo sapiens. Lastly,
with respect to James's formulation of human thinking, the notion of
breaking up the stream into discrete conceptual units makes clear that
34
Ibid., 1:461.

35
James, Principles, 2:333.
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his description of thought as a stream is propaedeutic to, but not the
essence of, his psychology of thinking.

In fact, it might be more

accurate to follow Linschoten and say that it is experience rather than
thought that James had in mind when he described it as a continuous
36

stream.

In this way we can save the word thinking for the process of

tearing out portions of the stream and intending its objects with spe
cific interests in mind.
This leads us to the second process which characterizes reasoning,
a process which, in fact, is continuous with abstraction.

Once the

thinker conceives of an object as a member of an abstract class, he
searches and checks to see if the relations which hold for the class are
applicable to the problem he is facing.

Thus analysis follows abstrac

tion and it involves a covert or overt testing of the alternatives sug
gested.

James understood, for example, that a cat could open a door by

randomly stumbling upon the behavior of moving the latch.

But this is

a case of association by contiguity, not reasoning proper.

That this is

the case can be seen by examining what would happen if a door became
jammed against the lintel on a humid day.

Assuming it wanted to get out,

the cat would remain at the mercy of chance.

But the human would

(1) search for and attend to the source of the problem, (2) after locating
it at the top of the door he would classify it in terms of his knowledge
about the characteristics of wood, resistence etc., and (3) assuming he
simply wanted to leave the room he would press down on the handle and
open the door.

37

However trivial the example, it contains all the essen

tial elements of James's formulation of reasoning.

Thus reasoning is a

36
Linschoten, Psychology of William James, pp. 62-64.
37
James, Principles, 2:339.
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problem-solving situation, a search for the means for obtaining specific
ends; and James thought that homo sapiens was uniquely equipped to
handle such situations.

Rather than being bound to reproducing the past,

the reasoner can creatively apply his knowledge to problems that he is
interested in solving.
James's conception of the subject-object relationship underlies
his account of reasoning in an interesting fashion.

Rather than conceiv

ing of objects as discrete, clearly defined entities, James wrote that
objects are "well-springs of properties . . . .
infinity of aspects or properties."

38

Every reality has an

A relativism pervades his concep

tion of objects.
There is no property ABSOLUTELY essential to any one thing.
The same property which figures as the essence of a thing on ^
one occasion becomes a very inessential feature upon another.
His own italics make it clear that he sought to overcome the common-sense
notion that the essence of an object is fixed and resides in the object.
At the same time, however, his account of reasoning is founded upon the
proposition that people are able to deal with objects in terms of essences.
In the face of this paradox James maintained that the capacity to deal
with objects in terms of essences is an activity of the knower. Thus he
wrote that
. . . the only meaning of essence is teleological, and . . .
classification and conception are purely teleological weapons
of the mind. The essence of the thing is that one of its prop
erties which is so important for my interests that in comparison
with it I neglect the rest.40
Again, James's own italics reveal his fundamental contention.
GO

The thinker

QQ

Ibid., p. 332.
40
Ibid., p. 335.

Ibid., p. 333.
(James's italics.)

(James's italics.)
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himself classes, names and conceives of an object in terms of the cate
gories which he believes to be the most important or valuable.

In other

words, the interests, values and emotional beliefs of the knower cut
through the relativism of objects and create worlds of truth.

Thus

Helmholtz’s mechanistic conception of science offers us one perspective,
one version of the essence of objects.

But James's point is that even

the scientific conception of objects is grounded in a commitment to a set
of passionately held values.
At first glance, James might be criticized for simply assuming that
all conceptual activity is embedded value-laden emotional considerations;
but his detailed analyses of the motives of philosophical belief make
such a contention less powerful than it might be.

If his account of

thinking in the Principles begins with the proposition that thinking is
inextricably inter-penetrated by value judgments, it must also be noted
that this position was adopted only after a great deal of scrutiny of the
most abstract forms of human thought.
the next section.

We shall return to this theme in

At this juncture we must complete James's account of

human thought by examining his formulation of the a priori.
Morton White has made a distinction between two closely related
strains of James's formulation of the a priori in the Principles. At one
level, James is concerned with the question of psychogenesis, the evolu
tionary origin of the brain structures which make necessary or non-empirical truths possible.^

In addressing this question, however, White

noted that James crosses over into the epistemological realm and considers
the method of justifying necessary truths.

The distinction between

41
Morton White, Science and Sentiment in America: Philosophical
Thought From Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1972), pp. 173-180.
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psychogenesis and epistemology is valuable for our discussion in two
related respects.

First, it serves to clarify the focus of our discus

sion since the question of psychogenesis alone plays a central role in
James's psychology of human thinking.

Second, given this focus, it must

be made clear at the outset that James, along with the vast majority of
nineteenth century experimental psychologists, interpreted Kant's a priori
in biological terms.

Our goal, then, is simply to understand James's

formulation of the -a priori, to attempt to integrate the role played by
biologically-given brain structures with his psychology of human reason
ing. This goal leads us to the question of psychogenesis.
James's formulation of the origin of biologically-given brain
structures was offered as an alternative to what he saw as the seduc
tively appealing but logically untenable "experience hypothesis" of
Spencer.

According to Spencer, a priori knowledge is the product of the

accumulated experience of the race.

Spencer's formulation is an exten

sion of the Lamarckian position that the acquired knowledge of our an
cestors is transmitted to successive generations until it becomes manifest
as instinctual or biologically a priori reactions.

The appeal of this

formulation was rooted in its capacity to integrate seemingly contradic
tory philosophical positions.

Most importantly, Spencer's a priori

allowed him to acknowledge Kant's contention that some aspects of cogni
tion are prior to the individual's experience while retaining the funda
mental tenet of empiricism, viz., that all knowledge is ultimately the
product of experience.

Of course, the notion of experience must be

expanded to include the history of the race as well as the individual,
but even this concession turned out to be an attractive feature of Spencer's
interpretation.

Evolutionary theory had made the genetic history of the
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organism an essential ingredient of the formation of distinct species
and Spencer's position, at long last, brought attention to the biologi
cally-given structures of the brain.

Thus when he asked: "What is the

meaning of the human brain?," his answer sought to integrate Kantian
rationalism with evolutionary theory without sacrificing empiricism.
"It is," he wrote,
. . . that the many established relations among its [the
brain's] parts, stand for many established relations among
the psychical changes. Each of the constant connextions among
the fibres of the cerebral masses, answers to some connextion
of phenomena in the experiences of the race.42
Empiricism is upheld by the statement that the inherited brain structures
of the individual are ultimately derived from his ancestor's adaptation
to their environment.

It might also be noted that this formulation is

fully compatible with Spencer's definition of mind as the correspondence
of inner relations to outer relations.

As a complex of physical struc

tures, Spencer conceived of the human brain as a continuously developing
product of the history of an entire species.
James's argument against Spencer did not center around the exis
tence of biologically-given brain structures, for both agreed that:
(1) Kant's a priori must be interpreted in evolutionary terms and (2) the
human brain at birth possesses numerous instincts and capacities which
distinguish humans from other species.

What James challenged was Spencer's

account of the mode of origin and nature of the innate structures of the
human brain.

That is, James rejected the notion that the mind (or brain)

is wholly structured by phenomena of the external world.

In other words,

he rejected the fundamental tenet of Spencer's empiricism, viz., that
42
Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols., (1855;
reprint of second edition, New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1896), 1:468.
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all knowledge can be conceived of as the product of the combined experi
ence of the race and the individual.

For James, there is something

intrinsic to the human mind or brain which has absolutely no analogue
or correspondent in the external world.

And since this something can not

be construed as the product of experience, it is itself in no way depen
dent upon or conditioned by the actual sequences and coexistences ex
perienced by the individual for its continued application.

Furthermore,

James argued that this something is responsible for the unique features
of human cognition, viz., that the human is not bound, like brutes, to
the repetition of past experience.

Before examining the nature of

James's a priori let us consider his argument against Spencer's formu
lation of their mode of origin.
A strict Spencerian empiricism is committed to discovering the
external relations which correspond to the internal relations exhibited
by the organism.

It is this feature of empiricism which James brought

attention to when he wrote that:
Most psychologists nowadays believe that the objects first, in
some natural way, engendered a brain from out of their midst,
and then imprinted these various cognitive affections on it . . . .
it must then be fair to assume universally [they reasoned] that,
with time enough given, the mere presence of the various
ob.jects and relations to be known must end by bringing about
the latter's cognition, and that in this way all mental structure
was first to last evolved.43
This conception of Spencerian empiricism led James to make a distinction
which became the foundation of both his critique of Spencer and his own
formulation of psychogenesis.

The distinction is between what he called

brain-born (or back-door) and experience-born (or front door) modes of
origin of brain structures.

44

If we restrict the word experience, as

43
James, Principles, 2:629.
44Ibid., pp. 629-633.

(Italics mine.)

128

James did, to "processes which influence the mind by the front-door-way
of simple habits and association," then Spencer's formulation calls for
an entirely experience-born genesis of brain structures.

45

With this

notion of experience, the distinction between the race and the individual
is less important than the empiricist contention that all brain struc
tures are ultimately the product of experience.
James rejected Spencer's empiricism unambiguously and maintained
that the origin of the fundamental structures which underlie human thought
are brain-born— arising from accidental variations in the molecular
structure of the human.

Thus James countered Spencer's Lamarckian notion

with the Darwinian notion that internally generated chance variations
are inherited and come to characterize entire species by loading the evolutionary dice in favor of the lucky mutants.

46

Thus, in describing his

position James wrote that:
The higher thought-processes owe their being to causes which
correspond far more to the sourings and fermentations of
dough . . . than to the manipulations by which [its] physical
aggregates came to be compounded.47
If we can continue within the imagery of James's analogy, it might be said
that he rejected the notion that the structure of the human brain is
passively shaped by the poundings of external objects.

Left to itself,

James argued that transformations take place in the brain as they do in
dough, and the results of these changes can not be conceived of as the
product of external objects.

Thus James conceived of the unique charac

teristics of human thought as originating as "pure idiosyncrasies,

45Ibid., p. 628.
46
White, Science and Sentiment, pp. 173-176.
47

James, Principles, 2:638.
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spontaneous variations, fitted by good luck . . .

to the cognizance of

objects . . . without being in any intelligible sense immediate deriva
tives of them."^

And these "pure idiosyncrasies or spontaneous varia

tions" produced the physical basis of the distinctive features of human
experience.

Thus he wrote that:

Our aesthetic, moral and intellectual life seems made up of
affections of this collateral and incidental sort, which have
entered the mind by the back stairs, as it were, or rather have
not entered the mind at all, but got surreptitiously born in
the house.49
While both accounts of the origin of a priori brain structures are
speculative, Spencer's is riddled with a devastating logical problem.
Spencer’s position holds that all a priori knowledge was originally ac
quired during the lifetime of the organism's ancestors.

This formulation

seems immanently plausible when it is applied to particular, isolated
relations between the organism and its environment.

Thus that a bird of

prey responds instinctively to its victim's movements is easily under
standable within Spencer's account.

In fact, it was instinctual responses

and reflex actions which Spencer gave as examples when he presented his
experience-hypothesis in his Principles of Psychology. B u t

James's

formulation of the a priori in his Principles was not primarily concerned
with isolated response dispositions.

Instead he sought to explain the

origin of, in his words, the "theoretical part of our organic mental struc51
ture."

The difference is of fundamental importance, as James sought to

understand the origin of the basic capacities, activities and processes
which distinguish human from non-human mentality.
48

Ibid., p. 631.

And in applying Spencer's

49
**Ibid., p. 627.

"^Spencer, Principles, 1:419-425; 458-460; 465-471.
■**James, Principles, 2:677-678.
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account to these general capacities, "the categories themselves," James
called them, one arrives at a logical conumdrum.

An example will make

this clear.
One capacity which James said distinguishes human from non-human
mental life is the reflective memory of homo sapiens, our ability to recall
objects of thought as distinct from objects in the world.

Can it be

reasonably argued that our ancestors gradually increased their capacity
to reflect on what had occurred in the past in a manner analogous to the
way that the ancestors of hawks gradually increased their efficiency as
field-mice hunters?

This evolutionary scenario is logically impossible

because any particular instance of reflective memory presupposes a capa
city which makes this type of memory possible.

That is, the capacity to

reflectively remember, a biologically given brain structure, is logically
prior to any particular string of human-like memories.

And this capacity,

James argued, must be construed as the result of spontaneous variations
in the brains of the ancestors of humans.

Spencer's account would lead

one to the untenable position that an organism, in adapting to its environ
ment, could— in principle— outstrip its biologically given brain structures.
How else could novel characteristics of the brain emerge in the evolution
of a species?

This aspect of Spencer's formulation was an artifact of

the dualistic teleology of Lamarck's formulation of the inheritance of
acquired characteristics— that the desire to perform some action creates,
over a period of time, the ability to carry out that action.

52

And while

Spencer obscured this principle in his vague, systematic writings, James
unearthed it and used it to refute Spencer's evolutionary empiricism.
52

The teleological foundation of Lamarck's formulation of the devel
opment of species is considered in John C. Greene's The Death of Adam:
Evolution and Its Impact of Western Thought (Ames, Iowa: Iowa University
Press, 1959), pp. 163-164.
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The form of James's argument against Spencer— that any particular
instance of a given type of experience necessarily assumes the brain
structures which make that type of experience possible— has a distinc
tively Kantian flavor to it.

James himself recognized the similarity;

but before we call him a disciple of the great German philosopher a number
of fundamental differences must be acknowledged.

53

First, as we have

said, James offered a biological interpretation of the a priori and its
mode of origin.

A second and more radical difference revolves around

James's conception of the nature of the a priori.

That is, the processes

which James had in mind when he spoke of a priori brain structures are
quite different from those of Kant or Spencer.

In a little-quoted but

revealing footnote in the Principles he tells us why such a difference is
necessary.
Kant . . . made a strange tactical blunder in his way of showing
that the forms of our necessary thought are underived from ex
perience. He insisted on thought-forms with which experience
largely agrees, forgetting that the only forms which could not
by any possibility be the results of experience would be such as
experience violated. The first thing a Kantian ought to do is
to discover forms of judgement to which no order in 'things'
runs parallel . . . .
I myself have already to some extent
proceeded, and in the pages which follow shall proceed still
farther to show the originality of mind in this way.54
Footnotes are a historian's delight when they express, in a few sentences,
a person's general orientation toward an extremely complex topic.
this is what we have here.

And

James says that Kant's argument for an a priori

53
James's adoption of a type of apiriorism is explicitly admitted
in the Principles, 2:618.
54

James, Principles, 2:664-665. (Italics mine.) This form of
argument against Kant's formulation of the a priori is evidenced in Spencer's
Principles, 1:467. James was obviously responding to the Spencerian argu
ment when he offered a Darwinian interpretation of the a priori.
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element suffers from the fact that his categories are themselves frequently
encountered in experience!

Consider, for example, Kant's hypothetical

form of judgment, which can be expressed as if A, then B.

The question

is whether this category is derived from or logically prior to experience.
Given these alternatives, the empiricist could argue that the hypothetical
form of judgment is merely a generalization from a person's experience
of two external events— a and b— invariably following one another.

Aware

of this problem, James's search for the a priori centered around psycho
logical processes which correspond to nothing in the external world.
If found, such processes would be more reasonable candidates for arguing
for the "originality of the mind."
In carrying out this strategy, James effected an important change
in the notion of the a priori.

That is, the a priori was transformed from

a fixed set of categories into the general capacities and processes which
are built into the structure of the human brain.

Psychologically, James's

a priori amounts to a group of functional processes which are correlated
with the unique structural features of the human brain.
examined one such process, the expanded memory of humans.

We have already
We shall now

turn to the process of conception.
The process responsible for the unique structure of human thinking
is conception and conception, for James, is founded upon the fact that
the "mind can always intend, and know when it intends, to think the
55
Same."

James called this the principle of constancy in the mind's

meanings and it stands as the a priori foundation of human thinking.
a priori nature of this principle can be seen from two perspectives.
First, James emphasized that this sense of sameness is rooted in the

James, Principles, 1:459.

The
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"mind's structure a l o n e . T h a t is, he is speaking of a psychological
or subjective given rather than an objective sense of sameness— the mind
imposes sameness on a world that may or may not be offering the same
things.

As he said: "Without the psychological sense of identity same

ness might rain down upon us from the outer world for ever and we be none
the wiser.Il"’7

But given this psychological capacity, the thinker approaches

the world in terms of meanings which remain the same.

The principle of

constant meanings is also a priori in the sense that the meanings created
are ideal concepts which are able to transcend the spatio-temporal rela
tions given in experience.

That is, in employing this principle the

human mind is able to create ideal concepts which are more than mere copies
of things or relations experienced.

The concept of white, for example,

can not be thought of as an image of some white object, as the nominalism
of empiricism would lead you to believe.

Instead, it must be construed

as one abstract property of an object which a mind has choosen to attend
to and intend as a conceptual ideal.

"Thus," James wrote,

. . . amid the flux of opinions and of physical things, the
world of conceptions, or things intended to be thought about,
stands stiff and immutable like Plato's Realm of Ideas.58
In other words, no matter how often white objects change intoblack objects,
or moving objects into stationary ones, what we mean by the concepts of
white and motion remains the same by virtue of the principle of constancy
in the mind's meanings.

As concepts, white and motion are aspects of

the sensible flux which have been attended to and intended ina way that
is independent of the particulars of experience.
James effected the transition from isolated concepts to conceptual
systems by positing another a priori capacity— comparison.

56Ibid.

57Ibid., p. 460.

For James,

58Ibid., p. 462.

134

comparison is actually a family of a priori activities through which people
judge things to be the same, different or similar.

As he said:

In noticing the differences and resemblances of things and
their degrees, the mind feels its own activity, and has given
the name comparison thereto.59
In other words, in classifying things as instances of abstract kinds or
categories, the human mind employs a capacity which is independent of
experience in two senses.

First, James argued that the process of classi

fication is itself independent of the particulars of experience.

Thus he

wrote that classification into kinds
. . . has nothing to do with the particular order of experi
ence, or the outer coexistences and sequences of terms. Were it
a mere outgrowth of habit or association, we should be forced
to regard it as having no universal validity; for every hour of
the day we meet things we consider to be of this kind or that,
but later we learn that they have none of the kind's properties.
. . . Instead, however, of correcting the principle by the cases,
we correct the cases by the principle.60
That is, no matter how frequently we misclassify a thing as an instance
of an abstract category, we never, as a result of our errors, question
the process of classification itself.

In this sense, classification is

a principle which structures, rather than is structured by, experience.
Classification also violates the order of experience in another sense.
In classifying things, the person is able to bring things together which
have never been experienced in close spatio-temporal contiguity.
James's formulation of the genesis of ideal conceptual systems is
somewhat mysterious and entirely rational.
be the product of "our free mental play."^

Such systems are alleged to
What he seems to mean is

that a mind gifted with the capacities to create concepts and compare

59Ibid., 2:643.

^ James, Principles, 2:638.

6°Ibid., pp. 649-650.
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them will eventually discover relations between concepts which are wholly
dependent on the nature of the concepts compared.

62

Thus, for example,

once the person has learned to ignore the sensible differences between
different objects and treat them in terms of their abstract numerical
quality, he will discover that "the same number, operated on . . . in the
same way will always give the same result."
numerical

63

This relation between ideal

concepts is grounded in what we mean by the concepts rather

than the actual relations experienced.

Thus no matter how many times we

add drops of water together and continue to obtain one as a result, the
mathematical principle remains intact.

The same basic framework holds

for the creation of ethical or scientific systems— abstract concepts are
created and then relations between the ideal concepts are discovered.
Thus there is a clearly rationalistic aspect of James's psychology of
thinking, the origin, creation or discovery of conceptual systems is in
dependent of the order of experience.
As we have seen a number of times already, however, James's psy
chology is an attempt to integrate rationalism and empiricism, and his
account of thinking is no exception to this rule.

Thus he tempered even

the most rationalistic element of his psychology of thinking with a dose
of empiricism.

The result is what John Wild has called the "testable"

nature of James's formulation of the a priori.^

For Kant, the cate

gories of thought are a priori and legislate the structure of all experi
ence for all time.

They are the conditions which the knower must impose

on any particular thought and as such, they are not open to empirical
verification.

In contrast, James's a priori is, as we have said, a

62Ibid., p. 642.

63Ibid., p. 654.

64
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general capacity of the human mind to create ideal conceptual systems.
And while the capacity is a priori, the ideal systems created through
its employment are neither universal nor ultimate.

As James said:

They stand waiting in the mind, forming a beautiful ideal
network; and the most we can say is that we hope to discover
realities over which the network may be flung so that ideal
and real may coincide.65
In a sense, then, James's a priori can be viewed as an epistemologically
neutral potential of the human mind.

Ideal meanings and comparison can

be employed to construct any number of internally consistent conceptual
systems.

But there is no guarantee that any one of these systems un

covers the real structure of reality.

Any ideal system must therefore

be viewed as tentative, an ideal construction which is subject to empiri
cal verification.
Science, for example, offers us one way of looking at reality, one
way of structuring and organizing sensible experience.

Within the sci

entific frame of reference, we have a world which is assumed to be in
habited by ideal entities (e.g., atoms) and governed by ideal relations
(e.g., mathematical laws).

But any ideal system, however much it is

dependent on a priori capacities for its origin, must, according to James,
be verified in sensible experience to be recognized as true.

Thus, while

he argued forcefully for the need to posit an a priori element to explain
scientific thinking, he clearly recognized that the power of science is
rooted in its empirical nature, "the things of Nature turn out to act
as if they were of the kind a s s u m e d . O f course, other conceptual sys
tems are possible, but they too must be verified in experience; they must
demonstrate that the "ideal and real coincide."

^James, Principles, 2:665.
66Ibid., p. 668.

(Italics mine.)
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James also mentions the systems of metaphysics and ethics as exam
ples of ideal conceptual systems which, like science, are made possible
by the a priori capacities of the human mind.

These enterprises also

share another fundamental characteristic with science.

That is, science,

ethics and metaphysics are each rooted in the teleological nature of
human thought— each seeks to show that the ideals contained in its sys
tem coincide with the real structure of the world.

James stated that the

areas of experience which metaphysics and ethics seek to systematize are
less easily accessible to verification but he was unwilling to declare
these systems barren on this basis alone.

Metaphysical and ethical

ideals serve as valuable guides to our systematic undertakings.

The

metaphysical notion that 'nothing can happen without a cause', for example,
is a valuable aid to the scientist who continually acts as if this ideal
were absolute truth.

Similarly, the ethical principle that 'man is free'

is valuable to the moralist who, in believing the principle, continually
strives for a more just world.

In both instances, faith in a contestable

proposition helps create the world one posits to be real.

Thus James's

psychology of thinking offered a framework and world-view which left
hope for the future reconciliation between the variety of seemingly con
flicting conceptual systems.
It cannot be too often repeated that the triumphant application
of any one of our ideal systems of rational relations to the
real world justifies our hope that other systems may be found
also applicable. Metaphysics should take heart from the example
of physics, simply confessing that hers is a longer task.
Nature may be remodeled, nay, certainly will be remodeled, far
beyond the point at present reached.67
Thus the ostensibly contradictory ideals of science and ethics may well
be integrated by an as yet undiscovered system of thought.

67Ibid., p. 671.
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In summary, James's account of thinking is perhaps best viewed as
an integration of rationalism and empiricism which is embedded in a
teleological formulation of mind.

The rationalistic strain is clearly

evidenced in his suggestion that a priori capacities must be posited to
explain the origin of ideal conceptual systems.
these capacities are epistemological neutral.

But, as we have said,
They allow humans to create

conceptual systems which function to structure, organize and clarify the
flux of sense experience.

In fulfilling these functions, however, the

empirical strain of James's psychology of thinking becomes manifest.
That is, the truth of a given conceptual system depends upon its verifi
cation in experience.

The teleological foundation of this integration

can be seen in his insistence that all conceptual activities are grounded
in and conditioned by the subjective interests or purposes of the thinker.
From this perspective, each stage of the process of thinking— abstraction,
classification, testing— can only be understood within the context of the
plans, purposes and ideals of the person engaged in that process.

We

shall develop this theme in the next section.

Transitive States and Beliefs:
The Horizon of Values
Thus far we have examined James's reinterpretation of associationism, as well as his formulation of reasoning and the a priori.

A theme

which pervades each of these topics is that human experience is condi
tioned by the interests of the knower; that dynamic, emotional and aes
thetic interests play a central role in the structuring of human experi
ence.

Given this, it is important to recognize a fundamental unity

between James's early analysis of the motives of philosophical belief
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68

and his treatment of thinking in the Principles.

In the first chapter we attempted to show that James, between 1874
and 1884, sought to understand the diversity of philosophical opinion in
terms of the different emotional and aesthetic ideals which they contain.
In essence, he argued that philosophical systems, however abstract they
may appear in print, come wrapped in an inarticulate matrix of emotional
commitments.

Furthermore, he argued that the vague sentimental tendencies

which suffuse philosophical systems affect one's choice between philos
ophies; that, all other things being equal, a person's choice between
philosophies is determined by how compatible that system is with the be
liever's aesthetic ideals.
In this section we hope to show that James's early analysis of the
motives of philosophizing served as the working model for his psychology
of the higher mental processes in the Principles. ^

We shall build this

interpretation by examining two important themes of the Principles, the
transitive portions of the stream of thought and the psychology of belief.
In fulfilling this goal we shall explore the implications of the teleo
logical foundation of James's psychology of thinking.
68

The essays are William James's "The Sentiment of Rationality,"
Mind 4 (1879):317-346, reprinted in The Will to Believe, pp. 63-110.
Idem, "Rationality, Activity and Faith," Princeton Review 2 (1882):58—86.
Idem, "Reflex Action and Theism," Unitarian Review 16 (1881):389-416,
reprinted in The Will to Believe, pp. 111-144. Page numbers from The
Will to Believe will be cited whenever possible. Perry, in his Thought
and Character of William James (l:495ff), first brought attention to
James's "motives of philosophizing" essays.
69

See Perry, Thought and Character of William James, 1:495. Perry
notes that the substance of these essays was completed during 1877. This
is one year before James was contracted to write a psychology text. Thus
James was interested in the 'psychology of philosophy', the psychology
of philosophical belief, before he began his systematic writing in psy
chology.
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The distinction between the substantive and transitive portions of
the stream of thought is a fundamental feature of James's descriptive
psychology.^

Hume, for example, described mind as a procession of dis

tinct ideas, "a kind of theater," he wrote, "where several perceptions
successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away and mingle."

71

In terms of nineteenth century psychology, we have seen that Wundt's
method of introspection institutionalized the empiricist concern for
sensory elements by calling for a description in terms of the various
contents of mind.

In terms of James's distinction, empiricism was acutely

sensitive to the substantive portions of experience; those seemingly
stable images or sensations which seem to dominate experience.

Beyond

their stability and imaginal nature, these portions are easily labeled
in terms of the objects they represent.

From James's perspective, the

nameability of these portions of the stream was a perniciously important
feature, because that which could not be easily named was ignored and
then explicitly denied!

This position, taken to its extreme, can be seen

in the nominalistic systems of Berkeley and Hume, who denied the possi
bility of forming an abstract idea.
It was with this trend in mind that James called for the recognition
of the importance of the transitive portions of experience.

He argued that

experience is more analogous to the "life of a bird," with its "flights
and perchings," than Hume's theater of mingling ideas.

72

In this analogy,

the perchings or resting places are the sensorial images of the empiricist
70
The distinction first appeared in William James's "Some Omissions
of Introspective Psychology," Mind 9 (1884):1-26.
71
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1896), p. 252.
72
James, Principles, 1:243.
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tradition, what James called the substantive portions.

He certainly did

not deny the presence or importance of the substantive portions, but he
did proclaim rather boldly thht "the definite images of traditional psy
chology form but the very smallest part of our minds as they actually
live."

73

This is an audacious challenge to a psychology which had been

dominated by the analysis of sensational contents.

But James sought to

make clear that inarticulate schemes of relations surrounded each sub
stantive state like a halo or fringe and that dimly felt feelings of
direction suffused and united the successive substantive states.

He was

fully aware of the difficulty involved in describing these transitive
states in verbal terms:
As a snowflake crystal caught in the warm hand is no longer
a crystal but a drop, so instead of catching the feeling of
relation moving to its term, we find we have caught some
substantive thing, usually the last word we are pronouncing.
But despite this difficulty, he pointed to the pervasiveness of these por
tions of experience, "a good third of our psychic life consists in these
rapid premonitory perspective views of schemes of thought not yet arti
culate."^

Confronted with the felt vagueness of the flow of experience

as it actually appears, he asserted that his notion of the transitive
states was aimed at "the reinstatement of the vague to its proper place
in our mental life."

76

These must surely seem like strange utterances

to the contemporary psychologist, but we must not let James's rhetoric
keep us from the descriptive richness of his formulation of experience.
We must go beyond what he says about these states and focus on his de
scriptions.

73Ibid., p. 255.

74Ibid., p. 244.

75Ibid., p. 253.

76Ibid., p. 254.
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As soon as we do this the revolutionary nature of James's descrip
tion becomes manifest.

He is not only challenging the traditional way of

describing experience, he is seeking to replace the very terms employed
in such a description.

But revolutions, however eye-opening, tend to be

unsystematic; and James's notion of the transitive portions is no excep
tion to this rule.

A German reviewer of the Principles expressed exas

peration at the diversity of phenomena he found in James's treatment of
the transitive states and he was critical of James for not setting down
organizing principles for classificatory purposes.

77

In lieu of a

systematic exposition, James offers the reader a long series of examples;
brilliant, timeless descriptions of long-overlooked aspects of experience
but without apparent organization.

Happily, recent scholarship has begun

the task of formulating the underlying structure in James's descriptions.
Working from a phenomenological perspective, Aron Gurwitsch has articu
lated what might be called the temporal and cognitive horizons in this
aspect of James's psychology.

Though we shall add another, distinctively

Jamesian, horizon to Gurwitsch's analysis, his interpretation can serve
as a valuable introduction to an extremely complex topic.
In a very early paper Gurwitsch argued that a fundamentally new
conception of consciousness appears in James's discussion of the transi
tive states, a conception which he said is "defined in terms of temporality."

78

This is certainly true.

The transitive portions are the means

through which James pressed for the sensible continuity of the past,

77Aron Gurwitsch, "William James’ Theory of the Transitive Parts
of the Stream of Consciousness," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
3 (1943):474; 477.
78Ibid., p. 452.
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present and future.

In the second chapter we examined James's account

of the given connectedness of the past-to-the-present in his analysis of
the feeling of thunder.

Instead of describing this feeling as an isolated

impression, he noted the importance of the silence which interpenetrates
and feeds into the experience of thunder.

Although the silence has passed

in objective, external time, his description of the feeling as thunderbreaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it makes clear that the past,
in experiential terms, is contained in the present.

For James, a

primitive and dimly perceived "fading echo" mingles with and reverberates
into the present.

80

This vaguely felt transition from the past-to-the-

present is at the basis of his argument for the continuity of experience;
and this continuity is a perfectly general characteristic of experience
as it actually appears.

Imagine, for example, someone bursting into my

office while I am writing.

I am, for a moment, disoriented and my first

reactions to my intruder are dimly but very definitely colored by the
feeling that I have been interrupted.

Note, however, that this inarticulate

sense of having been interrupted is not composed of sensorial images.
Similarly, the silence which is broken by the thunder is not an image
or auditory echo.

Instead, it might be better described as a dimly felt

background of experience which is indigenous to the transition from
silence to thunder.

Thus Gurwitsch rightly pointed out that James was

one of the first psychologists to recognize the importance of imageless
thought.

81

79Ibid., pp. 452-457.
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Gurwitsch, "James' Theory of the Transitive Parts," p. 458.
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The transition from the present-to-future also finds its way into
James's discussion of the transitive portions in the Principles; and
again the transition is accomplished by indistinct portions of the fringes
of experience.

He mentions "attitudes of expectancy" and "signs of direc

tion" as two definite but only dimly perceived classes of experience
through which the present melts unsuspectingly into the future.

82

In

another place he offers the 'intention to say something before it is said'
as an example of what he has in mind.

This is a perfectly definite

feeling which points toward but precedes the actual utterance.

Further

more, this indistinct feeling has an effect on the substantive portions
of experience.

Thus we sometimes say, after finishing an utterance—

"No, that's not what I mean!"— even before our listener has responded.
It seems, then, that our intention to say something is retained and checked
at some level with the actual utterance.

In comtemporary terms, it might

be called a self-monitoring device of some sort.

I have carried this

example a bit beyond James to make clear that his formulation of the
transitive portions is not simply an exercise in psychological descrip
tion.

James maintained that the transitive portions have an important

function, although they are themselves devoid of sensorial content.
also examined the experience of trying to recall a forgotten name.

He

83

Again, we have a definite feeling emerging from the past, filling our
present and pointing intensely toward the future but again the feeling
is imageless.

Thus every pulse of thought, what he called the "specious

present," contains a vague halo of the past and an inarticulate anticipation of the future.

84
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James, Principles, 1:251-252.
83Ibid., p. 251.

84Ibid., 1:609.
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In a later work Gurwitsch examined another dimension of James's
treatment of the transitive states, one which is contemporaneous with the
temporal horizon.

That is, James observed that any substantive portion

or idea appears surrounded and suffused by a "fringe" or "halo of rela85
tions."

Like the feelings of temporal continuity, the fringe of felt

relations is imageless and only dimly perceived by the thinker.

The

process James is describing in formulating the substantive portion-fringe
relationship is perhaps best communicated through a perceptual analogy.
That is, he is pointing to the non-perceptual analogue of the figureground relationship.

Like the figure of perceptual experience, the idea

or topic of thought stands out in clear focus as the central theme or
problem toward which our thinking is directed.

In other words, the topic

of thought is the thing attended to— our reason for thinking.

Surrounding

this clearly felt topic, however, is a dim background or network of rela
tions which form the frame of reference within which the problem appears.
Again, James does not provide a systematic exposition of his notion of
the fringe but from the examples he gives it is clear that it represents
a terribly complex, multi-layered process.

He notes, for example, that

the rules of grammar are dimly felt in the periphery of experience and
determine the sequence of words spoken:
A noun in a certain position demands a verb in a certain mood
and number . . . . Adjectives call for nouns, verbs for ad
verbs . . . . And this foreboding of the coming grammatical
scheme combined with each successive uttered word is so prac
tically accurate that a reader incapable of understanding
four ideas of the book he is reading aloud, can nevertheless
read it with the most delicately modulated expression of
intelligence.86
He also suggested that the "sense of familiarity" is supplied by the fringe

85Ibid., p. 256.

86Ibid., p. 254.

146

of relations.

87

This is the feeling that the present thought is the same

as, or of the same kind as, a previous thought.

In the last section we

saw that classification into kinds is an a priori activity of the human
mind.

We now see that the appropriateness of any particular classifica

tion is signaled by an inarticulate but very definite feeling in the
fringe.

James also alluded to the operational nature of thinking in his

discussion of the fringe, the fact that thinking involves operating on
symbols and relations.

With respect to the cognitive or symbolic nature

of thinking, he quoted a lengthy

passage from G. H. Lewes in support of

the proposition that thought is a kind of algebra.

88

These examples make

clear that the notion of the fringe is a multi-layered structure which
contains a truly heterogeneous group of phenomena.

In hopes of providing

some degree of order, we might anticipate James's conclusion and state
that he is going to describe the process of thinkingin terms of a par
ticular type of relationship between the terms or symbols in the fringe
and those present in the topic of thought.
In contemporary terms, it might be said that the fringe was formu
lated to do justice to the role of the cognitive horizon in thinking—
the fact that any idea appears within a network of related ideas, a
complex scaffolding of conceptual relations.

The horizonal nature of the

fringe is perhaps most clearly evidenced in James's suggestion that the
meaning of any idea is provided by the fringe:
The sense of our meaning is an entirely peculiar element of
our thought. It is one of those evanescent and 'transitive'
facts of mind which introspection cannot turn upon . . . .
In the (somewhat clumsy) terminology I have used, it pertains
to the 'fringe' of the subjective state, and it is a feeling
of tendency whose neural counterpart is undoubtedly a lot of
g^
dawning and dying processes too faint and complex to be traced.

87Ibid., p. 252.

88Ibid., p. 270.

89Ibid., p. 472.
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Having recognized the symbolic nature of thought, James is calling for
what might be called a cognitive horizon formulation of meaning, a formu
lation in which ideas appear escorted by a network of semantic relations.
What he is reacting against is the correspondence theory of meaning.
According to the latter formulation, meaning or knowledge is understood
to be an image of the thing signified, the mental correlate of the
external object.

My thought of a man, for example, was thought to

involve a mental image of some kind of a particular man.

James criticized

this account as a "preposterously false descriptive psychology" and an
examination of a few of his examples will make clear why he was unsympathetic with this account.

90

He examines the meaning of man in two

sentences— "What a wonderful man Jones is!" and "What a wonderful thing
Man is!"

In both sentences the same sound— man— is uttered but the word

is intended and understood in two distinctively different senses in these
sentences.
meanings

His fundamental contention is that the difference in these
is not reducible to a difference in images, in the substantive

portion of the stream.

Having established this, he went on to argue that

the different meanings of the word man are supplied by the fringes which
surround the utterances.

Thus the same word can mean different things

depending on the penumbral halo of relations which surround one's utter
ances.

And however vague these halos might be, James argued that they

are essential to the psychology of meaning.

He also noted that entirely

different words or phrases can have the same meaning if they are escorted
by the same fringe of relations.

91

There is no paradox in this position,

he wrote, if one recognizes that words or images can be taken in two
senses, as physical stimuli— "qua sensations"— and as meanings— "qua

90Ibid., p. 471.

91Ibid., p. 269.
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thoughts, qua sensations understood."

92

In other words, James saw the

need for distinguishing between two levels of meaning, what might be
called the surface and deep levels; and he recognized that the deep level
could only be understood by articulating the cognitive horizon which
surrounds a particular word or idea.
Gurwitsch employed the notion of the fringe in offering his own
phenomenological account of thinking.

93

But there is something distinc

tively unJamesian in Gurwitsch's account.

That is, he makes no mention

of the interests of the knower, a construct which we have argued is cen
tral to James’s psychology of thinking.

By surveying his treatment of

the transitive states we hope to show that the notion of interests is a
fundamental constituent of James's formulation of thinking, as fundamental
as the sensible continuity or symbolic nature of thinking.

In other words,

without denying that James recognized the cognitive nature of thought,
we shall try to show that he demanded more of his psychology of thinking
and that this something more is an explicit recognition of the role of
the subjective interests of the thinker.
Prima facie evidence for this interpretation is not difficult to
find; remember that James posited that the interested nature of thought
is one of its five essential characteristics.

94

More detailed evidence

can also be found in his descriptions of the fringe.

He wrote, for

example, that "the significance, the value, of the image is all in the
halo or penumbra that surrounds and escorts

95
it."

He is referring to

more than cognitive meaning in this statement, he is alluding to the
92
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value of an idea, its specific relation to the present purpose of our
thinking.

Hodgson had taught James that cognitive relations, in and of

themselves, were too numerous to explain the particular path taken in
thought.

What was needed was the recognition that the interests of the

knower function to select the particular direction or flow of thought.
Thus James suggested that the primary function of the transitive states
is "to lead from one substantive conclusion to a n ot he r.I nte res ts,
felt in the fringe, function to select the most relevant cognitive rela
tions offered in the stream.

In this way, the particular interest or

purpose stands within the vaguely felt background of awareness and guides
and directs the flow of thought.

As James wrote:

Relation, then, to our topic or interest is constantly felt in
the fringe, and particularly the relation of harmony and discord,
of furtherance or hindrance. . . . When the sense of furtherance
is there we are 'all right'; with the sense of hindrance we are
dissatisfied and perplexed and cast about us for other thoughts.
Now any thought . . . whose fringe lets us feel ourselves 'all
right', is an acceptable member of our thinking . . . . Provided
we only feel it to have a place in the scheme of relations in
which the interesting topic lies, that is quite sufficient to
make of it a relevant and appropriate portion of our train of
ideas.97
This passage stands at the foundation of our interpretation for a number
of reasons.

At one level, this description of what goes on in thinking

corroborates James's teleological account of reasoning.

For James,

thinking begins with a consciously felt interest or purpose in some seg
ment of the stream, a desire to discover the means to a clearly envisioned
end.

But when the cognitive operations of thinking begin, i.e., selecting,

classifying, searching for alternatives, this superordinate interest or
purpose recedes into the dim background of our awareness.

96Ibid., p. 243.

97

Ibid., p. 259.

At this stage,

(Italics mine.)
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our attention is focused on particular cognitive relations.

In terms of

the figure-ground analogy, the cognitive relations become the figure and
the interest recedes to the ground.

In moving to the background, however,

James says that the interest continues to be felt and continues having
an important effect on our thinking. The superordinate interest effects
thinking by guiding the selection of particularly interesting or relevant
cognitive relations.

This effect is experienced as a dimly felt "feeling

of harmony," that distinctive relation between a particular cognition
and the purpose of thought.

If one idea feels particularly relevant it

is brought into clear focus in thought and, if a feeling of harmony is
experienced, the person continues working out that idea until the desired
end is reached or discord is felt.

If the latter feeling appears first,

we withdraw our attention from the discordant idea and return to the
original purpose and begin the process again.

One must not underestimate

the importance of these transient feelings of harmony and discord.
play an essential role in James's psychology of thinking.

They

As he wrote,

"the most important element of the fringe is . . . the mere feeling of
harmony or discord, of right or wrong direction in our thought."

98

These

feelings continually monitor the relation between the interests and cog
nitions of the thinker.
It is also important to note that James's description of the role
of feelings of harmony and discord in thinking in the Principles is
remarkably similar to his analysis of the nature of philosophical belief.
Remember that James posed the question of how the philosopher recognizes
a rational answer to a problem in his 1879 essay, "The Sentiment of

98Ibid., p. 261.
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Rationality."

99

The answer he offered at that time was that a rational

answer is accompanied by an inarticulate but very distinctive feeling,
which he called the sentiment of rationality.

In his 1879 essay he de

scribed this experience as a "strong feeling of ease," or "perfect fluency"
in thought, or as simply a feeling of " r e l i e f . I n contrast, an un
satisfactory solution is accompanied by a "state of puzzlement and per
plexity" or "distress.

His early analysis of philosophical belief

sought to demonstrate that the aesthetic ideals and interests of the
philosopher play an important role in determining just what sort of system
will produce these feelings of "ease" or "distress."

What we are arguing

is that the same basic model underlies James's account of thinking in
general in the Principles, but by 1890 he had developed the sentiment of
rationality into the notion of the fringe.

There can be no doubt that

James himself was aware that his formulation of thinking in the Principles
was an elaboration and extension of the model he first articulated in his
analysis of philosophical belief in the late 1870's.

In both he says

that the process of thinking is governed by the absence of feelings of
..

. 102

discord.
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In the Principles, for example, James wrote that "the feeling
of rationality . . . seems rather a negative than a positive thing,
being the mere absence of shock, or sense of discord, between the terms
of thought" 1:263-264. Compare this with the fundamental thesis of
his "The Sentiment of Rationality" essay of 1879; that the sentiment
of rationality "seems to be a negative rather than positive character."
He then goes on to ask:
"Shall we then say that the feeling of rationality is constituted
merely by the absense of any feeling of irrationality? I think
there are very good reasons for upholding this view" pp. 63-64.
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In his early analysis of philosophical belief, James conceived of
philosophical systems as a kind of projective test for intellectuals in
the sense that they reveal a person's commitment to aesthetic and meta
physical ideals which are unprovable.

They disclose a person's fundamental

world-view, which James argued was based on a teleological act of faith.
Now if he really is extending his motives of philosophical belief model
to thinking in general in the Principles, one would expect to find that
a thinker's fundamental metaphysical commitments play a central role in
James's psychology of thinking.

In fact, these fundamental metaphysical

commitments do appear in James's psychology of thinking in the Principles
as a very special layer of interests.

In recognizing this fact we arrive

at the paradoxical core of James's treatment of the higher mental pro
cesses, a theme appears which is continuous with his earlier work and it
becomes the source of both richness and contradictions.
be stated in any number of ways.

His position can

Most simply, James is contending that

thinking (cognition) is embedded in and conditioned by feeling (the
thinker's aesthetic ideals).

In terms which James might have used, we

might say that thinking is inextricably interwoven with the emotional
beliefs of the person engaged in thinking.

In contemporary terms, it

might be said that thinking always implies valuing, or that the cognitive
horizon is suffused by a horizon of values.
Until now we have used the concept of interest rather loosely to
denote a covert valuing process which becomes manifest in the knower's
selection of particular aspects of phenomena.

In fact, James himself uses

the concept rather loosely throughout the Principles, although an impor
tant distinction in his usage is discernable.

At one level, he describes

the knower as interested in achieving particular ends before he begins
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searching for whatever means which are available.

This is the way he

uses the concept of interests the vast majority of the time.

We have

called this the transient teleology in James's account of reasoning, or
we might speak of the interests of the knower with a small *i'.
sense, the means are wholly subordinate to the ends.

In this

This transient

teleology is fully compatible with the biological-functional strain in
James's psychology, a strain which conceives of mind as an organ or tool
for adapting to the ever changing environment.

This sense of interests

admits the biologically obvious— that mind is wholly dependent upon the
continued integrity of the body for survival.
But in presenting his psychology of belief, which occurs in his
"Perception of Reality" chapter of the Principles, a deeper and more
pervasive level of Interests emerges.

This level of Interests, with a

capital 'I', does not refer to a person's transient adaptations to his
environment.
the ends.

At this level, the means become at least as important as

This deeper realm of Interests refers to the relatively stable

complex of metaphysical commitments which the person believes to be the
most valuable way of viewing reality.

It is, in fact, the thinker's

tacitly-held world-view, which we have called the fundamental teleology
in James's early thought.

And like his analysis of philosophical belief,

he rooted this fundamental teleology in the thinker's emotional consti
tution.

Thus, not only will the thinker strive to make the world intel

ligible, he will also strive to make its intelligibility compatible with
his fundamental emotional sensitivities.

As a way of orienting oneself

in the world, James's fundamental teleology gives notice to the fact that
thinking of any form implicates and emerges from a horizon of values.
James's transient teleology gives notice to the fact that the thinker

If
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approaches any problem with plans of action, then his fundamental teleology
gives notice to the fact that all the specific plans and purposes are
grounded in a Life Plan which the thinker is continually trying to verify.
As we have seen, James analyzed philosophical belief with the hope
of showing that different philosophers work on different "orders of reality."

103

Similarly, in the Principles he speaks of the various "orders"

or "sub-universes of reality;" but now he distinguishes seven sub-uni
verses in hopes of accounting for every shade of human belief.

The seven

are:
(1) The world of sense, or of physical 'things' as we instinc
tively apprehend them . . .
(2) The world of science, or of physical things as the learned
conceive them . . .
(3) The world of ideal relations, or abstract truths believed
or believable by all, and expressed in logical, mathematical,
metaphysical, ethical, or aesthetic propositions.
(4) The world of 'idols of the tribe', illusions or prejudices
common to the race . . .
(5) The various supernatural worlds, the Christian heaven and
hell, the world of Hindoo mythology . . . etc. Each of these
a consistent system . . .
(6) The various worlds of individual opinion . . .
(7) The worlds of sheer madness and vagary . . .104
He distinguished these sub-universes as a preliminary attempt to formulate
the very general frames of reference in which human thinking takes place:
"Every object we think of gets at last referred to one world or another
of this or some similar list."^^^

In this sense, the sub-universes are

an essential aspect of James's psychology of thinking as well as belief.
They become, for James, the real life categories of human thought.

But in

calling the sub-universes categories or general frames of reference, we
must make clear that James was speaking of more than knowledge systems
103
James, The Will to Believe, p. 65.
104James, Principles, 2:292-293.

105Ibid., p. 293.
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per se.

The notion of personal values permeates James's formulation of

the sub-universes, and these values are rooted in the person’s emotional
make-up:
. . . reality means simply relation to our emotional and
active life. This is the only sense which the word ever has
in the mouths of practical men. In this sense, whatever excites
and stimulates our interest is real; whenever an object so ap
peals to us that we turn to it, accept it, fill our mind with
it . . . so far it is real for us, and we believe it. Whenever,
on the contrary, we ignore it, fail to consider it . . . so far
it is unreal for us and disbelieved.106
Beyond their emotional basis, a number of features of James's formulation
of the sub-universes deserve to be made explicit.

First, note that James

places attention at the center of his formulation of psychological real
ity (or belief)— what is attended to is ipso facto real and what is
ignored is unreal.

Thus the sub-universes of reality have a rather pre

carious existence for James, "each world whilst it is attended to is
real after its own fashion; only the reality lapses with the attention.
Thus, for example, a scientist leaves the 'world of sense' and enters a
very special enclave
his laboratory.

of the 'world

Again,

when he is

of sense'when his child or wife enters
teaching,his students bring him face

to face with the 'world of opinion'; and when our scientist sits down at
night to read a novel he enters the tenuous but entertaining 'world of
vagary' (fantasy).

These transitions between the various sub-universes

are commonplace but generally unrecognized happenings and they depend upon
changes in attention.

As one might suspect, this view of reality brings

us perilously close to a rampant subjectivism.

James himself sees this

as an unavoidable conclusion at some level: "The fons et origo of all real
ity, whether from the absolute or practical point of view, is thus subjec
tive, is ourselves.11

106Ibid., p. 295.

107Ibid., p. 293.

108Ibid., pp. 296-297.
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James also notes that each sub-universe has "its own special and
separate style of existence."

109

it is commonplace and obvious.

This characteristic is as important as

What he is referring to here is that each

sub-universe has its own, somewhat unique, criteria of credibility and
its own particular region of applicability.

In a sense, each sub-universe

is conditioned by the demands, possibilities and limitations of its own
region of experience.

An old adage, for example, might be positively

false within some sub-universes but to the extent that it serves as a
valuable and reliable guide to action in our common-sense world, it will
continue to be believed.

Again, James seems to be heading toward an

untenable subjectivism in his attempt to do justice to all regions of
human experience.

If he was a pure logician he would have to choose

between the variety of sub-universes and present one set of criteria for
belief.

But James is writing as a psychologist and his task is to do

justice to all regions of human experience; he is concerned with thinking
as it actually occurs in human beings rather than an abstract schematization of how people ought to think to arrive at absolute truth.

And the

psychological fact is that people face a wide variety of situations in
their lives and they employ a variety of criteria to come up with answers
to different types of problems.

Thus James’s recognition that different

sub-universes have separate and somewhat unique styles of existence is a
brilliant psychological observation, however inappropriate it might be
as a formulation of truth.
James sought to escape an untenable subjectivism by offering two
general criteria for true belief (or knowledge).

He presents the first

as nothing more or less than the verifiability principle in science:
109

Ibid., p. 291.
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. . . no mere floating conception, no mere disconnected rarity,
ever displaces vivid things or permanent things in our belief. A
conception, to prevail, must terminate in the world of orderly
experience . . . . What science means by *verification1 is no more
than this . . . . Sensible objects are thus our realities or the
tests of our realities. Conceived objects must show sensible
effects or else be disbelieved. H O
He later elaborated this criterion for belief into his pragmatic concep
tion of meaning, and then truth, but we are concerned with his psychology
rather than his philosophy.

Within this context, it is imperative to

note that James's criterion for belief falls significantly short of
rigorous scientific verifiability in practice. That is, he states that,
to be believed, a proposition "must terminate in the world of orderly
experience."

In other words, a proposition will be believed if its effects

are manifest in sensible experience.

Conversely, a proposition will not

be believed it if does not have any sensible effects.

But, as any number

of critics of pragmatism have noted, there is a difference between pro
viding a scientific verification of a proposition and showing that it has
an effect in sensible experience.

That is, there are some classes of

statements which can not be verified scientifically but which can be con
strued as producing effects in sensible experience.
example is, of course, metaphysical statements.

The most obvious

Thus propositions like

'Man is free' or 'Everything has a cause' are not verifiable but it can
be argued that they do have important effects in sensible experience.
The former gives the moralist the energy needed to continue striving to
accomplish the seemingly impossible, e.g., to wipe out evil.

The latter

gives the scientist the energy to continue striving for his impossible,
e.g., to build a unified understanding of the universe and wipe out ignor
ance.

In other words, as ideals, these metaphysical statements have

*^Ibid., p. 301.

(James's italics.)
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important effects in experience although neither is strictly verifiable.
And taken psychologically, both are believed (by some people) and both
function to create the somewhat different styles of existence for their
particular sub-universe.
The second general criterion which James presents is that a prop
osition will be believed only if it does not contradict some already
established belief.

Belief, wrote James, is the "mental function of

cognizing reality," and as such, it is experienced as an inarticulate but
distinct feeling of harmony or non-contradiction.***

For James, then, a

proposition is believed if it produces a "cessation of theoretical agitation."

112

The opposite of belief is experienced as a feeling of discord

and it leads to the activities of "doubt and inquiry."

113

When this de

scription of belief and doubt is taken in conjunction with the notion of
a variety of sub-universes, we have a kind of 'struggle for existence'
between beliefs, with propositions competing with one another within a
given sub-universe.

The loser of any particular struggle finds itself

'hustled and bandied about' among the various other sub-universes until it
finds a region where it is not contradicted.

Thus, for example, while a

moral postulate may contradict established beliefs in the sub-universe of
science, it will come to rest uncontradicted, and even warmly welcomed,
in the sub-universe of ideal, ethical relations.

The philosophical ques

tion which begs to be answered is how one determines which of two contra
dictory propositions is true when they come to rest uncontradicted in
different sub-universes.

That is, is there a criterion to settle disputes

between James's sub-universes?

The fact is that James avoided the philo

sophical question in the Principles, although he spent the rest of his life
111

Ibid., p. 283.
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Ibid.
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Ibid., p. 284.
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trying to answer it.

In the Principles, however, we do find a psycho

logical answer to this question and it leads us directly to the fundamental
teleology in James's psychology of thinking.
James answers this question, and inserts what we have called a
fundamental teleology, in the following seemingly innocuous passage:
Each thinker . . . has dominant habits of attention; and these
practically elect from among the various worlds some one to be
for him the world of ultimate realities. From this world's
objects he does not appeal. Whatever positively contradicts
them must get into another world or die.H4
In terms of the text, he has just finished stating that the different sub
universes have separate and special styles of existence.

Now, with this

passage, he answers the question of how real people settle real life dis
putes between the claims of different sub-universes.

The answer is

strikingly simple, but it has far-reaching implications for a psychology
of thinking.

His answer is that each individual comes to choose the one

sub-universe which is most compatible with his emotional constitution.
As he wrote:
The world of living realities as contrasted with unrealities is
thus anchored in the Ego, considered as an active and emotional
term. . . . Whatever things have intimate and continuous con
nection with my life are things of whose reality I cannot doubt.
This dominant sub-universe is the person's court of last appeal, his ul
timate reality.

In terms of a psychology of thinking, it might be said

that a person's most serious work emerges from and is conditioned by his
passionate commitment to a world-view which is itself unverifiable!

It

is as if a structured horizon of values comes to be superimposed upon the
horizon of knowledge and effects a rearrangement and reorganization of

HA

Ibid., pp. 293-294.

(Italics mine.)

^'’ibid., pp. 297-298.

(Italics mine.)
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valued meanings which function as that person's Life Plan.

In fact, it

seems more reasonable to say that a person's horizon of values determines
the content of his knowledge by leading him toward areas which are most
compatible with his values.

Whatever the case may be, the important thing

for James is that our seemingly objective knowledge stands on a foundation
which is itself unprovable and a function of our emotional tendencies.
All human beings begin their lives with the practical 'world of
sense' holding the preeminent and irrefutable position.

This is a world

filled with objects and subjects and things that must be done to survive.
Other sub-universes may possess a reality of sorts but "these things are
usually real with a less real reality than . . . the world of sense."

116

The person who never relinquishes the practical 'world of sense' displays,
in his orientation and actions, an emotional commitment to a set of tacit
ly-held beliefs which act to structure and organize his experience.

The

assumptions, values and beliefs of this world-view represent the funda
mental teleology of the layman; and he imposes this world-view onto all
experience and creates a more or less organized whole from a chaos of
sensory flux.

Of course, his world-view is partial— he may be unimpressed

with the ideal worlds of theoretical science or religion unless they
directly touch his world— but his world-view is the means through which
he confers truth and reality to certain objects of experience.
Of course, other world-views are possible; humans, according to
James, have the a priori capacity to create ideal conceptual systems which
function as alternatives to the 'world of sense'.

But any other world-view

is also partial and it also both contains and reveals a fundamental tele
ology which is rooted in the inarticulate emotional commitments of the

116Ibid., p. 294.
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thinker.

The scientist, for example, subordinates the 'world of sense'

to the abstract terms and relations of the 'world of science'.

But this

world is also founded on unprovable emotional commitments and its unique
style of existence makes atoms in motion and universal laws the ultimate
realities.

For the scientist, these terms and relations contain an aes

thetic beauty which is unparalleled in the cruder 'world of sense'.

And

thus he too imposes the assumptions, values and beliefs of his ideal
world onto experience in an attempt to transform a chaos into a rigorous,
logically consistent whole.

But the only way he can accomplish this

transformation is to be partial or

selective; to ignore some, and explicitly

deny the reality of other, aspects of experience in favor of those real
ities which his fundamental teleology claims to be the 'most real reality'.
With regard to the selectivity of the scientist's world, James wrote
quite frankly that the concepts of science:
. . . are never matters of experienceat all, but have to be
disengaged from under experience by a process of elimination,
that is, by ignoring conditions which are always present. The
elementary laws of mechanics, physics and chemistry are all of
this sort. The principle of uniformity is of this sort; it has
to be sought under and in spite of the most rebellious appear
ances . . . .117
In other words, the process of science is a very human process, with its
practitioners making a determined effort to show that the real world really
is as their ideal system describes it.

But the attempt of science to

show that the 'ideal and real coincide' is grounded, like any other at
tempt to reconcile the ideal and real, in the emotional and aesthetic
interests of the thinker.

Thus James wrote that:

The conceiving or theorizing faculty works exclusively for the
sake of ends that do not exist in the world of impressions . . .

^^Ibid., p. 636.

(James's italics.)
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but are set by our emotional and practical subjectivity. It is
a transformer of the world of our impressions into . . . the
world of our conception; and the transformation is effected in
the interests of the volitional nature, and for no other purpose
whatsoever.
This conclusion, which stands at the foundation of James's psychology of
thinking, should sound familiar, for it is the same conclusion he obtained
in his analysis of the motives of philosophizing.

For a psychology of

thinking, it means that human conception is forever embedded in and con
ditioned by the fundamental teleology of the thinker.

Thinking, like nny

other aspect of human existence, involves a teleological act of faith;
and before we can understand human thought, we must understand the emo
tional and aesthetic ideals which the thinker believes are the most accu
rate representation of reality.

This means that every ideal, logically

consistent way of conceiving of the world is grounded in an inarticulate,
tacitly-held world-view.

In other words, every concrete, potentially

answerable question emerges from a world-view which is unprovable and
dripping with value judgments which serve to guide the person's thought.

We have covered an enormous amount of heterogeneous material in
this chapter; a critique of philosophical associationism, an account of
reasoning which was aimed at distinguishing human from brute intellect,
a biological interpretation of Kant's a priori and lastly, a conception
of experience which sought to bring the person's dimly felt interests and
purposes back into the psychology of thinking.

In the midst of this

heterogeneity, however, there lies a fundamental unity which all the
particular formulations and critiques stem from.
logical conception of mind.

James's critique of a passive interpretation

1 1Q

Ibid., p. 634.

This theme is a teleo

(Italics mine.)
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of associationism set the stage for a formulation of reasoning which
emphasized the interested, purposive nature of human experience.

But

his account of reasoning raised further questions, most importantly, how
is it that humans are able to deal with objects in terms of their essen
tial properties.

In answering this question James offered a unique,

biological interpretation of the a priori, an interpretation which tied
the process of conception to the purposes and interests of the conceiver.
Finally, this interpretation of the a priori gave rise to a conception of
human nature in which human beings are passionately striving to show that
the flux of sensory experience is really only a working out, in concrete
form, of a system of ideal terms and relations.

We began this chapter

with an excerpt in which James said that the "whole man within us is at
119
work when we form our philosophical opinions."

We have tried to show

that the "whole man"— with his intellectual, volitional, aesthetic and
emotional demands— is also at the foundation of James's formulation of
the higher mental processes in the Principles.
119
James, "Rationality, Activity, and Faith," p. 74.

(Italics mine.)

CHAPTER 4

JAMES’S INTEGRATION OF NATIVISM AND EMPIRICISM:
PERCEPTUAL REALISM

I must say a word or two on your articles now appearing in Mind,
on the "Perception of Space." I don't know anything that has
given me greater pleasure, or excited more genuine admiration
in my mind, than these articles. . . . You are working out in
detail, and with psychological proofs, my very conception of
space as an inseparable but distinguishable element of certain
classes of sensations . . . [Hodgson to James, April 8, 1887]. *
I'm glad you smiled on Santayana . . . and still gladder you
smiled on my space articles, which were all written out seven
years ago. I always supposed myself that they were but a filling
out of your Time and Space framework [James to Hodgson, April 18,
1887] .2
The articles which Hodgson is expressing admiration for in the above
letter are a series of four essays which James published in the journal
Mind during 1887.

They were later revised, integrated and republished as

the "Space Perception" chapter of the Principles. The goal of this chap
ter is simply to understand what James meant when he said that his account
of space was "but a filling out" of Hodgson's "Time and Space framework."
We shall argue that Hodgson's method of reflection, and the new conception
of experience which it produced, formed the essence of the "framework" of
James's formulation of space perception.

Specifically, we shall attempt

to show that these elements of Hodgson's philosophy stood at the foundation

Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of Williams James,
2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1935), 1:641-642. (Italics mine.)
Hereafter cited as Perry, Williams James.
^Ibid., p. 642.

(Italics mine.)
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of James's critique of, and alternative to, the empiricist account of
space.

In the process, we shall present James's explanation of the per

ception of spatial attributes as an attempt to integrate nativism and
empiricism through a perceptual realism which emphasizes selective atten
tion.
Realism is a position which states that material objects exist
externally to us and independent of our perception of them.

These objects

are conceived of as emitting a wide variety of patterns of physical energy
which are structured by other sources in the environment.

Put simply,

the perceptual realist conceives of the perceiver as possessing mechanisms
(e.g., sense organs, perceptual structures) which allow him to perceive
and respond to a subset of the objective properties of objects.

As such,

the properties of external objects are directly apprehended by the perceiver in perception.

3

From the context of nineteenth century philosophy

and psychology, this doctrine can be distinguished from idealism and
phenomenalism.

In the words of Berkeley, the originator of modern idealism

as well as the empiricist account of space, esse is percipi— "to be is to
be perceived."^

For the idealist, objects simply do not exist apart from

our perception of them.
idealism.

Phenomenalism can be viewed as a refinement of

It states that the perceiver is only immediately aware of his

own mental states, which nineteenth century philosophers and psychologists
called sensations.

The phenomenalist sought to reduce material objects

to particular combinations or groups of sensations, transitory events which
the perceiver learns to locate in the external world.

Phenomenalism can

3

Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1972 ed., s.v. "Realism," by R. H.
Hirst.
4Ibid., 7:77.
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be viewed as an improvement on the intuitively offensive doctrine of
idealism in the sense that material objects came to be defined in terms
of groups of possible as well as actual sensations.

Thus John Stuart

Mill defined matter as "groups of permanent possibilities of sensation,"
thereby evading the position that objects cease to exist when not per
ceived.^

We shall find James rejecting the phenomenalistic accounts of

empiricism and offering a unique version of perceptual realism.
This chapter is divided into three sections.

In the first section

we shall examine James's critique of the empiricist account of the origin
of spatial attributes.

The aim here is to show that he employed Hodgson's

critique of elementism to refute the empiricist attempt to create spatial
attributes from the association of non-spatial sensations.

In the second

section we shall examine James's nativistic formulation of the direct
apprehension of primitive spatial attributes.

In addition to the impor

tance of Hodgson, it will be argued that James's commitment to a percep
tual realism underlies the nativistic strain of his account.

The latter

theme will be explored more fully in the last section, where we shall
examine James's attempt to retain a perceptual realism while acknowledging
the importance of intellectual factors in our mature perception of spatial
relations.

James's Critique of the Empiricist
Account of Space Perception
It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to present a general sketch
of the empiricist account of space perception in the second half of the
nineteenth century.

Theories of visual perception literally abounded

^Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1972 ed., s.v. "Phenomenalism," by
R. J. Hirst.
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during this period and there was a variety of somewhat different theories
even within the empiricist camp.

Faced with this diversity at the theo

retical level, we shall turn to the empiricist account of three concrete
issues in the psychology of perception.

The issues are the unconscious

inference explanation of color contrast, the doctrine of the eccentric
projection of sensations and the muscular feeling explanation of visual
form.

Our reasons for choosing these topics are twofold.

First, they

will provide the historical and theoretical background for our examination
of James's account of space perception.

Second, in examining James's

critique of the empiricist accounts of these issues, we shall see the
sense in which the Principles is a continuation of Hodgson's polemic
against an elementistic conception of experience.

Simultaneous Color Contrast
The first thing we must do in approaching this topic is to divest
ourselves of the Freudian notion of the unconscious.

Our topic demands

that we examine a pre-Freudian formulation of unconscious mental processes,
a formulation which had its roots in the early nineteenth century idealistic philosophies of Arthur Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann.

From

these speculative beginnings, a truncated and less extravagent version
of the unconscious found its way into the early perceptual theories of
Wundt and Helmholtz.

Thus, in the period when psychology was beginning

to achieve institutional status as a natural science, reference to uncon
scious mental processes was a central feature of the empiricist formulation

^For a general sketch of the relationship between Schopenhauer,
von Hartmann and Freud see Henri Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Uncon
scious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry (New York: Basic
Books, 1970), pp. 208-210.
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of perception.

At the same time, however, there was a great deal of

confusion, and some controversy, over what the concept of unconscious
mental processes really meant.
David Klein has recently examined Helmholtz's use of the phrase
unbewusster Schluss, literally "unconscious conclusion" rather than "un
conscious inference."^
straightforward.

Helmholtz's fundamental contention is rather

If perception is viewed as a genetic process, then it

is obvious that an intellectual or cognitive component is an essential
aspect of that process.

That is, certain meanings or relations are habit

ually associated with certain sensory contents and after much practice
the cognitive terms come to be perceived immediately, as if they were
directly given by the sensory object.

Helmholtz's primary theoretical

objective was to make clear that these acquired meanings and relations
are the products of past experience, thus challenging that nativist posi
tion that certain relations (e.g., spacial attributes) are intuitively
given.

In this respect Helmholtz was working in the venerable tradition

of British empiricism, which sought to reduce perception to the associa
tion of phenomenal contents with learned meanings and relations.

Helmholtz

employed the term unbewusster Schluss to make clear that perception is
pervaded with inferences or conclusions which are unconscious in the sense
that the perceiver is not directly aware of the intellectual act which
gives meaning and stability to his perceptual experience.

Thus, in ex

plaining why certain illusions persist, Helmholtz wrote that:
Even when we have learned to understand the physiological
origin and connection of the senses, it is impossible to get
rid of the illusion in spite of our better knowledge. This

David B. Klein, The Unconscious: Invention or Discovery (Santa
Monica: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 53-61.
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is because inductive reasoning is the result of the unconscious
and involuntary activity of the memory.8
This explanation is clear and seems innocent enough.

Perception involves

the generation of inductive generalizations based on the effects of past
experience.

Let us now turn to Helmholtz's explanation of a more com

plicated phenomenon, simultaneous color contrast.
The phenomenon of simultaneous color contrast is easy enough to
describe.

If a rather small gray patch is placed on a colored background

and a piece of transparent white tissue paper covers both surfaces, the
area of the gray patch takes on a hue which is the complement of the
colored background.

If, for example, the background is green, the center

patch is perceived as pink-red.

Pastore, who examines the empiricist ex

planation in some detail, quotes Helmholtz stating that the induced com
plementary hue results from "acts of unconscious or involuntary judgment"

9
acquired in experience.
follows.

Helmholtz's explanation can be summarized as

First, since the green background covers a larger surface, the

person unconsciously assumes that the entire surface has a greenish hue
to it.

At the same time, however, the person also unconsciously perceives

the white patch in the center, i.e., the retinal impressions of the center
patch are objectively white.

The person then makes yet another unconscious

inference, that the white patch is, in fact, an object located behind a
greenish veil.

As we shall see, this reversal of the spatial relations

of the green and white surfaces is essential to Helmholtz's explanation.
Through these unconscious mental operations Helmholtz obtained the premises

8Ibid., p. 55.
9
Nicholas Pastore, A Selective History of Theories of Visual Percep
tion: 1650-1950 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 167.
Although we shall criticize Pastore's interpretation of James, the value
of this work for organizing this chapter must be acknowledged.
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from which the final unconscious inference is made.

It is as if a person

in the color contrast situation is obtaining white sensations from an
object located behind a green veil.

The question then becomes— what color

would such an object have to be to produce white sensations?

The answer,

in terms of the laws of color combination at least, is pink-red; the
wavelengths of green combine with those of pink-red to produce white.
But Helmholtz argued that an analogous series of unconscious acts produced
the experience of pink-red in the color contrast situation.

If this is

the case, the illusion certainly is intellectual or cognitive rather than
sensory.

Sully, an English follower of Helmholtz, described the series

of intellectual acts in the following manner:
Not directly seeing the under sheet, and perceiving the green
light shimmering through the thin white veil, we necessarily
conceive this visible upper sheet to be of a pale green hue;
and from this assumption, we reason that beyond the inferred
greenish veil where the scrap lies— the pure retinal impression
of which must be a dull white— there is a red.10
Sully offered this explanation as scientific fact, an example par excellence
of how a series of unconscious acts could produce an experience which
armchair philosophers had supposed was directly given.
However convoluted this explanation may seem to someone acquainted
with the lateral inhibition explanation of color contrast, the HelmholtzSully explanation is important in the sense that it reveals a number of
tendencies of the empiricist program.

At one level, this explanation is

an example of the psychologists' fallacy, the tendency to substitute our
knowledge about the object under study for its internal means of produc
tion.

We have already quoted James giving credit to Hodgson for clearing

^James Sully, Sensation and Intuition: Studies in Psychology and
Aesthetics (London: Henry S. King and Co., 1874), p. 68.
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up the confusion of the "analysis of an idea with its means of production"
in our discussion of James Mill's analysis of a complex idea.^

Now,

while Helmholtz's explanation is based on a mechanical analysis of a
perceptual phenomenon, the underlying logic is identical to Mill's.

That

is, both shared the assumption that if some sort of model can be schema
tized which produces the same results as are evidenced in a given organism,
then the operations which produce the results in the model must also
occur in the organism.

In other words, in building a model which simu

lates the behavior of art organism, one also obtains a full articulation
of the theoretically relevant internal structures of the organism.

A

number of philosophers who have examined the relation between computer
simulation and explanation have concluded that such a position is tenuous,
at best.

12

Thus, for example, just because a computer can be programmed

to play a more or less good game of chess, it does not necessarily mean
that the programs which the computer employs are in any way similar to
the rules which govern the behavior of the human chess player.
Of course, Helmholtz did not have computers, but he did have the
materials needed to combine colors mechanically.

With this primitive tech-

hology, it was easy to demonstrate that a pink-red object viewed through
a greenish veil produces the impression of white.

Most importantly, it

also seems clear that Helmholtz had this color mixture model in mind when
he sought to explain the perception of pink-red in the color contrast

^William James, Principles of Psychology, 2 vols., (New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1890), 2:281. Hereafter cited as James, Principles.
12

See Jerry Fodor, Psychological Explanation: An Introduction to
the Philosophy of Psychology (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 121-152;
Keith Gunderson, Mentality and Machines (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and
Co., 1971), pp. 39-59.
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situation.

That is, in offering a psychological explanation for the illu

sion, he assumed that the mental state under study (the perceiver in the
color contrast situation) must also know what he, the scientist, knows
about the laws of color mixture.

In making this assumption he imposed his

own knowledge into his explanation of how pink-red is actually produced
in the human brain.

The foremost difficulty with this explanation involves

understanding why the perceiver should reverse the spatial relations be
tween the green and white surfaces.

Helmholtz's answer, that the color

contrast situation unconsciously reminds the perceiver of a white object
partly occluded by a green surface, seems forced.

In fact, positing this

hypothetical reversal, which must take place if the perceiver behaves
just like the mechanical model, seems to be rooted in the demands of the
mechanical model rather than empirical evidence.

If and only if the white

object was behind the greenish veil would the perceiver's brain simulate
the laws of color mixture.

Thus, in lieu of empirical evidence, Helmholtz

allowed his model to dictate the particular operations which go on within
the perceiver's head.
There must have been some rather powerful reason for Helmholtz, the
arch-empiricist, to forsake experience; and this something is rooted in
his undying commitment to atomistic conception of experience and the ner
vous system.

This commitment is manifest in what Pastore called the "law

of isolated conduction," the physiological model which underlies Helmholtz's
theory of perception.

13

It can be viewed as the physiological embodiment

of Hume's description of mental life as a succession of discrete impres
sions.

"We may allow," wrote Helmholtz,
13
Pastore, Visual Perception, p. 165.
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. . . that each of . . . the cones has a nervous fiber which,
through the mediation of the optic nerve, extends to the brain
in isolation in order to conduct there the impression it receives,
so that the state of excitement of each of these cones may give
rise to one isolated sensation.14
In fact, this physiological model represents Helmholtz's reformulation of
Johannes Muller's doctrine of the law of specific nerve energies, and,
as such, it set the foundation for both his research and theory in percep
tion.^Pastore has noted that Helmholtz's

assumption was an essential

feature of nineteenth century empiricism and he integrates it with the
constancy hypothesis, the notion that there is a point for point corre
spondence between retinal excitations and visual sensations.Within
this assumptive frame of reference there can be no interaction between
adjacent retinal receptors, either excitatory or inhibitory, and any dif
ference between retinal receptors is assumed to result from an intellectual
contribution.

Its pervasiveness should also be noted.

Here we have a

physiological model of the nervous system which provides the believer with
a philosophical conception of experience as well as the fundamental cate
gories of a psychology.
In a sense, Helmholtz's law of isolated conduction can be viewed
•0

as an expression of his aversion to the positing of innate physiological
mechanisms, which he saw as overused and unverified.

His explanation of

color contrast is certainly consistent with the assumptive foundation of
the law of isolated conduction.

Adding the green background to the gray

patch does not, for Helmholtz, change the nature of the retinal excita
tion corresponding to the gray patch.

What is changed is the perceiver's

conception of what the gray patch is seen as, from a simple patch of
color to an object located behind the green background.

14Ibid. (Italics mine.)
16Ibid., pp. 164-165.

15Ibid., pp. 128-132.
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Of course, the law of isolated conduction (and the constancy hy
pothesis) is diametrically opposed to Ewald Hering's nativistic explana
tion of color contrast in terms of the lateral inhibition of adjacent
retinal receptors.

But James found nothing aversive in positing innate

physiological mechanisms and he did see problems with adopting Helmholtz's
explanation in particular and the constancy hypothesis in general.
he endorsed Hering's explanation and rejected Helmholtz's.

Thus

Gurwitsch and

Linschoten have documented James's rejection of the constancy hypothesis.^

We shall close this section by sketching the relation between James's
rejection of the constancy hypothesis and Hodgson's critique of empiricism.
The constancy hypothesis is rooted in a physicalistic conception
of experience, where the contents of experience are assumed to perfectly
mirror the physical attributes of obejcts in the world.

As we have seen,

Hodgson rejected this frame of reference on the basis of his distinction
between first and second intention descriptions.

We have also seen that

Hodgson's critique of elementistic empiricism became the empiricist ver
sion of the psychologists' fallacy in the Principles. Thus it should not
be surprising that James viewed Helmholtz's law of isolated conduction as
an example of the psychologists' fallacy.

He wrote that:

Helmholtz . . . is no more careless than most psychologists in
confounding together the object perceived, the organic condi
tions of the perception, and the sensations which would be
excited by several parts of the object . . . providing they
came into action separately . . . . If each organic condition or
part of the object is there, its sensation, he thinks, must
also be there, only in a 'synthetic' form— which is indistin
guishable from what the authors we formerly reviewed called an
'unconscious'— state.18

^Burwitsch, The Field, p. 171; Linschoten, Psychology of William
James, pp. 88-96.
18
James, Principles, 1:521.
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This passage is illuminating in two respects.

First, we find James apply

ing a Hodgsonian principle— the psychologists' fallacy— against Helmholtz's
explanation of simultaneous color contrast.

Second, from this passage it

is also clear that James viewed references to unconscious mental processes
as an erroneous but necessary supplement to a psychology which assumes
that experience comes to us in a disjointed, elementistic manner.

The

unconscious synthesis must be called upon to give the unity and structural
integrity which disjointed sensations can not themselves possess.

James

chose to view the automatic categorizations of perception as simply cere
brally represented habits, thus avoiding the confusing connotation that
mental states could be unconscious.

19

The Eccentric Projection of Sensations
The doctrine of the eccentric projection of sensations is a nine
teenth century version of a problem which was first created and answered
by Bishop George Berkeley in his eighteenth century empiricist manifesto,
An Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision. The problem involves the phenom
enal locus of visual impressions experienced for the first time, and more
generally, with a psychological explanation of the genesis of external
space.

The two questions are intimately related.

In fact, Berkeley's

answer to the first question, that the first visual impressions are lo
cated in the "eye or mind," is little more than a corollary to his more
general position that distance judgments are "entirely the effect of experience."

20

For if distance cues are themselves entirely derived from

19
Ibid., 1:164-176; 2:111-114. In discussing the role of unconscious
inferences in the process of perception James wrote that: "To call percep
tion unconscious reasoning is thus either a useless metaphor or a positively
misleading confusion between two different things." 2:113.
20
Berkeley Selections, ed., Mary Calkins (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1957), p. 33.
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the association of tactile feelings (e.g., reaching, walking) and visual
impressions, then as yet unpaired visual impressions must have the same
phenomenal location as thoughts or feelings.

In fact, Berkeley adopts

this line of reasoning in his examination of a newly resighted blind
person.
From what hath been premised, it is a manifest consequence,
that a man born blind,
being made to see, would at first have
no idea of distance by sight; the sun and stars . . . would
all seem to be in his eye, or rather in his mind. The objects
introduced by sight would seem to him (as in truth they are)
no other than a new set of sensations, each . . . as near to
him as . . . the most inward passions of the soul.21
Berkeley's account and its

idealism literally set the foundation forlater

empiricist theories of space perception.

The

notion of the musclesense,

for example, became a seminal issue in the nineteenth century because
Berkeley held that spacial relations are entirely derived from muscular
feelings.
The empiricist account seemed to gain experimental support from
Cheselden's report in 1728 that a resighted boy said that objects "touched
his eyes" in a fashion analogous to the way objects touch the skin.

22

Although this description is open to alternative interpretation, it made
Berkeley's theory sufficiently attractive for the late eighteenth century
French empiricist, Etienne de Condillac, to adopt it with only slight
revisions.

In the mid-nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill described

Berkeley's account as "one of the least disputed doctrines in the most
disputed and disputable of all Sciences, the Science of Man."

^Ibid.
22

23

In the

(Italics mine.)

Pastore, Visual Perception, p. 97.

23
John Stuart Mill, "Bailey on Berkeley's Theory of Vision," West
minister Review 38(1842): 318-336, pp. 318-319.
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period between 1860 and 1890 George T. Ladd, Alexander Bain, Hippolyte
Tain and Helmholtz adopted the fundamental tenets of Berkeley's empiricist
position, including the eccentric projection of sensations.
The doctrine of the eccentric projection of sensations can be
broken down into two complementary parts.

The first is a refinement of

Berkeley's contention that visual impressions are originally experienced
in the eye or mind.

By the mid-nineteenth century this position was em

bodied in the empiricist contention that only the spectral colors and
shades of light are immediately given in retinal stimulation. Form,
solidity, distance, direction and location were thought to be learned
through the association of muscular feelings and visual sensations.

But

in stating that only colors and shades of light are given in vision, the
empiricist was left with explaining the fact that visual objects seem to
be immediately apprehended in external space.

The specifics of this

explanation took a variety of forms but all seemed to agree that we learn
to project or extradict our originally non-spatial visual sensations into
space.

This is the second part of the doctrine of the eccentric projec

tion of sensations.

Ladd, for example, said that this projection was

achieved through a mental act, "an act which in its perfection results
24
from a long and intricate process of development."
For Bain, the loca
tion of sensations in external space was the result of the association
of muscular feelings and visual sensations.

Perhaps the most detailed,

and certainly the most audacious, exposition of this process was presented
in Taine's On Intelligence.
24
George T. Ladd, Elements of Physiological Psychology: A Treatise
of the Activities and Nature of the Mind from the Physical and Experimental
Point of View. (New York: Scribner, 1888), p. 383.
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Taine, the French empiricist, saw the implications of Berkeley's
position clearly and he brought them to their logical conclusion.

"A

sensation," he wrote, "engenders, by its presence alone, an internal
phantom which appears as an external object."

25

Now, if objects are

themselves simply groups of sensations, we are led to the inevitable
conclusion that external objects are "nothing more than resemblances or
phantoms."

26

For such a phenomenalism, it becomes a matter of semantics

whether perceived objects are real or merely veridical hallucinations, and
Taine devoted over thirty pages of his treatise to defending the latter
proposition.

In the process, he explained that these phantoms appear in

external space because of "localizing judgements," through which we pro
ject our sensations to "the spot in which we are accustomed to meet the
cause or conditions it excites."

27

In a passage which states clearly

everything James thought was wrong with the eccentric projection doctrine,
Taine wrote that:
All our sensations of color are thus projected out of our body,
and clothe more or less distant objects, furniture, walls,
houses, trees, the sky, and the rest . . . .
Thus all our sen
sations are wrongly situated, and the color is no more extended
on the arm-chair than the sensation of tingling is situated at
my fingers' ends. They are all situated in the sensory centers
of the encephalon; all appear situated elsewhere, and a common
law allots to each of them their apparent location.28
The crucial part of this passage is the contention that sensations are
really situated "in the sensory centers of the encephalon."

It is this

confusion between the spatial reference of a sensation and its physical
25
Hippolyte Taine, On Intelligence, trans. T. D. Haye (London:
Reeve and Co., 1871), p. 264.
26Ibid., p. 265.

27Ibid.

28
James, Principles, 2:33, quoting from Taine's De 1'Intelligence,
2 vols. (Paris, 1870), 2:47-53. (Italics mine.)
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antecedent, argued James, which stood at the heart of the doctrine of the
eccentric projection of sensations.
Again, this confusion can be presented in terms of the psychologists'
fallacy.

The fallacy involves the psychologist imposing his knowledge

about the location of the cause of the sensation onto his description of
the spatial properties of the sensation itself.

That is, the psychologist

knows that the neural antecedent of a sensation is located within the
cranium of the perceiver.

Knowing this, he mistakenly assumes that the

sensation under study must also locate itself in the same physical space
as the psychologist locates its cause.

As James said, the eccentric

projection theorists tacitly assume that the sensation "must place itself
where they place it."

29

Thus when Taine asserts that sensations are

really located "in the sensory centers of the encephalon" he is confusing
physiology with psychological description.

In fact, this initial con

fusion does create a phantom and it haunts the empiricist until it is
projected into the external world through a mental act of some sort.

As

we shall see in the second part of this chapter, James argued that spatial
qualities are given, along with colors and shades of light, in visual
experience.

Within this formulation, the phantom is transformed into a

real object and the mysterious mental act of projection becomes unnecessary.

Muscular Feelings and the Perception of Form
We must now turn to some of the murky details of the empiricismnativism controversy in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Given

this as unavoidable, it will be helpful to offer a means for distinguish
ing empiricist from nativist theories of perception.
29
James, Principles, 2:34.

The criterion we
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have chosen involves the perception of two-dimensional spatial attributes,
i.e., length and width or visual form.

This is the criterion which

underlies Woodward’s classification of nineteenth century theories of
perception.

30

It is also the criterion which Ribot pointed to when he

summarized the empiricism-nativism debate in the following manner:
What is the peculiar object of sight? This very simple ques
tion sums up the debate. If we reply: Color, we are empiricists.
If we reply: Color extension, we cast our lot with the nativists.
Thus the nativists argued that length and width— two-dimensional visual
form— is given in visual sensations.

In contrast, the empiricists stated,

following Berkeley, that visual sensations are originally non-extended
and they sought to explain all spatial properties in terms of non-visual
muscular feelings.

This criterion gains historical support from the fact

that Berkeley tried to reduce visual form as well as distance and solid
ity, to the association of visual impressions and muscular feelings.
In moving from Berkeley to the second half of the nineteenth century
however, one must take note of an important change in what empiricists
meant by muscular feelings. That is, after 1850 the feelings arising from
the movements of the ocular-motor muscles of the eye-ball migrated to the
center of theoretical interest in the empiricist explanation of visual
form.

A number of factors facilitated this change, but at the theoretical

level, Woodward has shown that Hermann Lotze’s theory of local signs
served to redirect the visual form debate around the question of feelings
arising from eye-movements.

32

30
William Woodward, "From Association to Gestalt: The Fate of Hermann
Lotze's Theory of Spatial Perception, 1846-1920," Isis, 1979, in press.
31
Theodore Ribot, German Psychology Today: The Empirical School,
trans. James Mark Baldwin (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1886),
pp. 126-127. (Italics mine.)
32
Woodward, "Hermann Lotze's Theory of Local Signs."
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Lotze's theory of local signs first appeared In 1846 and it is best
viewed as an attempt to explain the perception of two-dimensional extension
(form) in terms of non-visual feelings.

33

stimulates the periphery of the retina.

Imagine that a point of light

According to Lotze, an innate

reflex automatically brings the visual sensation to the fovea.

While this

reflex is innate, Lotze hypothesized that the reflex gives rise to psycho
logical "feelings of movement" which are not innate but which specify the
relation between the point stimulated and the fovea.

For Lotze, there

are as many unique feelings of movement as there are points on the retina
and the person gradually learns the system of muscular feelings which
correspond to the spatial relations of the visual field.

This is a unique

combination of nativism and empiricism, non-spatial visual sensations are
associated,

by means of an innate reflex, with feelings of movement which

specify the spatial relations of the visual field.

In time, each retinal

point comes to have its own local sign which is defined in terras of feel
ings of movement.

With experience, the spatial relations of the visual

field are mapped out in terms of a coordinated system of muscular movements.
The perception of visual form becomes possible when the local signs
for each retinal point have been learned.

Once these relations have been

learned, an array of visual sensations would suggest, through what Lotze
called the mere "tendencies of movements," the connected series of eye movements which would be needed to outline the figure.

34

Thus, for example,

a straight line would be signalled by a connected series of increasingly
strong feelings of movement in the same direction.

In contrast, a circle

would be signalled by a connected series of movements equidistant from the

34
Ribot, German Psychology, p. 87.
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fovea.

Although the details of Lotze's theory are complex and assume an

incredible degree of sensitivity to minute muscular movements, it is his
torically important because it established a precedent, plausible rationale
and terminology for understanding the origin of spatial relations.
Wundt was one of the many experimental psychologists who developed
and elaborated Lotze’s theory.

He agreed with the two fundamental fea

tures of Lotze's theory: that spatial qualities are not given in vision
and that they must be explained in terms of feelings which arise from
eye-movements.

In fact, even when Wundt differs from Lotze's formulation

of the theory of local signs, the difference seems to consist of a Wundtian
twist to a basically Lotzean theme.

One area of difference is Wundt's

doctrine of "feelings of movement," which states that any visual impres
sion produces a feeling of the motor (efferent) discharge needed to bring
the impression to the fovea.

35

There are subtle differences between

"feelings of innervation" and "tendencies of movement" but the explanatory
principle is the same: the intensity of muscular feeings are the psycho
logical basis of spatial estimations.

Thus Wundt explained the over-esti

as opposed to an empty (----- ), line by

mation of a filled

saying that a filled line offers more muscular resistance than an empty
line of equal length.

This increased resistance results in greater amounts

of motor innervation and the illusory expansion of the length of the filled
line.

Wundt also departed from Lotze in suggesting that a psychological

synthesis occurs when muscular feelings are combined with local visual
sensations.

This synthesis is similar to Mill's mental chemistry in the

sense that attributes present in neither of the elements are created when
the elements are combined.

35Ibid., p. 204.

For Wundt, spatial attributes are created out
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of non-spatial elements in the synthesis.

But Lotze too had stated that

spatial attributes must be reconstructed by the soul and whether one calls
it a reconstruction or synthesis, the fact remains that an internal pro
cess creates attributes not present in the elements given.
Empiricism found its most rigorous proponent in the work of Helmholtz.
For Helmholtz, visual sensations come to be interpreted as signs or sym
bols for practical action.

Spatial attributes are entirely the product of

the association of muscular feelings of the eye with the bodily movements
needed to outline the object.

The message is essentially the same if we

move to the British school of empiricism.

Bain, for example, wrote that

"visible picture [form] is, in fact, a train of rapid movements of the
eyes, hither and thither, over luminous points, lines and surfaces."

36

For both Helmholtz and Bain, visual sensations functioned to merely direct
the eye movements which define the variety of visual forms.
James's critique of the empiricist account of the derivation of
spatial attributes can be broken down into two parts: (1) the rejection
of the proposition that spatial attributes are not intrinsically visual
and (2) the subsequent subordination, in James, of the role of muscular
feelings in explaining the origin of spatial attributes.

Given Ribot's

criterion for distinguishing nativist from empiricist theories, we shall
emphasize his critique of the empiricist contention that visual form is
not immediately given.

This emphasis leads us to a passage where Helmholtz

gives voice to the rule or principle which underlies the empiricist approach
to space preception.

In his Physiological Optics he wrote that:

No elements in our perceptions can be sensational which may
be overcome or reversed by factors of demonstrably experimental
36
Alexander Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, 3rd ed. (New York:
D. Appleton and Co., 1868).
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origin. Whatever can be overcome by suggestions of experience
must be regarded as itself the product of experience and custom.
If we follow this rule it will appear that only qualities are
sensational, whilst all spatial attributes are results of habit
and experience.37
By qualities Helmholtz means light and colors, those sensational properties
which the empiricist thought to be given in retinal stimulation.

By

spatial attributes he means form, direction, distance, solidity, etc.,
those ostensibly visual properties which empiricism sought to reduce to
more primitive sensory data, viz., muscular feelings.

Pastore has called

this Helmholtz's modification rule and it stands at the foundation of
the empiricist program in ways which deserve to be made explicit.

38

First, the relationship between the law of isolated conduction and
the modification rule should be made explicit, for together they created
the fundamental categories of the empiricist approach to perception.

As

a law which assumes a point for point correspondence between retinal ex
citation and psychic effects, the law of isolated conduction provides a
physiological model which portrays the receptor-to-brain connection as a
telegraph system.

In assuming this type of connection, Helmholtz allows

his physiological model to create the fundamental unit of his psychology,
viz., sensations.

His elementistic definition of sensation is, in fact,

a deduction from an elementistic physiological model; nothing else is
possible with punctate receptors transmitting excitations through isolated
nerves.

With this definition of sensation in hand, Helmholtz reasoned that

any attributes of perception which change with experience cannot, by the
very fact that they change, be sensational. Thus, in a sense, the
37
James, Principles, 2:218, quoting from Helmholtz's Handbuch der
Physiologischen Optik (Berlin, 1856-1866), p. 438.
38
Pastore, Visual Perception, pp. 165-167.
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modification rule is simply an elaboration of the physiological model
which underlies the law of isolated conduction; it states that any changes
which do occur must be intellectual or cognitive, the result of brain
processes. The two rules complement one another perfectly.

The law of

isolated conduction defines what is sensational and the modification rule
specifies the processes through which sensations are changed.

Together

these assumptions created the most powerful tradition in nineteenth cen
tury psychology, an atomistic empiricism.

Its fundamental strength lies

in its professed ideal of imposing a scientific, physicalistic framework
onto the last frontier of science— the human mind.
The empiricism of Helmholtz’s system becomes clear by applying his
modification rule to the question of the origin of spatial attributes.
It is obvious that spatial attributes vary continuously in perception;
widely different spatial relations are perceived as the same (e.g., the
constancies) and the same spatial stimulus can be perceived as different
(e.g., the Muller-Lyer illusion).

Since spatial attributes vary with

experience, they must be themselves products of experience.

In this

manner Helmholtz rejected the sensational status of spatial attributes
and he went on to argue, based on the law of isolated conduction, that
all spatial attributes are the product of intellectual acts.
James wrote that the modification rule had achieved "an almost
deplorable celebrity" in his time.

39

At a purely logical level, James

pointed to a glaring inconsistency in Helmholtz's employment of the maxim.
On one hand, Helmholtz maintained that spatial attributes cannot be sen
sational because they are easily changed with experience.

On the other

hand, Helmholtz was willing to say that light and color are immediate
39
James, Principles, 2:218.
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visual sensations.

To this James wrote that:

Helmholtz's reservation of 'qualities' is inconsistent. Our
judgements of light and color vary as much as our judgements
of size, shape, and place, and ought by parity of reasoning
to be called intellectual products and not sensations.40
That is, brightness and color constancies are at least as easy to demon
strate as shape and size constancies.

If Helmholtz applied the modifica

tion rule consistently, he would have to deny that anything is sensational
by his definition.

But this conclusion would then contradict the law of

isolated conduction, which states that percepts are the joint product of
sensory elements and memory.

In fact, James argued that any sensory

quality whatsoever can be changed or overpowered by our knowledge and
therefore that the modification rule is an inadequate criterion for dis
tinguishing between the sensational and intellectual components of perception.

41

Thus far we have attempted to show that the modification rule is
intimately tied to the physiological model underlying the law of isolated
conduction and that James rejected the former.

It should not be surprising,

then, that he rejected the law of isolated conduction also.

In fact, we

have already examined his critique of the law of isolated conduction in
our discussion of Hering's explanation of color contrast.
point deserves mention at this juncture.

A more general

That is, James offered the

lateral inhibition explanation for an entire class of illusions (e.g., the
rotating spiral, color contrast, apparent motion, Wundt's filled line
illusion) which the empiricists offered as evidence for their claim that
spatial qualities are derived from muscular feelings.

Take Wundt's

40Ibid.
^William James, "The Perception of Space (III)," Mind 12(1887):
321-353, pp. 329-333.
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explanation of the over-estimation of the length of a filled line as an
example.

His explanation in terms of the increased feelings of innerva

tion needed to traverse the filled line is more than a way of understanding
a curious visual illusion.

If verified, Wundt’s account gives credence

to the entire empiricist program of seeking to reduce visual form to mus
cular feelings!

Thus when James offered the lateral inhibition explana

tion for this entire class of illusions, he was challenging the empiricist
account of space

as well as their explanations for theseparticular phe

nomena.

of assuming that spatial attributes are the product of

Instead

intellectual acts, James's explanation assumes that these illusions are
entirely visual.

In place of the atomism of empiricism, he offered what

might be called a field-view of sensation

or perception; what is given in

the stimulation of a sense-organ is conditioned by the state of excitation
of the entire field of sensory receptors.

Just as the substantive portion

of the stream of thought is conditioned by the transitive portions which
surround it, the focus of the perceptual field is conditioned by the
stimulation of its peripheral portions.

In both cases James went to

experience rather than a physiological model to obtain the fundamental
categories of his psychology.
Let us briefly turn to James's rationale for relegating muscular
feelings to a subordinate role in the perception of spatial attributes.
It is obvious that muscular feelings do come to signify spatial relations.
We can, after all, indicate the unit of space called a foot with our hands
even when our eyes are closed, or trace a figure in the air with the tip
our finger.

How can he argue that muscular feelings do not constitute our

spatial ideas without denying the obvious fact that muscular feelings come
to signify spatial relations?

The answer is easier than it at first seems.
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Even If one holds that spatial attributes are given in vision, it is
reasonable to argue that particular muscular feelings come to be asso
ciated with particular visual lengths and forms; and that after enough
practice the originally visual sensation can be signified in muscular
terms.

Within this framework, James conceived of muscular representa

tions of spatial relations as the learned product of afferent feedback
obtained by tracing visual forms with the hands and arms.

42

James’s Spatial Quale and Perceptual Realism
James's account of space perception is notoriously difficult and
painfully detailed.

The chapter on "The Perception of Space" is the

longest in the Principles, filling 148 pages!

Given this we must go

directly to the theme which integrates the details of this frightfully
complex subject.

Our examination of the empiricist account will help us

understand the importance and uniqueness of James's fundamental contention.
Thus, in the face of the empiricist attempt to create spatial attributes
from some more primitive sensory elements, James wrote that:
. . . all spatial knowledge is sensational at bottom, and
that, as sensations lie together in the unity of consciousness,
so no new element whatsoever comes to them from a supra-sensible
source.43
This is James's fundamental contention, but what exactly does he mean?
One way it can be clarified is to contrast the role which intellectual
factors are supposed to play in the space perception theories of James
and the empiricists.

For the empiricist, spatial ideas were thought to

be composed of, or constituted by, intellectual contributions which are
the product of experience.

Since empiricism from Berkeley to Helmholtz

42
James, Principles, 2:193-197.
^Ibid., p. 152.

(Italics mine.)
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denied that spatial attributes are immediately given in vision, these
attributes had to be construed as the product of some sort of intellectual
construction.

Thus in Helmholtz's system space was explained in terms of

unconscious inference, or an act of the understanding. Similarly, Wundt
conceived of space as a product of a psychological synthesis, J. S. Mill
viewed it as a product of mental chemistry and finally, Lotze's psychology
44
created spatial attributes through a reconstruction of the soul.

Beneath

the terminological diversity, however, there is a fundamental conceptual
unity.

Having denied that spatial attributes are immediately given, the

empiricist sought to construct space in a piece-meal fashion through a
mental act.
In the face of this approach, James sought to explain the origin
and development of our knowledge of space "without the aid of any mysteri
ous 'mental chemistry' or power of 'synthesis' to create elements absent
from the original data of feeling."

45

In other words, James sought to

reduce all our spatial knowledge to terms which are themselves sensational
and immediately given.

He called this immediately given feeling of exten

sity the spatial quale (feeling).

For James, the spatial quale is a

primitively given feeling of three dimensionalspace; it is immediately
given in the same sense that light or color is immediately given.

Just

as any visual sensation must contain a specific quality of light, so it
must also contain a specific spatial quality.

Here, then, is the fundamen

tal contention of the passage we began this section with: all spatial
knowledge is entirely derived from a primitive spatial feeling, the spatial
quale, which is immediately given.
44
Ribot, German Psychology.
45
James, Principles, 2:203,

In one place James states his position
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In terms of the contents of our perception of space, "the content of the
ordered [our mature space perception] remains identical with that of the
multiplicity [the spatial quale]— sensational through and through.
Of course, by saying that the spatial quale is immediately given James
is siding with the nativists.

And while we shall treat the nativistic

aspect of James's formulation of space perception in some detial, the
remainder of this chapter is organized around a more fundamental conten
tion— that James was, above all a perceptual realist.

As he says above

in rather bold terms, all the contents of attributes of our mature spatial
knowledge (e.g., form, solidity, distance) are contained, in potential
form, in our first visual experience.

In this sense, James— the perceptual

realist— was directly challenging the claim of a phenomenalistic empiricism.
Our senses bring us into contact with real, externally located and poten
tially discriminable objects rather than discrete, mind-located sensations.
In addition, James held that the attributes embedded in our first primitive
space-sensations are discovered, but not created, through acts of selective
attention.
tion.

This important qualification will be examined in the next sec

It saved James from an untenable naive realism and brings the

activity of the perceiver into the foreground of his account of perceptual
development.
We must begin our examination by clarifying the somewhat clumsy
terminology which surrounds James's treatment of sensation.

For James,

sensation is "the immediate psychic effect of a peculiar sort of nerveprocess excited."

47

That is, sensation is the most primitive psychological

effect of a physiological process, an effect which is uncontaminated by
46

Ibid.

47

Ibid., p. 145.
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Intellectual (brain) processes.

The word uncontaminated is somewhat con

troversial in the abstract but it becomes less so in concrete cases.
That is, sensations, for James, are uncontaminated in the same sense that
the lateral inhibition theory of color contrast portrays that phenomenon
as uncontaminated by brain (intellectual) processes.

James was fully

aware that his definition of sensation created an abstraction which was
never fully realized in adult life.

But he said that sensations must be

postulated as the psychic function through which "we first become aware
of the bare immediate natures" of the objects of experience.

48

Defined

in this manner, sensation is synonymous with what James called knowledge
by acquaintance.

In fact, the latter phrase is preferable because it

does not imply that sensations actually constitute our experience of whole
objects; we are first acquainted with objects, as-yet-undiscriminated wholes
rather than disjointed sensory elements.

In the second chapter we argued

that James's knowledge by acquaintance is synonymous with what Hodgson
called first intention descriptions.

Thus it should not be surprising

to find James writing, in a section of "The Cognition Function of Sensa
tion," where he is discussing our primitive acquaintance with light, that
. . . the best taught born-blind pupil lacks a knowledge
which the least instructed seeing baby has. They can never
show him light in its 'first intention'; and the loss of that
sensible knowledge no book-learning can replace.49
Thus sensation, knowledge by acquaintance, and first intention descriptions
are synonymous for James; he employed Hodgson's philosophy to define the
most primitive units of his psychology in a non-elementistic way.
In the Principles he argued that a primitive space-sensation is
given in sensory stimulation of any kind, just as intensity is given.
48

Ibid., p. 3.

49
Ibid., p. 4.

(Italics mine.)
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Every experimental psychologist was willing to admit that intensity is
an inseparable but distinguishable element of sensory stimulation. But
it was James's contention that extensity should also be assigned the same
sensational status as intensity.

"Extensity," he wrote,

. . . being an entirely peculiar kind of feeling indescribable
except in terms of itself, and inseparable in actual experience
from some sensational quality which it must accompany, can itself
receive no other name than that of sensational element.50
For James, a spatial quale accompanies not only visual sensations but all
sensory stimulation whatsoever.

This immediately felt sensational quality

is what allows us to feel thunder as more extensive than a squeaking
blackboard, that full immersion in a bath is more extensive than a wet
finger.

While James examines all the senses in some detail, our discussion

will be limited to visual extensity.
In vision, James describes the spatial quale as a vague, undifferen
tiated feeling of "vastness" or "volume" which accompanies any visual
sensation.This primitive visual space contains all the attributes of
our mature spatial knowledge in potential form.

It is a space within

which depth has yet to be discriminated from length and width, where left
and right have yet to be assigned a specific direction.

James said that

the first primitive feeling of space is experienced as a mere "there" which
accompanies the first visual sensation, but these vague spatial feelings
are without a specific location or direction.

52

In calling it a mere

"there," James was simply trying to avoid committing the psychologists'
fallacy, which in this case would involve imposing his mature knowledge
about space onto his description of the primitive spatial quale. As he
wrote in describing a child's first experience of a visual object, the

50Ibid., p. 136.

51Ibid.

52Ibid., p. 8; p. 35.
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object "fills its own place" but the location of that place can only be
determined after the child acquires a more refined spatial knowledge.

53

In spite of the vagueness of the first spatial quale— a vagueness which
is, in fact, an essential feature of that notion— one thing must be made
clear.

That is, for James, our first visual sensations are spatial.

In other words, what we mean by visual sensations as they are actually
experienced is inherently, though originally only vaguely, spatial; just
as any visual sensation, must be of a certain intensity to be experienced,
so it must also possess extensity.
However straightforward this point might be, given James's notion
of the spatial quale, it deserves to be elaborated upon for two reasons.
First, the spatial quale makes the doctrine of the eccentric projection
of sensations superfluous.

There is no need to project sensations into

external space if sensations are themselves intrinsically spatial.

The

need for an additional mental act disappears when sensations are not
confused with the brain processes which produce them.

Only the brain

processes are inside our heads and only those physiological processes
would need projecting into the world.

But, since we become conscious of

objects rather than brain processes, the act of projection is an unneces
sary encumbrance on the psychology of perception.
More importantly, however, Nicholas Pastore, whose Selective History
of Theories of Visual Perception has become the authoritative work in this
area, has argued that James contradicts himself with regard to the notion
of the spatial quale. That is, Pastore suggests that there are two con
tradictory perception theories in the Principles and that what he calls
James's "second theory" is founded upon the "apparent denial of any

53Ibid., p. 35.
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sensation of extension or s p a c e . O n e of the central pieces of evidence
which Pastore offers in support of his interpretation is that James once
wrote, in discussing sensation, that "the first time we see light, in
55
Condillac's phrase, we are it rather than see it."

He interprets this

sentence to be a tacit endorsement of the empiricist position that visual
sensations are originally located in the mind rather than in the world.
If this can be substantiated, then James is: (1) saying that visual sen
sations are originally non-spatial and (2) setting up a purely empiricist
account of space alongside his avowedly nativistic notion of the spatial
quale. Although James is ambiguous in places, we shall argue that he
offers only one theory of perception in the Principles, a theory which
integrates empiricism and nativism.

In the course of this chapter we will

examine other evidence which Pastore offers in support of his interpreta
tion.

For now we shall show that James's allusion to Condillac was merely

a passing jab at the rationalistic theory of knowledge.
Pastore's interpretation is prima facie implausible because it
amounts to a blatent contradiction of the notion of the spatial quale.
It becomes strikingly implausible, however, when one reads the pages which
immediately precede and follow the controversial sentence.

Two pages

before the Condillac allusion James wrote, and I retain his own italics,
that "in both sensation and perception we perceive the fact as an immedi
ately present outward reality. A l t h o u g h James's reputation as a con
sistent thinker has been much-maligned by historians of psychology, it
seems incredible that he would reverse his position on such an important
54

Pastore, Visual Perception, p. 239.

55
James, Principles, 2:4; also see James, Psychology, p. 14.
56
James, Principles, 2:2.
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issue without warning, in a matter of two pages!

Furthermore, four pages

after the controversial sentence we find him again describing a position
which is thoroughly consistent with his formulation of the spatial quale.
Here again he considers the hypothetical case of a child’s first sensation.
The first sensation which an infant gets is for him the entire
Universe. . . . In this dumb awakening to the consciousness of
something there, a mere this . . . the infant encounters an ob
ject in which all . . . the ’categories of the understanding'
are contained. It has objectivity, unity, substantiality, causal
ity, in which any later object or system of objects has these
terms.37------ --------- ------ ---------- -------------James's reference to "objectivity" is nothing else than the spatial quale
which accompanies the child's first sensation.

Again, these are the words

of a perceptual realist; the child's first sensation is identical, in
terms of content, to the same sensation experienced by a mature person.
Of course, the mature person will know more about the sensation— he can
locate it in space and time and assign a meaning to it— but these concep
tual operations do not transform the content of the sensation.
Given these two explicit statements which are fully consistent with
his spatial quale, it seems positively incredible that James would insert
between them, as Pastore says, an implicit endorsement of the empiricist
account of space.

But what else could James have had in mind when he

wrote that "the first time we see light, in Condillac's phrase, we are it
rather than see it"?

The key to a different, and entirely consistent in

terpretation of this sentence is contained in James's 1885 essay, "On the
Function of Cognition."

58

It is here that he first challenged Ferrier's

First Proposition, that any knowledge whatever presupposes a knowledge of
a self as distinct from the object of knowledge.

Now by writing that "the

57Ibid., 2:8.
58
William James, "On the Function of Cognition," Mind 10(1885):27-44.
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first time we see light . . . we are It .

in the Principles he may

be simply challenging the epistemological foundation of the rationalist
formulation of knowledge.

This challenge is fully compatible with the

spatial quale, as well as the related position that the "primordial condition" of human experience is a "consciousness of objects."

59

In terms

of our interpretation, the child jLs light simply because he has, as yet,
no knowledge of self, or anything else except light.

In other words, I

understand James to be agreeing with Condillac’s position that knowledge
of self is itself derived from our knowledge of objects.

Later experience

will bring the child knowledge of self, as well as other optical knowl
edge but, as James wrote in the sentence immediately following his allusion
to Condillac, "all our optical knowledge is about what this experience
gives."

60

Although James's reference to Condillac is ambiguous because

he does not specify the particular sense in which he is agreeing with the
empiricist, it does not necessarily contradict his formulation of the spa
tial quale. What Pastore fails to recognize is that James could agree
with the empiricist critique of the rationalist formulation of knowledge
without endorsing the empiricist formulation of knowledge or space.
When one examines the assumptions which underlie James's treatment
of the visual spatial quale the importance of Hodgson's thought appears
at a number of levels.

For example, that the psychologists' fallacy con

tinually surfaces in his critique of the empiricist account is itself
testimony to the importance of Hodgson.

It is hardly coincidental, then,

that it is at the end of his "Perception of Space" chapter that James
accuses empiricism, as a school, of being "guilty of that confusion which
c q

James, Principles, 1:273.

Ibid., 2:3.
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Mr. Shadworth Hodgson has done so much to clear away, viz., the confounding of the analysis of an idea with its means of production."

61

t

This

f

allusion to Hodgson is hardly coincidental because Hodgson provided the
clearest formulation of what James called the psychologists' fallacy in
his examination of the empiricist formulation of the origin of spatial
attributes in his Time and Space in 1865.

62

We began this chapter with

James writing that "I always supposed myself that they [the 1887 space
perception articles] were but a filling out of your Time and Space frame63
work.11

We shall now see what James had in mind when he spoke of

Hodgson's "framework."
We must return to Hodgson's Time and Space, but not simply because
his account of space is the same as the Principles.

In fact, there are

significant differences in their formulations of space.

64

We must turn

to Time and Space because Hodgson cut through the Gordian knot which had
bound empiricism to an atomistic elementism from the time of Hobbes in
that work.

How did he accomplish this feat?

Put simply, he turned to

experience and refused to allow a physiological model to determine the
nature of his description of visual experience.

Put more complexly, Hodgson

called for an assumptionless description of the phenomenon of seeing itself.
His basic message to psychology might be summarized in the following manner:

61Ibid., pp. 280-281.
62
Hodgson, Time and Space.
^Perry, William James, 1:642.
64
Hodgson, still working partly within the traditional empiricist
framework with regard to the psychological origin of space, argued that
the third dimension was a joint product of visual and tactile sensations,
see Time and Space, pp. 80-82. In contrast, James maintained that all
three dimensions of space are the immediate product of visual sensations,
see Principles, 2:212-216.
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If psychology is going to deal with experience at all, it must begin with
rigorous descriptions of experience and let those descriptions be the data
from which psychological theories are constructed.

In effect, Hodgson

called for a reversal of the methodological orientation of traditional
empiricist psychology, replacing physicalistic assumptions with pure des
criptions.

In doing so, he set the "framework" for James's account of

the perception of space.
This reversal can be seen in Hodgson's argument for the immediate
visual apprehension of form.

As we have seen, empiricism sought to reduce

form to a series of muscular movements over time.

In response to this

formulation Hodgson turned to a description of visual experience.
The eye opened to light sees a whole surface, one small portion
of it distinctly, the rest indistinctly; it see part bright,
part dark, part clear, the rest obscure; this is the phenomenon
of seeing; and I cannot conceive how any one can suppose that the
space-relations of this surface are reducible to relations in
time . . . . the extended surface is seen at once, and is seen
as something different from feelings which are not extended.65
As a refutation of a time-honored theory this statement seems simplebordering-on naive.

Is it at all reasonable to attempt to refute a psy

chological theory on the basis of a description of the phenomenon being
explained?
complex.

With this question, what had seemed simple becomes frightfully
As we noted in the second chapter, Hodgson devised his method

of reflection to guard against the imposition of assumptions of any kind
onto our descriptions of experience.

According to the method of reflection,

one must voluntarily abstract all of one's knowledge about the experience
being described and present the experience as it is actually experienced.
Most importantly, one must guard against the seemingly irresistable tendency
to assume that the logical elements which are distinguishable upon reflecting

^Hodgson, Time and Space, p. 66.

199

on an experience are the psychological elements from which the experience
is produced.

For example, even though we can logically distinguish visual

space into length, width and depth, we have no right to assume that any
one of these dimensions antecedes the others within the life of the indi
vidual.

But this is exactly what empiricists since Berkeley had done in

formulating a psychological theory of the perception of the third dimension!
By applying this logic to the perception of the third dimension, Hodgson
reasoned that one must not assume that depth appears later than the other
two dimensions.
Sight contributes, at the least, perception of superficial
extension; so also touch; the combination of the two produces,
at the least, perceptions of the three dimensions, for part
of the visual superficies is pushed to a distance from the
body . . . when we touch the body and not the rest of the
superficies . . . .
This is the origin, the creation of the
third dimension of space when reasoned of as if it were an empiri
cal object.
6
b
'
Hodgson is playing the role of devil's advocate in this passage; this is
the logic behind the empiricist account of space.
of this position that is of the utmost importance.

It is his refutation
Thus, immediately

after this description he points to the fallacy underlying this line of
reasoning.
Sight and touch, however, come into operation together, and
consequently the perception of the third dimension of space
begins simultaneously with that of its superficial extension.
The perception . . . of things in space of three dimensions
is a highly complex state and object but not necessarily later
in time than that of the simpler states . . . of which it is
composed; it is we who import the notion of growth in time to
it, by our analyzing it into its elements and then composing
it afresh by their combination.67
This argument, which James later called the psychologists' fallacy, is the
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Ibid., p. 80.

(Italics mine.)

Ibid., p. 81.

(Italics mine.)

first step in Hodgson's critique of an atomistic empiricism.

To complete

his refutation and set the "framework" for James's account of space, we
must return to Hodgson's method of reflection.
In the second chapter we noted that Hodgson, in an article written
in 1876, said that one of the persistent problems of traditional empiri
cism was that it failed to give serious consideration to the question of
68

what is given in sensu.

In other words, empiricism tacitly assumed an

atomism which it inherited uncritically from the Newtonian conception of
science.

What we have referred to as the law of Isolated conduction can

be viewed as a nineteenth century rendition of this atomistic Weltanschaunng.
Hodgson recognized that this world-view provided a curiously a priori
answer to the question of what is given in sensu. What is given must be
discrete sensory elements, the mental analogues to Newton's atoms.
Hodgson also recognized that empiricism's alliance with a physicalistic
atomism resulted in an unconscious abnegation of its professed master—
experience.

Thus in an 1884 essay we find Hodgson demanding that empiri

cism return to experience:
. . . we must have recourse in the first instance to experi
ence itself, and see what its content is, apart from any hypo
thesis of its cause . . . .
What I say then is this,— throw
yourself frankly on experience . . . .
Experience without leading
strings is the thing to aim at and work for.69
Instead of assuming that experience is composed of elements which are as
discrete as their assumed causes, Hodgson said that the question of what
is given in sensu can only be answered by returning to experience.

He

recognized that this return involved a "radical change in our method of
68

Shadworth Hodgson, "The Metaphysical Method in Philosophy,"
Mind 9(1884):48-72, p. 55.
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philosophizing" but this was the only way to get at "experience without
leading s t r i n g s . T h i s radical change in method is, of course, the
method of reflection.

What must be made clear, however, is that Hodgson

stated that a rigorous application of this method would allow us to answer
the question of what is given in sensu.

In fact, for Hodgson, employing

the method of reflection was the only way philosophers and psychologists
could rediscover what is given in sensu.
We can now offer Hodgson's answer to the question raised earlier—
whether a description of the experience of a phenomenon can, in and of
itself, serve as a refutation of a psychological explanation of that phe
nomenon.

Hodgson's answer is clearly yes, but only if the explanation

makes reference to inferred psychological processes which can not be veri
fied in a rigorous application of the method of reflection.

Thus, if an

explanation makes reference to hypothetical mental processes which can
never be experienced— like, for example, Wundt's sensations or Helmholtz's
unconscious inferences— it is necessarily wrong.

Hodgson's method of

reflection also had a vitally important influence on James's account of
space perception, for the empiricism-nativism controversy revolved around
the question which Hodgson's method was designed to answer— what is given
in sensu.
One way of approaching this issue is to contrast the implications
of Hodgson's method of reflection and Helmholtz's modification rule with
the origin of spatial attributes in mind.

We have already seen that

Helmholtz employed the modification rule as a criterion for arguing that
spatial attributes are not given in sensu, i.e., he reasoned that since
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spatial attributes vary with experience they must themselves be products
of experience.

He also noted, however, that the converse of this rule is

definitely not v a l i d . T h a t is, just because perceptual attributes can
not be altered, we can not assume that they are given in sensory stimu
lation, for large amounts of practice will make some attributes so strong
that they can not be overcome by even a determined effort.

Remarkably,

in employing the method of reflection one obtains a criterion which is
the exact opposite of Helmholtz's!
Hodgson's method of reflection involves the voluntary adoption of
an attitude which is radically different from our usual way of experiencing
the world.

In 1884 he described this attitude as one of "pure receptivity,"

and its rigorous application allows one to get at "experience pure."

72

In our everyday experience we immediately impose learned meanings onto
the objects of our perceptual experience, so that a particular configura
tion of green and brown is seen as a tree.

Hodgson said that the method

of reflection was designed to "undo" or "invert" the effects of past experience by consciously holding our everyday assumptions in abeyance.

73

Thus, in a state of pure receptivity one ignores the tree-ness and even
the object character of this particular segment of perceptual experience.
Instead, Hodgson wrote that one
. . . takes the green andbrown expanse as it comes, in its
proper place in the stream of consciousness . . . .
So taking
it, I am aware of the larger expanse of which it was a part,
and also that while seeing it I heard (suppose) a sound, making
part with it of one stream of consciousness.74

^Pastore, Visual Perception, p. 167.
72
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This, for Hodgson, is what is given in the experience of seeing a tree—
patches of extended color in particular forms.

The difference between

Hodgson and Helmholtz reduces to one fundamental proposition: Hodgson
believed that one could, and in fact, must "undo" the effects of past
experience by a systematic suspension of everyday assumptions, while
Helmholtz believed that such an inversion was unnecessary.

While Hodgson's

method is an expression of his desire to achieve absolute certainty, its
plausibility and attractiveness is tied to his demand that we adopt a
state of mind which is radically different from normal experience.

Within

this state of pure receptivity, experience appears as it is given in sensu.
Thus, in marked contrast to Helmholtz's criterion, Hodgson would argue
that what remains unchanged and intact within this radically different
state is the uncontaminated product of sensory stimulation. Thus in
Hodgson we find an alternative to Helmholtz's modification rule.
Although James rejected the modification rule, he seems to offer
no explicit, general alternative criterion for determining what is given
in sensu.

Instead, he seems to treat each topic in space perception in

dividually, bringing experimental evidence to support his position when
ever possible.

He refers to Exner's studies on apparent motion, for

example, in the context of his argument that movement is a "primitive form
of sensibility."

75

But there are large gaps in the experimental litera

ture and he fills these gaps with descriptions which seek to bring the
reader back to the sensational or acquaintance mode of experience.

Most

importantly, these descriptions give credence to the idea that he had
Hodgson's method of reflection in mind when he claimed that spatial attri
butes are given in vision.

We have already noted that his knowledge by

^"\james, Principles, 2:172.

204

acquaintance is synonymous with Hodgson's first intention descriptions,
but now we are making a more specific claim.

That is, we shall attempt

to show that there are times when James says that spatial attributes are
given in vision on the basis of descriptions which approximate Hodgson's
state of perfect receptivity.
Evidence for this contention is not hard to find.

We have already

noted, for example, that James describes the "primordial condition" of
human experience as a vague "consciousness of o b j e c t s . W h a t he calls
the "primordial condition" is remarkably similar to Hodgson's state of
"perfect receptivity" except that James, the psychologist, points to
altered states which appear involuntarily, e.g., during a hypnotic trance,
a faint or our experience under the influence of anesthetics.

He pro

vides a more elaborate description of anesthetic intoxication in one part
of the Principles;
Such anesthetics as chloroform, nitrous oxide, etc., sometimes
bring about transient lapses [of self consciousness] even more
total, in which numerical discrimination seems gone; for one
sees light and hears sound, but whether one or many lights and
sounds is quite impossible to tell. Where the parts of an ob
ject have already been discerned . . . we can with difficulty
feel the object again in its pristine unity.77
In terms of the structural tone of experience, this passage is reminiscent
of James's description of a state of dispersed attention, and in both he
is describing a state similar to Hodgson's perfect receptivity.

The ac

tive, discriminating, attentive mode of experiencing the world recedes
and objects return to their "pristine unity."

The important thing for

understanding James's nativistic notion of the spatial quale is that the
pristine objects which appear in this state are accompanied by a primitive

^James, Principles, 1:273.
77

Ibid., pp. 487-488.

(Italics mine.)
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spatial vastness.

Thus James wrote that even when consciousness is reduced

to its most primitive level it "presents us with concreted objects, vaguely
continuous with the rest of the world which envelops them in time and
space."

78

Thus, after abandoning Helmholtz's criterion for distinguish

ing between the sensory and intellectual components of perception, James
seems to adopt the criterion contained in Hodgson's method of reflection.
The importance of this fact cannot be over-emphasized— it served as the
basis of the nativistic strain of James's formulation of space.

Hodgson's

criterion is also implicit in James's retort to the doctrine of the eccen
tric projection of sensation.
As I look at my bookshelf I cannot frame to myself an idea,
however imaginary, of any feeling which I could ever possibly
have got from it except the feeling of the same big extended
sort of outward fact which I now perceive.79
What is striking about this passage is that here James is offering the
irretrievability of non-spatial visual sensations as proof of the untenability of the notion of projection.

Like Hodgson's purely experiential

refutation of the empiricist account of the perception of the third dimen
sion, James is rejecting a psychological theory on purely descriptive
grounds.
Helmholtz would interpret the irretrievability of non-spatial visual
sensations as an example of the overriding importance of past experience
and unconscious inferences— we have had so much experience locating the
bookshelf in external space that the originally non-spatial character of
the visual sensations is unrecoverable.

But then his psychological theory

must contain an additional unconscious act of projection.

In contrast,

Hodgson would interpret the irretrievability of non-spatial visual sensations

78Ibid., p. 487.

79Ibid., 2;31-32.

(Italics mine.)
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as James does, as evidence that visual sensations are themselves origin
ally spatial!

The criterion actually employed determines whether one

offers a nativistic or empirical formulation of space.

If more explicit

evidence of Hodgson's impact is needed, one need only turn to James's
purely descriptive argument for the givenness of the third dimension.
Here he wrote that:
It is impossible to lie on one's back on a hill, to let the
empty abyss of blue fill one's whole field, and to sink deeper
and deeper into the merely sensational mode of consciousness
regarding it, without feeling that an indeterminate, palpitating,
circling depth is as indefeasibly one of its attributes as its
breadth. . . . Mind, I say nothing as
yet about our estimate of
the 'real' amount of this depth or distance. I only want to
confirm its existence as a natural and inevitable optical con
sort of the other two dimensions.80
What James calls "the sensational mode of

consciousness" is, for all in

tents and purposes, Hodgson's attitude of

"perfect receptivity;" and, on

the basis of a description of experience in this state, we find James
arguing that three dimensional space is immediately given in visual stimu
lation.
James's contention that a primitive three dimensional spatial quale
is given in vision is perhaps his most radical departure from the empiri
cist account of the origin of spatial attributes.

And while he expressed

sympathy for Hering's and Stumpf's formulations of the direct intuition
of three dimensional space in the Principles, two factors suggest that
Hodgson was also important in this respect.

81

First, and most importantly,

James admitted that the physiological process which underlies the immediate
80
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(Italics mine.)
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Hering see his Principles, 2:220-222. Surprisingly, he endorses neither
of these explanations explicitly, although he is clearly sympathetic to
these nativistic formulations.
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apprehension of depth had yet to be discovered.

82

This fact would be

something of an embarassment to a nativistic theorist unless he had some
other means to support his formulation.

According to our interpretation,

however, Hodgson's method of reflection provided James with exactly what
he needed— a criterion, independent of physiology, for determining what
is given in sensu.
Second, Hodgson himself offered a preliminary outline of the psycho
logical origin of the formal elements (space and time) in his Time and
Space. The interesting aspect of this sketch is that he noted that the
"constitution of the nerve" had been curiously ignored in previous theories.
In response to this omission, he made reference to Johannes Mtlller's doc
trine of specific nerve energies, which states that the nature of the sen
sation is conditioned by the structure of the nerve stimulated.

Given

this principle, he speculated that the psychological origin of time and
space may be rooted in the constitution of the nerve.
May it not depend on the constitution of the nervous matter that
we have space and time at all in our perceptions, and on the
particular constitution of the objects perceived that we have
g^
this and that size, length, figure and order in the perceptions?
Although there is no indication that Hodgson was aware of Hering's theory,
which appeared a year before his Time and Space, both share some fundamen
tal similarities.

Both, of course, are clearly nativistic.

More impor

tantly, however, both Hodgson and Hering grounded their nativism in
hypothetical neural mechanisms which operate within the sensory systems.
In this way, both avoided the untenable elementism and mental synthesis
82
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of the empiricist formulation of space.

I am certainly not suggesting

that Hodgson’s preliminary outline held more weight in James's mind than
the more elaborate theories of Hering and Stumpf.

What I am arguing,

however, is that Hodgson's method of reflection, and, to a lesser degree
his outline, provided the "framework" for James's theory of space percep
tion and disposed him to view nativistic theories with a sympathetic eye.
Before turning to James's account of the development of mature
perceptual knowledge, we must return to Pastore's "second theory."

In

addition to asserting that James's second theory holds that sensations
are originally non-spatial, Pastore states that it portrays the first
perceptual experience of a child as being "totally chaotic."

85

He bases

this rather extreme characterization on James's often-quoted remark that
the first experience of a child is "one great, blooming, buzzing, confusion."
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From this premise, Pastore reasons that a total chaos has no

stable, internal subdivisions and therefore James's second theory fails
to provide a conception of objects which the child's primitive perceptual
structures can discriminate.

In support of this contention, Pastore states

that James himself wrote that sensations are "originally homogeneous."

87

If this is true, James places himself in a curious logical bind— how can
one explain how attentional acts single out objects from an originally
homogeneous sensory mass?

We shall attempt to show that James never stated,

or even implied, that the first real perceptual experience of a child is
either: (1) totally chaotic or (2) entirely homogeneous.

In doing so, we

must conclude that Pastore's formulation of the "second theory" in the
Principles is based on a series of fundamental misconceptions of James's
psychology of perception.
85
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Pastore's second allegation is easily dispelled by giving voice to
Linschoten's distinction between the two ways which James employs the term
88
sensation.

At times, James uses sensation in a genetic sense, to sig

nify the first real experience of a child.

In this sense, a child's

original experience is sensational because it is the immediate effect of
sensory stimulation.

At other times, however, he uses the word sensation

in a quite different sense, to refer to an abstraction which results from
a conscious isolation of logically distinguishable qualities of experience.
In this sense, and in this sense alone, particular colors, sounds, exten
sity and other homogeneous feelings are sensations.

Pastore's claim that

"James supposes sensations to be originally homogeneous" is founded upon
a failure to distinguish between these two meanings of sensation.

89

That James himself had this distinction in mind becomes clear when one
turns to the section of the Psychology where he states that sensations
are homogeneous.

He had just completed discussing sensations as abstract

sensible qualities when he wrote:
Sensation, thus considered, differs from perception only in
the extreme simplicity of its object or content. Its object,
being a simple quality, is sensibly homogeneous.90
Taken in context, it becomes obvious that James was speaking of sensations
as abstract sensible qualities when he stated that they are homogeneous.
These sensations are adult abstractions which James stated are never
actually experienced alone in real life. Thus there is no reason to believe
that James ever maintained that the first real experience of a child is
homogeneous.

In fact, a child's original experience is as heterogeneous

as the objects which he is innately prepared to discriminate.

88
Linschoten, Psychology of William James, pp. 88-98.
89
Pastore, Visual Perception, p. 239.
90

James, Psychology, p. 14.

210

Pastore offers remarkably little support for his claim that "James
describes the original experience of a baby as being totally chaotic."

91

The substance of his interpretation consists of his unquestioningly as
suming that when James says that a child's first experience is a "pri
mordial chaos," he means that it is totally chaotic.

Beyond this, the

only textual evidence he offers is a segment of the 'blooming, buzzing
confusion' sentence.

In fact, if he had reproduced that sentence in its

entirety he would have found James writing that even these first confused
sensations possess a primitive extensity.

92

In response to Pastore's

contention, we might simply list some of the perceptual structures which
James does say would function to structure a child's first experience.
These include figure (form), solidity, color, shades of light, movement,
and relative magnitude and distance.

Of course, he maintained that these

features are only vaguely cognized by the child, but these features would
provide enough structure to guide the child's first discriminations and
actions.
The crux of Pastore's claim seems to be rooted in the fact that
James describes the child's first experience as "primitive," "vague," and
even "chaotic."

But there is no need to assume, on the basis of these

adjectives alone, that James ever conceived of the child's first percep
tions as being totally chaotic.

It may well be primitive in the sense

that it is not guided by a mature knowledge about the objects perceived,
91
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vague in the sense that only the most gross objective differences are
immediately perceived, and even chaotic in the sense that the constancies
which give stability to adult perception have yet to be learned, but it
still possesses a certain form and structure.

A more accurate summary of

James's position is contained in his suggestion that: "The law is that
all things fuse that can fuse, and nothing separates except what must."

93

And as a perceptual realist, gross differences between figures, colors
and shades of light are just the sort of objective differences which James
said must separate themselves immediately in the child's first experience.
These discriminations are the immediate result of the innate physiological
mechanisms of the child's sense organs.

Perceptual Realism and the Role of Intellect
In the previous section we found, among other things, that James's
nativistic formulation of space was rooted in his commitment to a percep
tual realism.

That is, by holding that a primitive sense of space is

immediately given, he avoided the need to posit that spatial attributes
are created, through a mental synthesis, from elements which are them
selves non-spatial.

But James's nativism is only the first step toward

a complete account of perception.

He recognized clearly that intellectual

factors (viz., knowledge) play an essential role in a person's mature
perception of spatial relations.

In fact, James's full account of the

perception of space is best viewed as an attempt to integrate nativism
and empiricism and we shall now show that a perceptual realism also stood
at the foundation of the empirical side of his account of space.

In the

process we shall look at his formulation of space from two perspectives.
93
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We shall first examine his explanation of one type of perceptual relation,
shape constancy, viewing it as paradigmatic of his treatment of spatial
relations.

After noting the problems with his explanation, we shall con

trast his general approach to perceptual development with that of tradi
tional empiricism.
Let us begin James's treatment of shape constancy by presenting his
own summary of the role which intellectual factors play in the perception
of spatial relations.

He wrote that:

In completely educated space-perception, the present sensation
is usually just what Helmholtz (Physiol. Optik, p. 797) calls
it, 'a sign, the interpretation of whose meaning is left to
the understanding'. But the understanding is exclusively re
productive and never productive in the process; . . . its
function is limited to the recall of previous space-sensations
which the present one has been associated and which may be
judged more real.94
Although he is not speaking specifically of shape constancy in this passage,
the principles and processes he alludes to can be applied to shape con
stancy, or any other space relation (e.g., distance, solidity, position).
His commitment to perceptual realism stands squarely behind his qualifi
cation of Helmholtz's position.

In stating that the "understanding is

exclusively reproductive and never productive" he is bringing attention
to the fact that association can only recall sensations which have them
selves been given in previous experience.

What he is challenging, of course,

is the empiricist tendency to give association the power to create attri
butes which have never actually been given as sensations.

His perceptual

realism therefore demands that he show that even our most refined spatial
knowledge can be conceived of as a reproduction of space-sensations which
are immediately given.
94
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selective attention may "shuffle and manipulate these data [the origin
ally given space-sensations] and hide them behind imagined ones," but
it is his task as a perceptual realist to show that all the shuffling
and manipulating in the world does not create new sensational attributes.

95

Let us now turn to shape constancy.
Shape constancy is easy enough to describe.

A square table can

produce an infinite number of retinal configurations and only one of them
is actually square.

Similarly, if a person looks down the length off a

dinner table at a row of plates, the retinal configurations produced are
a series of ellipses rather than circles.

In spite of the diversity of

retinal configurations, however, we perceive the shapes of objects as
remaining constant.

Now the first item James's explanation of shape con

stancy needs is an immediately given sensation of form or shape.

Of

course, he argued that visual form is immediately given in retinal stimu
lation.

His task therefore involves showing how experience enriches an

initially vague and meaningless visual form so as to achieve shape constancy
without positing any sort of mental synthesis; how our pirmitive acquaint
ance with visual forms develops into our mature knowledge about objects.
Of this developmental process James wrote that:
We have native . . . optical space-sensations; but experience
leads us to select certain ones from among them to be the
exclusive bearers of reality; the rest become mere signs and
suggesters of these.96
As we shall see, James limited the role of past experience to the reproduc
tion of past space-sensations.

These reproductions give meaning to and

guide our selection of that which is given by the senses but they do not
anything de novo to the content of what is given.

95Ibid., pp. 145-146.

96Ibid., p. 237.
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James’s explanation of the acquisition of shape constancy actually
involves two complementary processes, selective attention and association.
First, in the process of dealing with the object, the perceiver gradually
learns to choose or select one version of it to represent its "real"
shape.

97

A number of characteristics of this selection process should

be made explicit.

Most importantly, James said that the real shape is a

sensational copy of the object, retrieved from memory.
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This proposition

saves his perceptual realism, it gives him the power to reduce our mature
knowledge of objects in space to reproductions of previously experienced
sensational objects.

This real shape is the retinal configuration pro

duced when the object is viewed under ideal conditions.

The circular

sensation of a plate, for example, is obtained by viewing the plate in a
vertical plane directly in front of the perceiver.

Although he was aware

that this perspective was statistically rare, he seemed to think that it
held "so many aesthetic and practical advantages" that everyone would
eventually discover it.
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Moreover, he said that once this real shape is

discovered, it acquires an "extraordinary pre-eminence" over any of the
other retinal configurations which the object can p r o d u c e . T h i s leads
to the second process involved in James's explanation of s.hape constancy.
At the same time that the perceiver is learning to choose the real shape
of a given object, he is also learning that the real shape can be signaled
by a wide variety of related retinal configurations.

Depending on the

perceiver's perspective, for example, a circle can produce, by a series
of continuous gradations, any number of elliptical configurations.
According to James, the perceiver must learn to associate an entire class
97
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of retinal configurations with the real shape; the non-circular deviations
are relegated to the status of mere "signs" for the real shape "signified.
With this introduction, James's explanation of shape constancy can
be summarized in the following fashion.

Suppose, for example, that a

person is looking at a round plate from an oblique perspective.

Accord

ing to James, the elliptical pattern of retinal stimulation does not get
combined with, and then transformed or synthesized by stored representa
tions of the perceiver's knowledge about the plate.

Instead, the perceiver

simply ignores the elliptical retinal configuration.

In this sense, non

circular deviations of a real circle have the same status for James as a
wide variety of subjective phenomena which do not serve as signs for
external objects.

There are, for example, fibers and granules floating

in the vitreous humor of the eye which cast shadows on the retina and can
appear as little dark moving dots.

But these muscoe volitantes are rarely

attended to in everyday life because they do not signal the appearance of
external objects.

Similarly, the non-circular retinal configurations are

not attended to because they too do not represent a practically important
reality.

Both James and Helmholtz agreed that perception is dominated

by attention to phenomena which are important to the perceiver.

102

In

contrast to muscoe volitantes, however, James said that the non-circular
patterns of the plate are important to the perceiver in an indirect way;
they function as signs for the real shape signified, which has been stored
in memory.

In other words, the non-circular sensation suggests or evokes

an "imagined sensation" of the real shape of the object.

103

And the per

ceiver, who has learned through experience that it is more convenient to

101Ibid., pp. 240-244.
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deal with one real version of a visual form than a multiplicity of fluc
tuating forms, attends to the "imagined sensation" and completely ignores
what is given in the senses.

James offered the same basic explanation

for both size constancy and the perception of other spatial relations
(e.g., distance, location).

As he wrote:

Our rapid judgements of size, shape, distance and the like, are
best explained as processes of simple cerebral association.
Certain sense-impressions directly stimulate brain-tracts, of
whose activity ready-made conscious percepts are the immediate
psychic counterparts. They do this by a mechanism either
connate or acquired by habit.
There is no synthesis or unconscious inference in James's explanation, the
sense data simply stimulate brain tracts which lead to the reproduction
of previously experienced, and more practically valuable, sensations.
In this way, he sought to give experience a vital role in our mature spa
tial perceptions while retaining the fundamental tenet of perceptual real
ism, "that all spatial knowledge is sensational at bottom.
There are a number of problems with James's explanation of percep
tual relations.

First, his suggestion that sensory stimulation gives rise

to an "imagined sensation" of the real object makes his theory cumbersomebordering-on-unwieldy.

If we take James at his word, the perceiver would

need a distinct "imagined sensation" for every concrete object perceived.
That is, every plate, glass, table, door, picture ad infinitum would need
a stored replica of its real shape for its shape to be conserved.

James's

theory can be viewed as a template-matching model and it shares all the
problems of such a model.

Furthermore, if "imagined sensations" play such

a vital role in perception, why are they so difficult to experience?
James himself seemed to be aware of this problem when he wrote, somewhat

104Ibid., 1:169.

105Ibid., 2:152.
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unconvincingly, that the imagined sensation "is felt in its entirety but
vaguely.

The problem is, how can one be sure that a vaguely felt

object is, in fact, a sensational copy of a previous sensation?

Thus

James's account of the perception of spatial relations can be challenged
from the theoretical and experiential perspectives.

What he was unwilling

to admit is that an abstract rule system could serve as the general basis
for the conservation of the shape (or size) of an infinite number of ob
jects, that knowledge can supply stability and meaning to what is given
without changing its contents.

This position would have been inconsistent

with his version of perceptual realism.
James's perceptual realism can be viewed as a reaction to a com
plex of related tendencies which formed the empiricist approach to percep
tion and perceptual development.

In fact, to the extent that this prin

ciple led him to offer an untenable formulation of spatial relations, it
is perhaps best viewed as an over-reaction.

At the same time, however,

it must be noted that James's commitment to perceptual realism stood at
the foundation of his alternative to the general empiricist approach to
perception.

In closing this chapter we shall contrast these two divergent

approaches to perceptual development.
As we have seen throughout this study, empiricism conceived of
sensations as punctate mental analogues which result from isolated sensory
excitations.

As such, sensations were assumed to be the atomistic ele

ments of mental life.

Linschoten noted the problem with this position by

stating that: "Empiricism presupposed atomism on simply rational grounds—
and there certainly are some traces of contradiction in this position.

106Ibid., p. 163.
^^Linschoten, Psychology of William James, p. 87.
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In any case, the empiricist conceived of these mental elements as devoid
of intrinsic structure; the unrelated elements were thought to be united
or synthesized into whole objects through association.

This conception

of sensation set the stage for two intimately related features of the
empiricist approach to perceptual development.

First, empiricism conceived

of perceptual development as a progression from the simple to the complex,
from the meaningless element to the meaningful whole object of mature
perception.

All knowledge could therefore be reduced to the various com

binations of a fixed number of simple sensory bits.

A child's first ex

perience begins as a hodgepodge of internal sensations and he must gradually
learn that certain sensational complexes signify whole objects located in
the external world.

Moreover, they supposed that the elements which con

stitute the percept can be discovered through a reflective analysis of
the percept of idea.

The second dominant feature of the empiricist program

is that the association of ideas became the fundamental organizing prin
ciple of the human mind.

This internal organizing mechanism was the

necessary complement to sensations which were themselves incoherent.

Thus,

the process of association was forced to carry an awesome load singlehandedly— creating structure, unity and meaning from an originally chaotic,
meaningless mass of sensations.
The empirical psychology of James's era was clearly dominated by
this approach, and we have tried to show that James criticized this tradi
tion throughout the Principles. And although he does, at times, slip back
into the terminology of that tradition, one finds a new and radically
different conception of perceptual development taking form in James's
psychology.

This formulation appears most clearly in his descriptions

of perceptual experience.

Thus, in reconstructing the first experience
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of a child, he found "original sensible totals" rather than an incoherent
mass of elements.
Experience from the very first, presents us with concreted
objects, vaguely continuous with the rest of the world which
envelops them in space and time, and potentially divisible into
inward elements and parts. These objects we break asunder and
reunite.
The structureor form of a child's first experience is therefore very
primitive, and even chaotic by adult standards.

It is a world in which

objects appear in an indefinite space and change their shapes and sizes
continuously.

It is a world in which objects make abrupt exits and en

trances, and emit strange, sometimes frightening, sounds.

But the fact

remains that James's conception of a child's perceptual world does contain
a certain structure.

First and foremost, it is a world which is composed

of objects located in the world rather than in the child's head.

More

over, it is a world in which the objects stand out from their background;
a world in which gross visual discriminations can be made and motions can
be perceived.

109

In this sense, the original experience of a child is,

for James, far more than a total chaos.

It is perhaps best conceived as

a perceptual field whose primitive structure is a joint product of the
objects perceived and the primitive structure of the child's innate physio
logical mechanisms.

In this light, the nativistic strain of James's formu

lation of perception can be viewed as a retort to the empiricist conception
of sensation.

Where the empiricist found a jumbled, incoherent mass of

sensations, James found a primitive structure.

And his own conception of

the child's original experience set the stage for his approach to perceptual
development.
108
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Linschoten has shown that James conceived of perceptual development
as a movement from whole to part rather than from part to w h o l e . T h a t
is, in contrast to the empiricist approach, James conceived of perceptual
development as a progressive articulation of the originally given "sensible
totals" into more differentiated, segregated, meaning-filled objects.
Within this framework, 'attention carves out objects' and the brain assigns
meaning to what is given in the senses.
While Linschoten's treatment is valuable'and illuminating, we would
add that a perceptual realism underlies James's approach to perceptual
development.

That is, his psychology of perception is grounded in a

methodological dualism between the "knowing mind and the thing known.
This is the framework which psychology, as a science, must adopt and within
it, objects are conceived of as existing independent of the perceiver,
emitting patterns of energy which are structured in accordance with physi
cal laws.

On the other hand, the perceiver is conceived of as possessing

perceptual structures which enable him to attend to particular patterns
of energy.

It is within this realistic formulation of the subject-object

relation that James's account of perceptual development is articulated.
At first, the perceiver's perceptual structures are very crude and
lack differentiation.

Thus, as James said, a child's first experience

is "potentially divisible into inward elements and parts," but his innate
perceptual structures allow him to discriminate between only the gross
differences in physical stimulation, e.g., bright lights, loud sounds,
moving objects.

But even these primitive structures give form and meaning

to the child's first awkward explorations of the world.

From this first

^Linschoten, Psychology of William James, pp. 83-98.
^^James, Principles, 1:218.
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exploration onward, experience functions to enrich and articulate the
child's diffuse perceptual structures, thereby actualizing discrimina
tions which had existed previously as mere potentials. The process is
cyclical and mutually enriching: exploration provides the child with
more knowledge about the world, and that knowledge, in turn, allows him
to make finer and more meaning-filled discriminations and explorations.
In time, sensory experience comes to be subordinated to learned meanings,
the sensory flux serve as mere signs for the real objects signified.
But knowledge does not add something de novo to sensory impressions;
throughout the process of perceptual development our senses bring us
into contact with real objects and relations which exist externally to
us.

Within James's formulation of perception, knowledge simply enables

the perceiver to understand and attend to the increasingly complex rela
tions which the world offers continuously.

Thus, while James was willing

to speak in terms of the creativity of the knower within the context of
the higher mental processes, he steadfastly avoided the temptation to
state that the perceiver creates his world in perception.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The objectives of this final chapter are twofold.

We shall first

summarize the impact of Hodgson on the three areas of James's psychology
that have been examined in this study.

The aim here is to provide a

succinct statement of the fundamental insights which James-the-psychologist
obtained from the works of Hodgson, which he described early in his career
as "the greatest mine of philosophical wealth now extant."*

In conjunc

tion with this synopsis, we shall offer a brief, and admittedly truncated,
outline of the ramifications of the essential tenets of James's psychology
in the period between 1890 and 1920.

A detailed or extended examination

of the legacy of James's psychology is clearly beyond the scope of this
study.

At the same time, however, it is important to situate James within

the mainstream of psychological theory in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries for two reasons.

At a rather egocentric level, this

outline will provide a preliminary scheme for the future research of this
writer.

More importantly, however, there is the hope that even a prelimi

nary sketch will give the reader some sense of the continuity between the
issues which emerge in the Principles and early twentieth century psycho
logical theory.
In terms of philosophical assumptions, we have argued that Hodgson's

*Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James,
2 vols., (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1935), 1:616.
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system provided James with a set of principles which served as the method
ological foundation of his psychology.

Beginning with a critique of the

two dominant philosophical traditions of the nineteenth century, Hodgson
offered a new philosophical method (the method of reflection) which gave
rise to a fundamentally new conception of experience (the stream of con
sciousness).

Of course, the history of philosophy is littered with new

methods and a wide variety of appeals to experience.

What Hodgson recog

nized, however, was that any given appeal to experience appeared within
and was buttressed by a deeper, more pervasive and less explicit theory
of experience. In addition, he recognized that this tacitly-held theory
of experience is important for philosophers and psychologists because it
contains the principles which specify what different thinkers mean by and
count as experience.

It is this deeper, tacitly-held theory of experience

which Hodgson's method of reflection sought to clarify and make explicit.
Hodgson's philosophical principles appear in a variety of forms at
each level of the Principles■ They appear most clearly in the critical
strain which pervades James's psychology, in the unambiguous and continual
rejection of the sensationalistic atomism of nineteenth century empirical
psychology (viz., the psychologists' fallacy).

Most importantly, it was

the empiricist theory of experience as a succession of discrete ideas which
James sought to replace with his formulation of the stream of thought.
Thus when he said that psychology must begin with a rigorous description
of the immediate experience of individual minds, he meant to exclude the
abstract sensorial elements of the empiricist on methodological grounds.

2

In a very important sense, it was James's methodological commitment to the
2

William James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols., (New York;
Henry Holt and Co., 1890), 1:224. Hereafter cited as James, Principles.
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description of the concrete experience of human beings in real life which
gave rise to the fundamental units of analysis of his psychology.

In

terms of the higher mental processes, the unit of analysis became a person’
purposive search for the attainment of an adequate means to particular ends
Thinking came to be treated as an essentially cognitive-emotive process,
with the thinker choosing one of the "teeming multiplicity of objects and
relations" which appear simultaneously with the stream.

The nature of

the explanatory constructs of his psychology of the higher mental processes
a biological a priori, his teleological formulation of conception and his
recognition of the importance of belief— all stem from his initial descrip
tion of the fundamental unit of human cognition.

The disembodied passage

of successive ideas was replaced by a formulation of thinking which em
phasized its plan-filled, goal-directed character.

The predominance of

James's descriptive orientation also appears at each stage of his treatment
of perception.

Here too, we find a continual rejection of any attempt to

create the objects of perception from the synthesis of sensory elements
which are never encountered in real life.

Here too, there is a method

ological commitment to begin with descriptions of perceptual experience,
where whole objects are carved out of what is immediately given.

Finally,

the nature of his explanation of the process of perception— which combines
nativism and empiricism and recognizes both the activity of the perceiver
and the reality of external objects— is conditioned by his description of
the fundamental unit of perception.

This intimate reciprocity between

the descriptive (methodological) and explanatory (theoretical) aspects of
James's system is the means through which he tried to integrate scientific
psychology and what would today be called phenomenological description.

3Ibid.
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And it is in this sense that James's psychology is an attempt to bring
Hodgson's conception of scientific psychology to fruition.
In terms of the specifics of James's formulation of the higher
mental processes, Hodgson's influence appears at two levels.

It appears

most clearly in the adoption of Hodgson's dynamic or active interpretation
of the laws of association in the Principles, which portrays the particular
direction of thought as a joint product of association and the interests
of the thinker.

At a less explicit level, however, James retained the

ideal of rigorous description even when he rejected the explanatory con
structs of Hodgson's system.

Thus, for example, he went beyond Hodgson

in stating that a priori processes must be posited to explain human think
ing, but he supported his claim with detailed descriptions of thinking as
it actually occurs in the lives of individual minds.
In a very important sense, evolutionary theory is the doctrine which
stands between the formulations of the higher mental processes found in
Hodgson and James.

While both clearly recognized the dynamic, as well as

cognitive aspects of human thinking, James had the advantage of developing
his formulation of thinking in a period which recognized the importance
of phylogenetic development for psychology.

James took advantage of this

opportunity and offered a dynamic, cognitive psychology which was founded
upon a biological interpretation of the a priori.
tionism could be challenged on scientific grounds.

At long last, associaIn the process, he set

the foundation for a functional psychology, a psychology which, James
Angell later wrote, conceived of mind as "primarily engaged in mediating
between the environment and the needs of the organism."^

If we only

^James Angell, " The Province of Functional Psychology," Psycho
logical Review 14(1907):61-91.
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substitute the notion of interests or subjective interests for Angell's
needs, the Jamesian flavor of the functionalist program comes through
clearly— the organism approaches any situation in search of a solution
to a problem which is interesting, or satisfies some momentary need.
While the substitution of needs for interests seems innocuous
enough in some respects, at another level it represents a significant
change in the direction of psychology in the early twentieth century.
Psychology after James became more experimental, more biological and less
concerned with the grand problems of human nature which inspired James.
If purpose was to be considered at all, as it was in the most sophisti
cated behaviorisms of John Dewey, Ralph B. Perry and Edwin B. Holt, it
first had to be cleansed of its teleological implications.

Purpose had

to be construed as a predetermined effect of the past on the present.
James had an important and direct influence on each of these thinkers,
whose works in psychology can be viewed as an attempt to deal with the
notion of subjective interests in an objective, thoroughly scientific
fashion.
But alongside this trend there was another strain of functional
psychology which, for a variety of reasons, refused to carry the banner of
an objectivistic, mechanistic, experimental psychology.

Mary Calkins,

William MacDougall and James M. Baldwin are representatives of this strain
of functionalism.
common.

At first glance, these thinkers seem to have little in

In fact, each developed a somewhat unique system during their

careers— MacDougall's hormic psychology, Calkins' personalistic psychology

’’Ralph B. Perry, "Docility and Purpose," Psychological Review 25
(1918):1-20; Edwin B. Holt, The Freudian Wish and Its Place in Ethics
(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1915); John Dewey, "The Psychology of
Effort," Philosophical Review 6(1897):43-56.
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and Baldwin's genetic logic.

But looking closer we find that each of

these people took up a theme which James himself championed and each, like
James, sought to do full justice to the complexity of human nature.

For

MacDougall, the themes were teleology and human freedom, as he sought to
show that the foresight of future goals have a causal efficacy in experi
ence.

In the process, he explicitly rejected the mechanistic format of

Holt, Perry and Dewey.

The central feature of Calkins' psychology is "a

mind in process, a someone who is experiencing . . .
spection I find a self."^

in a word in intro

Thus Calkins' personalistic psychology was

founded upon the introspective description of immediate experience and she
continually refused to reduce the self to terms which are not directly
experienced.
James.

Baldwin, as a thinker and a person, was perhaps most like

Tiring early of laboratory work, he took up the task of articulating

a genetic account of the origin of the principles which make human thought
possible.

Within this Kantian program, he developed and elaborated James's

notion of the biological a priori.

Most importantly, however, Baldwin

offered a psychology of the higher mental processes which sought to account
for the values (interests) as well as the knowledge (cognition) of human
experience.^

Baldwin went beyond his mentor in a number of important res

pects, but his life-long concern with the origin and development of the
higher cognitive and aesthetic features of human experience reveals a clear
indebtedness to James's psychology.
With regard to James's formulation of perception, our interpretation
emphasizes his commitment to a perceptual realism and relegates the nativism

^Mary W. Calkins, The History of Psychology in Autobiography. 5 vols.
ed. Carl Murchinson (Worcester, Ma.: Clark University Press, 1930), 1:44.
^Ibid., p. 4; pp. 16-19; p. 21.
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vs. empiricism controversy to a conceptually subordinate position.

Taken

historically, it seems likely that evolutionary theory diffused the latter
issue, so that philosophical empiricists (e.g., Spencer, Huxley, James)
could embrace a nativism based on racial inheritance without necessarily
contradicting themselves.

We have argued that Hodgson’s method of reflec

tion was important 7or James because it served as his methodological basis
for a perceptual realism.

That is, those properties which we later point

to as constituting the reality of objects (e.g., externality, substance,
form) are immediately given in sense experience.

For James, then, the
/

intellect carves out, but does not create, whole objects in external space.
Our interpretation becomes significant when we look to the theoreti
cal issues which dominated the psychology and philosophy of perception at
the beginning of the twentieth century.

What we find is the emergence of

New Realism, a doctrine which was articulated in the works of Holt, Perry,
g

Dewey and Bertrand Russell between 1905 and 1912.

Like James in the

Principles, the New Realists sought to refute the idealism and phenomenal
ism which reigned supreme in late nineteenth century philosophy and psy
chology.

Furthermore, their fundamental contention was that the perceiver

directly apprehends the objective properties of objects.

The psychology

of illusions played an important role in the New Realist program and Holt—
the psychologist in the group— applied a version of James's selection
theory of perception to that problem in the cooperative manifesto of that
school.^
g

John Dewey, "The Realism of Pragmatism," Journal of Philosophy,
Psychology and Scientific Methods 2(1905):324-327; Edwin B. Holt, Walter
J. Marvin, William P. Montague, Ralph B. Perry, Walter B. Pitkin and
Edward G. Spaulding, The New Realism; Cooperative Studies in Philosophy
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1912).
9
Holt et al, New Realism, pp. 303-373.
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Not surprisingly, the more tender-minded interpreters of James refused
to embrace the principles of the tough-minded New Realists.

Calkins, for

example, adopted the position of a thoroughgoing idealist and became an
outspoken and remarkably persistent critic of New Realism.*0
James, is more difficult to classify.

Baldwin, like

In his Thought and Things he devel

oped a theory of reality called pancalism, which sought to integrate the
data of fact (truth) with the data of value (interests).**

From our per

spective, Baldwin's system might be viewed as an elaboration, from the
developmental point of view, of James's pluralistic notion of the sub
universes of reality.

Most importantly, both recognize the psychological

importance of a variety of somewhat different worlds or realities in the
life of the individual.

Moreover, unlike the New Realists, neither thinker

opted for what Morton White has called "scientific imperialism," the
belief that observation and experiment are the only methods of achieving
true knowledge.

In. terms of the integration of realism and idealism,

James, and to a greater extent Baldwin, viewed human development as a
progressive movement from a perceptual realism to a biologically-based

Mary W. Calkins, "The Idealist to the Realist," The Journal of
Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 8(1911):449-458; Idem, "Mr.
Muscio's Criticism of Miss Calkins' Reply to the Realist," The Journal of
Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 9(1912);603-606; Idem,
"Unjustified Claims of Neo-realism," Philosophical Review 22(1913):53-56;
Idem, "Idealist to Realist, Once More: A Reply," Journal of Philosophy,
Psychology and Scientific Methods 11(1914):297-298; Idem, "Bertrand Russell
and Neo-Realism," Philosophical Review 24(1915):533-537.
**James M. Baldwin, Thought and Things: A Study of the Development
arid Meaning of Thought or Genetic Logic, 3 vols. (New York: Macmillan Co.,
1906-1911). Baldwin's integration of fact (truth) and value (interest)
is contained in the third volume of this work, Interest and Art Being Real
Logic. I. Genetic Epistemology. For Baldwin's pancalism see his Genetic
Theory of Reality: Being the Outcome of Genetic Logic as Issuing in the
Aesthetic Theory of Reality Called Pancalism (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
1915).

